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Abstract 
 
Memorialization and the Limits of Reconciliation: Transnational Memory Circuits of 
the Korean War 
 
by 
 
Kristen Frances Sun 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Ethnic Studies 
 
University of California, Berkeley 
 
Professor Elaine H. Kim, Chair 
 
The Korean War, as a “hot war” within the Cold War period with participation by 21 
member nations of the UN and the People’s Republic of China, and also an 
unresolved civil war between South Korea and North Korea, is characterized by still-
present animosities, which play out in contemporary politics in the Asia-Pacific 
region, as well as for the U.S. Furthermore, memoryscapes of the Korean War 
continue to be shaped and reshaped in the present. My dissertation examines built 
spaces and cultural texts of Korean War memorialization, focusing specifically on 
films, museums, and memorials in South Korea and the U.S. in the “post-Cold War” 
conjuncture. It focuses specifically on the theme of reconciliation to ask, how do 
Korean War memorial texts and spaces attempt to reconcile an unfinished Cold War 
conflict in a post-Cold War world? 
 
I trace the theme of reconciliation in multiple ways – first, I utilize the common 
definition of reconciliation as an act of bringing issues to an agreement. For example, 
how do memorial texts and built spaces suture histories and memories into coherent 
or cohering narratives? Furthermore, I examine reconciliation as a specific affective 
theme in South Korean popular and national cultures, particularly through the 
imagined reunification between South Korea and North Korea, and/or separated 
family members stuck on opposite sides of the DMZ border as well as divided 
ideologically. Lastly, I examine reconciliation as a conceptual theme underlying 
memorialization of the Korean War in relation to Cold War memory and history – 
what is the relationship between memorialization and history, particularly as 
memorial and national texts attempt to make sense of Korean War history (as a 
technically unfinished war) with Cold War history (as a “finished” event)? 
 
Memorials and national/popular memory of the Korean War are thus necessarily 
changing or constantly being amended in flux with changing presidential 
administrations as well as in response to veterans or civic groups in both the U.S. and 
South Korea. In studying the memory of war, it is impossible to ignore the ways in 
which memory and memorial discourses travel across geographic space in reference 
to each other, whether intentional or not. Drawing from the rich genealogy of Asian 
American cultural critique, this dissertation argues that critical Asian American 
memorial studies as methodology to study memorialization can bring out 
transnational narratives and allows for the multiple subjectivities of 
	 2	
museum/memorial visitors and film viewers to enable readings beyond existing Cold 
War frameworks and narratives in both South Korea and the U.S. Through conducing 
a transnational study of Korean War memory, this dissertation rethinks the Korean 
War as “forgotten war” or as the benchmark for showcasing South Korean 
developmentalism (“forgotten victory” discourse), but rather the nuances in 
differential layers of forgettings and rememberings that constitute Korean War 
memoryscapes in the “post-Cold War” period. 
	 i	
Dedication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Mom () and Baba () 
 
Thank you for everything 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 ii	
Table of Contents 
 
Dedication          i 
 
Acknowledgements         iii 
 
 
Introduction          vii 
 
 
Chapter One          1 
 “Freedom is not free”: Tracing Transnational Korean War 
 Discourses in the Post-Cold War Conjuncture 
 
Chapter Two          22 
 Korean War Memorialization and Temporality in “Post”-Cold 
 War South Korean Blockbuster Cinema 
 
Chapter Three          40 
 Post-2010s Korean War Cinema: Responsibility, 
 Misrepresentation, and Archival Memory 
 
Chapter Four          60 
 Broadening the Temporal and Spatial Scope of the Korean 
 War: Performing Art and Trauma at the Civilian Control 
 Line (CCL) and Gwangju, South Korea 
 
Chapter Five/Conclusion        74 
 Memorializing the Future: Rethinking Temporality of the 
 Korean War through Reunification Memorials in South Korea 
 
 
Works Cited          86 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 iii	
Acknowledgements 
 
 In thinking through theoretical issues of gift, debt, and freedom within the 
dissertation, I am always reminded of an epigraph that I encountered while reading 
erin Khuê Ninh’s text Ingratitude: The Debt-Bound Daughter in Asian American 
Literature, which has oftentimes stayed within my head as perhaps its own form of 
haunting: 
 
Even 
After 
All this time 
The sun never says to the earth, 
“You owe 
Me.” 
Look 
What Happens 
With a love like that, 
It lights the 
Whole 
Sky. 
Hafez, “Sun Never Says”1 
 
I first encountered this text in a seminar that I took with Professor Elaine Kim on 
Asian American Cultural Studies, and I often refer back to this passage, but it feels 
particularly meaningful now. Throughout the writing process of my dissertation, I 
have struggled but also have been uplifted by the generosity, kindness, collegiality, 
compassion, care, and love of too many people to name here. I would not have been 
able to complete this dissertation without you all. Thank you for everything 
throughout the years. 
 Without a doubt, my dissertation committee – Professor Elaine H. Kim, 
Professor Jinsoo An, and Professor Shari Huhndorf – has been essential in helping me 
not only with the dissertation writing process, but also throughout my graduate school 
career. I entered graduate school specifically wanting to work with Elaine, and I am 
so grateful that she continued to stay on as my dissertation chair after retirement. I 
could not have asked for a more generous mentor. At her retirement party and 
celebration in 2015, a speaker mentioned an “Elaine diaspora” due to the many people 
she has impacted, mentored, and served as a role model to; I count myself so 
extremely fortunate to be part of this “diaspora” as well. When I first moved to 
California from the east coast of the U.S. in 2011 to enter graduate school, I did not 
know anyone and had few connections in the Bay Area. Elaine invited me to join the 
organization AWU (Asian Women United) and through this group, I was able to find 
friendship and community amidst the initial loneliness of moving to a new location. 
This is just one of many actions that I am grateful to Elaine for. Elaine has not only 
supported me academically, but also personally, and it is thanks to her that I can look 
back on my graduate studies and say that I have no regrets. Thank you for pushing me 
to become a better scholar and person, Elaine. 																																																								1	erin	Khuê	Ninh,	Ingratitude:	The	Debt-Bond	Daughter	in	Asian	American	Literature	(New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	2011):	159.	
	 iv	
 Professor Jinsoo An has modeled for me what great mentorship looks like, 
and I feel so fortunate that he joined UC Berkeley shortly after I entered as well. 
Jinsoo’s breadth and depth of knowledge in Korean cinema and Korean Studies has 
been instrumental to my dissertation writing process, and his deep archive of Korean 
films ensured that I was never at a loss for resources. Jinsoo is also deeply caring and 
never fails to check in personally during our meetings as well – I could not have asked 
for a better mentor. I am grateful for Jinsoo’s careful readings that pushed me to 
refine and develop my arguments theoretically and rhetorically. Thank you for giving 
me the courage to continue writing, Jinsoo. 
 Professor Shari Huhndorf has been incredibly supportive throughout my 
graduate school career, and was instrumental in leading me to study museums and 
helping me in crafting my qualifying exam field on Museum Studies and Race. Her 
graduate seminar on Visuality and Race really helped clarify and cement central 
themes that I was interested in within my own research, but did not quite know how to 
articulate. Additionally, when I was feeling discouraged from repeated fellowship 
rejections, Shari awarded me the Dean’s Summer Research Grant, which helped me to 
visit South Korea for the first time and begin preliminary fieldwork. Shari has always 
responded promptly to any queries or issues, and has always been extremely 
supportive and helpful, and a model for service, scholarship, and mentorship to me. I 
could not have asked for a better dissertation committee. 
 I am grateful for the funding that I received throughout the years, which made 
it possible for me to conduct fieldwork, to do research, and to write. At UC Berkeley, 
thank you to the Department of Ethnic Studies, Graduate Division, Center for Race 
and Gender, Center for Korean Studies, Global Urban Humanities Initiative, the 
SSRC (specifically the Mellon Mays Travel and Research Grant), the Hass Junior 
Scholars Fellowship, and the Dissertation Completion Fellowship for funding 
throughout the academic year and summers. Additionally, the FLAS Academic Year 
Fellowship (2013-2014) funded my Korean language studies, and the Fulbright 
Fellowship (2014-2015) funded my year of fieldwork in South Korea. I would not 
have even thought to enter graduate school, let along pursue a PhD, without the first 
research support that I received from the Mellon Mays Undergraduate Fellowship 
program at Northwestern University. 
 I owe many other scholars my gratitude for pushing me to think more 
critically, to write more effectively, and that have provided overall academic and 
other support throughout my graduate school years. Professor Keith Feldman, chair of 
my qualifying exam committee, has been a consistence source of mentorship during 
my coursework years. In the last few years of my program, I have had the amazing 
privilege to work with Professor Harvey Dong – for me, he is a true model of what 
engaged scholarship looks like as well as scholar-activism. I have learned so much 
from serving as his Graduate Student Instructor and Reader in the last few years. 
Thank you Harvey for reminding me of the importance of Asian American Studies 
historically and for new generations – my time at UC Berkeley has truly been 
enriched and made all the better from working together. I took a particularly 
memorable course with Professor Andy Shanken and Professor Lauren Kroiz on “City 
of Memory” that not only introduced me to important theoretical texts in architecture 
and memory, but also that paved the way for presentation and research funding that 
were essential for writing chapters of my dissertation. Professor John Lie and Laura 
Nelson’s seminars in the Center for Korean Studies were instrumental in introducing 
me to the field of Korean Studies and helped me to gain confidence in presenting my 
	 v	
work, as well as introduced me to different scholarly communities and international 
connections. Professor Seung-Eun Chang was my Korean language instructor at UC 
Berkeley, who also provided countless hours of support not only with language 
learning, but also graduate school advice in office hours. Professor Kim Yŏnghun of 
Ewha University was my official sponsor during the Fulbright year in South Korea, 
and I am grateful for his support in helping to situate me in South Korea. Professor 
Kyong-Mi D. Kwon of Ewha University rose above and beyond in her mentorship, 
helping me to secure much-needed office space in the Korean Studies department and 
also inviting me to the working group “Modern Korea’s Sentimentality and Visual 
Melodramatization,” which introduced me to Korean academia and a group of 
brilliant women. There are countless other professors who are not listed here; thank 
you so much for your support and collegiality throughout the years. 
 My life was made so much easier with the help of essential administrative 
staff. Gina Farales Blanco graciously and generously helped me to navigate both 
FLAS and Fulbright awards, and the administrative processes and paperwork in filing 
for in absentia status. Francisca Cázares provided endless emails and in-person visits 
worth of support. Latonya Minor has fielded too many emails, phone calls, and in-
person visits from me, yet always answers my questions and has helped me navigate 
the academic bureaucracy. Dewey St. Germaine has helped make the teaching process 
so much easier, from helping with student enrollment issues to reserving rooms for 
exams, and is always a friendly presence that I look forward to running into whenever 
I am in the department. Jeannie Imazumi is another friendly presence, and has been 
instrumental in helping with all the financial and reimbursement processes that I 
needed to fill out throughout my studies. Stephanie Kim, formerly at the Center for 
Korean Studies, has been the primary source of contact for Korean Studies funding, 
conferences, and seminars, which has invaluably aided my growth as a scholar. I 
cannot thank enough the administrative staff for helping make navigating graduate 
school all the smoother. 
 I could not have made it through the early years of my program without my 
brilliant cohort, the “Coolhort,” Angela Aguilar, Darren Arquero, Olivia Chilcote, 
Adrian Comly, Kira Donnell, Cynthia Ledesma, and Jeffrey Yamashita. In addition, I 
can never forget the support and advice of the cohorts above and below me and the 
advice and friendship that I received just from hanging out in the graduate lounge; 
thank you all. There are too many friends and colleagues to name here, who have read 
drafts, presented together with me at conferences, and provided all matters of support. 
I especially am grateful to the participants of the Center for Korean Studies Graduate 
seminars and the Haas Junior Scholars group – Kira Donnell, Sujin Eom, Grace M. 
Kim, James Lin, Ti Ngo, Gustavo Oliveira, Dongmin Park, and Jeffrey Weng – for 
reading early drafts of my dissertation and pushing me to become a better scholar. My 
Fulbright fellows cohort provided friendship and support while abroad. I am 
especially grateful also for the faculty and fellow workshop participants at the 
Graduate Student Conference hosted by Critical Asian Humanities at Duke University 
April 2016, who have modeled for me exemplary scholarship and hospitality. Friends 
and colleagues in Taiwan, particularly from the UC Berkeley 2016 Winter Institute 
and the 2017 TEEP-UST Winter Camp Workshop held at National Chiao-Tung 
University in Hsinchu, have ensured that I have a home away from home whenever I 
visit Taiwan. Minsu Kim was a major part of my life in the Bay Area and South 
Korea and I remain grateful to him and his family for security and support. The 
members of AWU have provided consistent warmth and friendship since I moved to 
	 vi	
California, and I am forever humbled to be part of this brilliant intergenerational 
group, especially Christine Chai, Eliza Chan, Karon Chow, Annie Kim Noguchi, 
Elaine Kim, Eunice Kwon (who also graciously turned in my filing documents for 
me), Hannah Michell, Evelyn Rodriguez, Vivian Thorp, Casey Tran, and Cecilia 
Tran. In South Korea, I am also especially grateful to Chan Yong Bu, Hwiyul Kim, 
and Dongmin Park for sustained friendships and many good meals together. I also 
could not have made it through the program without my dearest friends, Grace Kim 
and Phuongmai Truong – our writing dates, meals out together, and joint language-
learning and food blogging adventures in the case of Mai have sustained me during 
some of the most difficult times of my life. No matter the distance, I am grateful for 
the friendship and love. Thank you also to my Twitch friends for your support, love, 
and friendship. 
 Thank you to James and Lin Kuik (and Ziggy), who have provided me with a 
beautiful home, delicious meals, and a safe space to finish writing while I am in the 
UK. It has meant so much for me to feel like I am home while abroad. I am so 
grateful for my family who has patiently waited for me to finish writing the 
dissertation. My mom and dad, and the rest of my family, have unconditionally 
supported me. So much love to everyone – Pwo Pwo, Papa, Auntie Betty, Auntie 
Cecilia, Uncle Jim, Uncle Sam, Katie, Stephen, Mimi, and Lola. Lastly, thank you to 
Jonny Kuik for the love and support, including attempting to read my dissertation. I 
first found your piano streams while writing my dissertation, and I am glad that I have 
finally finished with your love, support, and companionship. Sometimes love compels 
us to cross oceans. 
 Thank you to everyone throughout my journey for showing me love that lights 
up the whole sky. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 vii	
Introduction 
 
Memorialization and the Limits of Reconciliation: Transnational Memory 
Circuits of the Korean War 
 
 The Korean War, 2  as a “hot war” within the Cold War period with 
participation by 21 member nations of the UN and the People’s Republic of China, 
and also as an unresolved civil war between South Korea and North Korea,3 is 
characterized by still-present animosities, which play out in contemporary politics in 
the Asia-Pacific region and for the U.S.4 Furthermore, memoryscapes of the Korean 																																																								2	Histories	of	the	Korean	War	in	both	South	Korea	and	the	U.S.	(including	at	national	memorial	sites	in	both	countries)	point	to	the	temporal	bracketing	of	the	Korean	War	as	falling	between	the	dates	of	June	25th,	1950	–	July	27th,	1953,	beginning	from	North	Korean	crossing	of	the	38th	Parallel	and	ending	with	the	signing	of	an	Armistice	Agreement	calling	for	truth	and	ceasefire,	and	not	an	official	peace	treaty.	The	text	of	the	Armistice	Agreement	can	be	found	here:	https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=85.	I	intentionally	do	not	provide	dates	for	the	Korean	War	in	this	opening	because	I	want	to	call	into	question	the	officially	accepted	temporal	boundaries	of	the	war.	3	Scholars,	most	notably	Bruce	Cumings,	have	complicated	the	June	25th,	1950	(6.25/yugio)	beginning	point	of	the	Korean	War	by	pointing	to	multiple	other	flashpoints	and	battles	since	the	end	of	WWII	and	the	struggle	for	legitimacy	that	characterizes	the	Korean	War	as	both	cold	war	conflict	and	civil	war	conflict.	See	especially	Bruce	Cumings,	The	Origins	of	the	Korean	War,	Volume	1:	Liberation	and	the	
Emergence	of	Separate	Regimes,	1945-1947	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1981)	and	Bruce	Cumings,	The	Origins	of	the	Korean	War,	Volume	II:	The	Roaring	of	the	
Cataract,	1947-1950	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1992).	Other	scholarship	has	also	pointed	out	that	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	has	never	truly	come	to	the	Korean	peninsula,	and	to	the	importance	of	social	history	in	telling	the	story	of	Cold	War	beyond	the	lens	of	ideological	confrontations	between	superpower	nations,	which	effaces	the	roles	of	ordinary	people.	See	especially	Heonik	Kwon,	The	Other	Cold	War	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2010)	and	Masuda	Hajimu,	Cold	War	Crucible:	The	Korean	
Conflict	and	the	Postwar	World	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	2015). 4	Korean	American	scholarship	on	the	Korean	War	within	Asian	American	studies	has	also	contributed	to	understandings	of	how	the	Korean	War	has	led	to	enduring	institutions,	memories,	and	legacies	of	U.S.	militarism	beyond	external	historical,	temporal,	and	geographic	markers.	See	Grace	M.	Cho,	Haunting	the	Korean	Diaspora:	
Shame,	Secrecy,	and	the	Forgotten	War	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2008);	Christine	Hong,	“The	Unending	Korean	War,”	positions:	east	asia	cultures	critique	23.4	(Fall	2015):	597-617;	Jodi	Kim,	Ends	of	Empire:	Asian	American	Critique	and	the	
Cold	War	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2010);	Ji-Yeon	Yuh,	“Moved	by	War:	Migration,	Diaspora,	and	the	Korean	War,”	Journal	of	Asian	American	Studies	8.3	(October	2005):	277-292.	Scholarship	in	South	Korea	has	also	pointed	to	the	ways	in	which	U.S.	militarism	and	South	Korean	politics,	particularly	in	regards	to	civilian	massacres,	have	worked	in	concert	with	one	another,	having	effects	on	not	only	the	memory	but	also	the	historiography	of	the	Korean	War.	See	especially	the	work	of	Kim	Dong-Choon:	“Beneath	the	Tip	of	the	Iceberg:	Problems	in	Historical	Clarification	of	the	Korean	War,”	Korea	Journal	42.3	(September	2002):	60-86;	The	Unending	Korean	War:	A	
Social	History,	translated	by	Sung-ok	Kim	(Honolulu:	Tamal	Vista	Publications,	2009);	“The	Truth	and	Reconciliation	Commission	of	Korea:	Uncovering	the	Hidden	Korean	War,”	The	Asia-Pacific	Journal:	Japan	Focus	8,	issue	9,	no.	5	(March	2010):	1-15;	“The	
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War continue to be shaped and reshaped in the present. This dissertation examines 
built spaces and cultural texts of Korean War memorialization, focusing specifically 
on films, museums, and memorials in South Korea and the U.S. in the “post-Cold 
War.” It highlights the theme of reconciliation to explore how Korean War memorial 
texts and spaces attempt to reconcile an unfinished Cold War conflict in a post-Cold 
War world. 
 I trace the theme of reconciliation in multiple ways – first, I utilize the 
common definition of reconciliation as an act of bringing issues to an agreement. For 
example, how do memorial texts and built spaces suture histories and memories into 
coherent narratives? Then I examine reconciliation as a specific affective theme in 
South Korean popular and national cultures, particularly through the imagined 
reunification between South Korea and North Korea, and/or family members on 
opposite sides of the DMZ border who are physically and ideologically separated. 
Lastly, I examine reconciliation as a conceptual theme underlying South Korean and 
U.S. memorialization of the Korean War in relation to Cold War memory and history. 
What is the relationship between memorialization and history, particularly as 
memorial and national texts attempt to make sense of Korean War history (as a 
technically unfinished war) in the context of Cold War history (as a “finished” event)? 
 National and popular memory of the Korean War are constantly being 
amended, with changing U.S. and South Korean presidential administrations, as well 
as in response to veterans or civic groups in both nations. Building on anthropologist 
Christina Schwenkel’s theory of “recombinant history,” I also trace how “memory is 
shown to be an active, constitutive force.”5 In studying the memory of war, it is 
impossible to ignore the ways in which memory and memorial discourses travel 
across geographic space in reference to each other, whether intentionally or not. 
 This dissertation examines how various modes of reconciliation within Korean 
War memoryscapes become entangled with one another, pointing to spaces of rupture 
and alternative critical readings of Korean War memorialization beyond dichotomies 
of remembering and forgetting. Drawing from the rich genealogy of Asian American 
cultural critique, this dissertation argues that critical Asian American memorial 
studies can be used as methodology to study memorialization in a way that can bring 
out transnational narratives and allow for the multiple subjectivities of 
museum/memorial visitors and film viewers to disrupt and enable readings beyond 
existing Cold War frameworks and narratives in both South Korea and the U.S. 
Through conducting a transnational study of Korean War memory, this dissertation 
rethinks the Korean War as “forgotten war” in U.S. contexts, or as the benchmark for 
showcasing how far South Korean developmentalism has come in the South Korean 
context (“forgotten victory”), but rather the nuances of differential layers of 
forgettings and rememberings that constitute Korean War memoryscapes in the “post-
Cold War” period. 
 
 
 																																																																																																																																																														social	grounds	of	anticommunism	in	South	Korea	–	crisis	of	the	ruling	class	and	anticommunist	reaction,”	Asian	Journal	of	German	and	European	Studies	2.7	(2017):	1-25.	5	Christina	Schwenkel,	The	American	War	in	Contemporary	Vietnam:	Transnational	
Remembrance	and	Representation	(Bloomington:	Indiana	University	Press,	2009):	10.	
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Critical Asian American Memorial Studies 
 
 In my approach to Korean War memorialization, I point to the importance of 
Asian American subjectivity and subject formations, which open up possibilities for 
alternative readings and imagining of U.S. empire and cold war knowledge 
formations, particularly through cultural critique and cultural productions.6 Asian 
American cultural critique, rather than solely enacting arguments about U.S. 
militarism and imperialism based on foreclosure, illuminates how the new subject 
formations that emerge from this critique can have life of their own as well.7 
 For example, Jodi Kim labels Asian American cultural texts as enacting a 
“politics of refusal,” a concept that she borrows from Native American studies scholar 
Audra Simpson. 8  The “politics of refusal” not only is a refusal of traditional 
knowledge production in which knowledge about specific populations are made 
legible for others, but also a refusal of Cold War Manichean boundaries: 
 
Rather than claiming that Asian American cultural texts express a positivistic 
will to knowledge and countermemory, a wholesale rendering visible of that 
which official nationalist culture and history render invisible, I want to suggest 
that it complexly grapples with an impossibility and at times a certain 
refusal….Yet this politics of refusal is not the space of complete silence, 
meaninglessness, or illegibility….Asian American critique as an unsettling 
hermeneutic or analytic for interpreting Asian American cultural forms and the 
Cold War as a multivalenced object of analysis reads such refusals as generative 
moments.9 
 
I extend Asian American cultural critique and readings of the subject formations of 
U.S. empire as a potential method for “de-imperializing.” 10  I approach Asian 
American cultural studies as not only a body of work,11 but also as methodology. 																																																								6	See	especially	Kuan-Hsing	Chen,	Asia	as	Method:	Toward	Deimperialization	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2010);	Jodi	Kim,	Ends	of	Empire:	Asian	American	Critique	and	the	
Cold	War	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2010);	Lisa	Lowe,	Immigrant	
Acts:	On	Asian	American	Cultural	Politics	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2006).	7	Victor	Bascara,	Model-Minority	Imperialism	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2006);	Vernadette	Vicuña	Gonzalez,	Securing	Paradise:	Tourism	and	Militarism	in	
Hawai’i	and	the	Philippines	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2013);	Jodi	Kim,	“Settler	Modernity,	Debt	Imperialism,	and	the	Necropolitics	of	the	Promise,”	Social	Text	36.2	(2018):	41-61;	Mimi	Thi	Nguyen,	The	Gift	of	Freedom:	War,	Debt,	and	Other	Refugee	
Passages	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2012). 8	For	more	on	the	“politics	of	refusal,”	particularly	in	the	context	of	ethnography	and	Native	Studies,	see	Audra	Simpson,	Mohawk	Interruptus:	Political	Life	Across	the	Borders	
of	Settler	States	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2014).	9	Jodi	Kim,	Ends	of	Empire:	Asian	American	Critique	and	the	Cold	War	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2010):	6-7.	10	Kuan-Hsing	Chen,	Asia	as	Method:	Toward	Deimperialization	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2010).	11	Victor	Bascara,	Model-Minority	Imperialism	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2006);	Mark	Chiang,	The	Cultural	Capital	of	Asian	American	Studies:	Autonomy	and	
Representation	in	the	University	(New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	2009);	Kandice	Chuh,	Imagine	Otherwise:	On	Asian	Americanist	Critique	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	
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While the texts that I study – films, museums, and memorials – can be read as reified 
sites for nationalism, conservatism, and universalism, analyzing these texts from the 
vantage point of Asian American cultural critique can call into question memorial 
form and memorialization techniques in the post-Cold War period, particularly in 
addressing how memorial texts reconcile an unfinished war in a so-called “post”-Cold 
War period. 
 Critical Asian American memorial studies can also be put into conversation 
with texts on the enduring legacies of the Cold War. Chen Kuan-Hsing’s book is 
particularly useful for giving space to subjectivity as a starting point, a 
methodological approach, and an intervention in thinking about “inter-referencing” 
conditions in Cold War/“post”-Cold War (East) Asian contexts. Chen writes: 
 
The effects of the cold war have become embedded in local history, and simply 
pronouncing the war to be over will not cause them to dissolve. The complex 
effects of the war, mediated through our bodies, have been inscribed into our 
national, family, and personal histories. In short, the cold war is still alive within 
us.12 
 
Chen’s assertion of the cold war subjectivities that is material in form, as well as 
affective, can also be read alongside Heonik Kwon’s assertion that geographical 
spaces of local specificity reflect the different “decomposing” temporalities of the 
Cold War. Furthermore, this assertion of the materiality of the Cold War that lives on 
in the body and that is “still alive within us” connects to Jodi Kim’s discussion of the 
“double injunction” for Korean Americans in regards to memory of the Korean War, 
which is “to forget (as assimilated Americans) and to remember (as gendered racial 
Korean immigrants and postimperial ‘exiles.’”13 The dialectics of remembering (as 
“immigrants”) and forgetting (as “Americans”) constitutes a central problematic for 
American cultural productions and politics more broadly in the “post”-Cold War 
period. 
 As Elaine H. Kim writes, 
 
What most Americans know about Korea has been told from the point of view 
of a U.S. military member or a missionary, about prostitutes, beggars, and 
orphans, many of them mixed race children, never speaking but always spoken 
for and about, souls being saved by the civilizing missions of neocolonialism 
and evangelism. No doubt they would have found it difficult to imagine that one 																																																																																																																																																														2003);	Allan	Punzalan	Isaac,	American	Tropics:	Articulating	Filipino	America	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2006);	Laura	Kang,	Compositional	Subjects:	
Enfiguring	Asian/American	Women	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2002);	Elaine	H.	Kim,	Asian	American	Literature:	An	Introduction	to	the	Writings	and	their	Social	Context	(Philadelphia:	Temple	University	Press,	1982);	Lisa	Lowe,	Immigrant	Acts:	On	Asian	
American	Cultural	Politics	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2006);	Ji-Yeon	Yuh,	“Moved	by	War:	Migration,	Diaspora,	and	the	Korean	War,”	Journal	of	Asian	American	Studies	8.3	(October	2005):	277-292.	12	Kuan-Hsing	Chen,	Asia	as	Method:	Toward	Deimperialization	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2010):	118.	13	Jodi	Kim,	Ends	of	Empire:	Asian	American	Critique	and	the	Cold	War	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2010):	146.	This	is	also	an	argument	made	by	Lisa	Lowe	in	Immigrant	Acts,	of	the	vexed	position	of	Asian	Americans	in	the	U.S.	
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day the voice of the native, having returned to the imperial center, might 
speak back – in English – from its very different positionality.14 
 
This text is an example of how Asian American studies and Asian American cultural 
productions can rethink Cold War binaries and non/alignments. Korean Americans, 
and by extension Asian Americans who have also been affected by cold war/hot war 
migrations, exile, forced displacement or adoption, and refugeehood (what Ji-Yeon 
Yuh refers to as “refuge migrations”15), are not just objects for study, as is often the 
case for fields that emerge from Cold War national security concerns such as area 
studies, but also have subjectivities and positionalities that can “speak back” (or even 
speak for empire, as Mimi Thi Nguyen writes about the “refugee patriot”16). Thus, 
critical Asian American memorial studies is the foundation, methodology, and 
groundwork for analyzing the transnational memory texts examined in this project. 
 
Global/Transnational War Memory Studies 
 
 While engaging with the field of memory studies, and specifically 
transnational war memory studies, I understand that memory is not a static force, and 
even though memory is often associated with particular and fixed spaces and places, 
the formations, experiences, and consumption of war memory are necessarily 
transnational. As Christina Schwenkel writes, “Memory is shown to be an active 
constitutive force; it moves, mobilizes, produces, and transforms, rather than simply 
dwell and exist.”17 Furthermore, while I engage with several key concepts and terms 
in memory studies, I also want to emphasize some of my departures from these key 
theories. Particularly, I focus on three concepts: history and memory, collective 
memory, and cosmopolitan memory/cosmopolitan commemoration. 
 Memory studies scholars, drawing from Pierre Nora’s influential work 
“Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,”18 point to the oppositional 
characteristics between memory and history. History is portrayed as being “truth” or 
“official,” whereas memories – deemed less trustworthy – are more fluid and give 
shape to human experience in a way that archives and histories cannot necessarily do. 
However, I have found that in my own research on the Korean War, there does not 
seem to be an agreed-upon history. For example, the causes of the Korean War have 
been continuously debated by historians – was the official starting point of the Korean 
War a surprise attack by North Koreans? Archival documents indicate that this was 
the case; however, scholars like Bruce Cumings have questioned the temporality of 																																																								14	Elaine	H.	Kim,	“Myth,	Memory,	and	Desire:	Homeland	and	History	in	Contemporary	Korean	American	Writing	and	Visual	Art,”	in	Holding	Their	Own:	Perspectives	on	the	
Multi-Ethnic	Literatures	of	the	United	States,	eds.,	Dorothea	Fischer-Hornung	and	Heike	Raphael-Hernandez	(Tubingen,	Germany:	Stauffenberg-Verlag,	2000).	15	Ji-Yeon	Yuh,	“Moved	by	War:	Migration,	Diaspora,	and	the	Korean	War,”	Journal	of	
Asian	American	Studies	8.3	(October	2005):	277-292.	16	Mimi	Thi	Nguyen,	The	Gift	of	Freedom:	War,	Debt,	and	Other	Refugee	Passages	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2012),	especially	Chapter	3	“Race	Wars,	Patriot	Acts.”	17	Christina	Schwenkel,	The	American	War	in	Contemporary	Vietnam:	Transnational	
Remembrance	and	Representation	(Bloomington:	Indiana	University	Press,	2009):	10.	18	Pierre	Nora,	“Between	Memory	and	History:	Les	Lieux	de	Mémoire,”	Representations	No.	26,	Special	Issue:	Memory	and	Counter-Memory	(Spring	1989):	7-24.	
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the Korean War by analyzing flashpoints before June 25th, 1950.19 Additionally, 
events like the Jeju Massacre or Uprising, which took place in 1948, could be seen as 
part of the Korean War conflict. Furthermore, there are few existing documents 
relating to civilian massacres during the war, whether perpetrated by North Koreans, 
South Koreans, or the U.S. and UN militaries. Basic historical information, such as 
timelines or death tolls, varies widely depending on the sources.20 
 In the case of civilian massacres, while evidence exists of U.S. massacres of 
Korean civilians, the U.S. has never admitted that specific massacres took place. As 
Seunghei Clara Hong observes, “By affirming participation but gainsaying direct 
involvement, the investigated turned the massacre at Nogunri into an incredible, 
ghostly event in which ‘people died, but no one [was] killed.’”21 Furthermore, the 
ongoing “history wars” relating to WWII 22 and the Asia-Pacific Wars, 23 which 
continue to cause disputes among China, South Korea, Japan, etc. demonstrates that 
history itself is contested just as fiercely as memory in Cold War and post-Cold War 
periods. Likewise, my experience of research in South Korea, especially in museums 
and memorials that do not champion or match the central narratives of Korean War 
discourse such as the Nogunri Peace Park and the Jeju 4.3 Peace Park, has shown that 
Korean War history and memory have been hotly debated as well. While the history 
and memory debates within the field are productive, most of them are Eurocentric and 
do not necessarily take into account contexts elsewhere in the world in which so-
called “official” histories can be denied or contested just as fiercely as survivors’ 
memories, particularly in the context of enduring legacies of colonialism, continuing 
affects of militarism, and ongoing Cold War politics of legitimacy. Therefore, while 
acknowledging history/memory debates for memory studies as a field, I am attentive 
to the ways in which the slippages between history and memory are often greater than 
their boundaries. 
 “Collective memory” is perhaps one of the most important keywords in 
memory studies,24 but I avoid using the term and instead use “national memory” and 
“popular cultural memory” to indicate that I am writing about national memorials, 
museums, and films. While I think that “collective memory” does exist in some form, 
it seems as if it is often interchangeably used with national memory without 																																																								19	Bruce	Cumings,	The	Origins	of	the	Korean	War,	Volume	I:	Liberation	and	the	Emergence	
of	Separate	Regimes,	1945-1947	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1981)	and	The	
Origins	of	the	Korean	War,	Volume	II:	The	Roaring	of	the	Cataract,	1947-1950	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1992).	20	This	can	also	be	reflected	in	the	naming	of	the	Korean	War	as	well	–	the	Korean	War	(han’gukchŏnjaeng)	in	the	U.S.	and	South	Korea,	yukio	or	6.25	for	the	day	the	war	began	in	South	Korea,	Fatherland	Liberation	War	(choguk’aebangjŏnjaeng)	in	North	Korea,	and	the	War	to	Resist	America	and	Aid	Korea	in	China. 21	Seunghei	Clara	Hong,	“Silenced	in	Memoriam:	Consuming	Memory	at	the	Nogunri	Peace	Park,”	Cross-Currents:	East	Asian	History	and	Culture	Review	4.1	(May	2015):	136.	22	See	Sheila	Miyoshi	Jager	and	Rana	Mitter,	eds.,	Ruptured	Histories:	War,	Memory,	and	
the	Post-Cold	War	in	Asia	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	2007)	and	Michael	Lewis,	ed.,	‘History	Wars’	and	Reconciliation	in	Japan	and	Korea:	The	Role	of	Historians,	
Artists	and	Activists	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2017).	23	T.	Fujitani,	Geoffrey	M.	White,	and	Lisa	Yoneyama,	eds.,	Perilous	Memories:	The	Asia-
Pacific	War(s)	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2001).	24	Jeffrey	K.	Olick,	Vered	Vinitzky-Seroussi,	and	Daniel	Levy,	eds.,	The	Collective	Memory	
Reader	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011).	
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problematizing nationalism or taking into account transnational and transpacific 
memory connections. 25  The problem with using “collective memory” is that it 
assumes a homogenous group of people with similar or cohering memories. As Asian 
Americanists Lisa Lowe and Jodi Kim contend, Asian American memory is unique 
from, and even counter to U.S. dominant national memories or narratives. Even 
within Asian American communities, memory differs and the collectivity of that 
memory is influenced by Cold War politics. The “collective” of “collective memory” 
must be problematized to be useful, although it helps in understanding nationalism in 
relation to memorials and museums. 
 Lastly, cosmopolitan memories or cosmopolitan commemoration flattens 
“locally specific” experiences. In the case of the Korean War memorials and 
museums, tropes such as gratitude (and its implied debt) for the “gift of freedom” 
emerge. Nationalist spaces such as the War Memorial of Korea and what started as 
more local but became national spaces such as the Nogunri Peace Park reflect a 
“conservative” ethos: one upholds Korean ethnonationalism and one universalizes a 
human rights discourse that obscures why the Korean War or the Nogunri Massacre 
happened in the first place. Jinsoo An also points out how South Korean films about 
the Korean War, whether anti-communist or anti-war, also reflect a conservative 
perspective through “highlighting humanistic values” and the same “framework of 
liberal humanism that anticommunist war films have developed as an ideological foil 
to the ostensible depravity and monstrousness of North Korea.”26 This dissertation 
problematizes memorialization of the Korean War beyond the nationalist and 
universalist claims that are made in museums, memorials, and films. 
 Furthermore, the shift in memory studies discourse from collective memory to 
cosmopolitan memory can be seen in Holocaust studies scholarship,27 as well as 
writings on the commemoration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombing victims. Like 
An’s critique of Korean War films that are both nationalist and anti-war, Hiro Saito 
articulates a critique of Holocaust commemoration and memory as cosmopolitan: 
 
Paradoxically, then, the cosmopolitan commemoration of the Holocaust 
reproduces the “either/or logic” of nationalism because it dehumanizes foreign 
perpetrators as enemies, even though they, too, are humans who may very well 
be victimized by those who claim to be absolute liberators coming to the rescue 
of absolute victims.28 
 
The problem that arises from these critiques, however, is that it becomes quite 
difficult to envision alternate imaginings of commemoration. While the concept of 																																																								25	Paul	Connerton,	How	Modernity	Forgets	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2009);	Paul	Connerton,	How	Societies	Remember	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1989);	Jeffrey	K.	Olick,	“Introduction:	Memory	and	the	Nation:	Continuities,	Conflicts,	and	Transformations,”	Social	Science	History	22.4,	Special	Issue:	Memory	and	the	Nation	(Winter	1998):	377-387.	26	Jinsoo	An,	“War	as	Business	in	South	Korea’s	Manchurian	Action	Films,”	positions	23.4	(2015):	792.	27	Daniel	Levy	and	Nathan	Sznaider,	“Memory	Unbound:	The	Holocaust	and	the	Formation	of	Cosmopolitan	Memory,”	European	Journal	of	Social	Theory	5.1	(2002):	87-106.	28	Hiro	Saito,	“‘The	A-bomb	victims’	pleas	for	cosmopolitan	commemoration:	Toward	reconciliation	and	world	peace,”	Thesis	Eleven	129.1	(2015):	75.	
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“absolute liberators” or “absolute victims” should be critiqued, the issue of 
“absolute perpetrator” should not be left out of the equation as well.29 In the case of 
the Korean War, for example, to recognize the U.S. as perpetrator (in 
contradistinction to the U.S. as “absolute savior”) is crucially important in challenging 
the dominant narratives of the Korean War. If neither nationalist narratives nor 
universal/cosmopolitan narratives are ideal, then how to proceed with theorizing 
memorialization? Moreover, to think through reconciliation, at what point does 
reconciliation become synonymous with forgetting as in “to forgive and forget”? And 
how to think of “cosmopolitan commemoration” and reconciliation alongside issues 
of power? 
 
Rethinking Korean War Memorialization through Cinematic and Memorial 
Converges 
 
 The chapters that follow address reconciliation specifically in relation to the 
Korean War as one of the problematics in memorializations of the war, which has 
been referred to as the “Forgotten War” in U.S. contexts. Much new scholarship about 
the Korean War attempts to prove why it is not forgotten.30 Yet, while the Korean 
War in the South Korean context is not a forgotten war, it is still written into U.S. and 
ROK narratives of progress and developmentalism (the Korean War for example as 
the rock bottom or starting point that made the “Miracle on the Han River” so much 
more impressive), especially in museum contexts. One of the biggest problems with 
thinking about reconciliation and memorialization is that there is a slight slippage: the 
Korean War is an unfinished war within a “post”-Cold War world that makes its 
contemporary memorialization more unique. In particular, convergences between 
memorials and films point to new readings for memorialization in the contemporary 
period. I utilize the example of 2004 South Korean blockbuster film Taegukgi: The 
Brotherhood of War and the War Memorial of Korea to demonstrate how politics of 
memorialization are intricately tied together in the mediums of films, memorials, and 
museums, a thread that runs throughout the dissertation. 
 A commander in the South Korean film Taegukgi: The Brotherhood of War 
(Kang Je-gyu, 2004), one of the most popular Korean War blockbusters for South 
Korean and international audiences, states to the main protagonist, Lee Jin-t’ae 
(played by Jang Dong-gun) that “you have to give to your country before asking for 
something.” Throughout the film, Jin-t’ae tries to find ways to protect his sickly 
younger brother, Lee Jin-sŏk, from participating in the horrors of war. With the 
“advice” of the commander, he attempts to earn a medal of honor in exchange for his 
brother’s military service, to the point where he increasingly takes part in more and 
more suicidal missions. 
 On a similar vein, the introductory plaque at the War Memorial of Korea in 
Yongsan, Seoul, states in English the phrase “Freedom is not free,” and in Korean 																																																								29	For	critique	along	these	lines	in	the	context	of	WWII	and	the	Cold	War	see	Lisa	Yoneyama,	Cold	War	Ruins:	Transpacific	Critique	of	American	Justice	and	Japanese	War	
Crimes	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2016).	30	For	some	examples	see	Suhi	Choi,	Embattled	Memories:	Contested	Meanings	in	Korean	
War	Memorials	(Reno:	University	of	Nevada	Press,	2014)	and	Levi	Fox,	Not	Forgotten:	
The	Korean	War	in	American	Public	Memory,	1950-2017	(PhD	diss.:	Temple	University,	2018).	
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“freedom is not given freely,”31 which will be discussed in greater detail in the first 
chapter. The appearance of an unfree freedom, or freedom with strings attached, in 
both the contexts of the War Memorial of Korea and Taegukgi: The Brotherhood of 
War shows the similarities in how the Korean War is memorialized in both texts. 
Specifically, an analysis of Taegukgi illustrates the interconnections between physical 
memorial spaces and film texts as memorials. 
 Taegukgi: The Brotherhood of War begins in the present-day with the Korean 
War Excavation Task Unit carefully excavating bodies from a battlefield. The film 
literally begins from the perspective of the dead – the first shot of the film is that of 
darkness and the darkness/dirt is brushed away by members of the excavation task 
unit. The next shot then reveals them uncovering bodies, objects, and weapons. For 
the first few seconds of the film, the viewers take the place of the dead and as they are 
unveiled, the viewers are also entering into the story of the film and thus, undergo a 
re-discovery/recovery/re-memory of the Korean War. 
 After beginning from the first-person perspective of the skeletons, the scene 
then moves to the excavation task unit as they carefully brush the dirt off the bones 
and place the bones and objects (guns, canteens, helmets, etc.) into different cased 
based on the category of item. The remains are then placed into caskets draped with 
the t’aegukki – the South Korean national flag – and the excavation task units salute 
the caskets under a banner labeled “Memorial Site for souls of the Korean War.” 
Setting itself apart from other earlier popular South Korean films about the Korean 
War, Taegukgi presents the Korean War as flashback, as the film opens with the 
present day and specifically, with a commemoration ceremony. 
 The beginning of Taegukgi parallels the introductory video that introduces the 
first Korean War room at the War Memorial of Korea. This opening film, a common 
introductory exhibit in museums to establish historical context and overarching 
narratives, introduces an overview of the Korean War and ends with a 3D rendering 
of the UN Memorial Cemetery in Busan and 3D rain that splashes over the graves. 
This scene then cuts to archival footage of Korean War Excavation Task Units, 
recovering bodies and objects, similar to the opening of Taegukgi. The archival 
footage, including images of forests, bones, and excavators digging, is then overlaid 
with varying t’aegukki patterns. These patterns then reveal the t’aegukki-draped 
boxes containing the remains carried by excavators and saluted by fellow solders. The 
screen fades and the phrase “Freedom is not free” and its Korean translation appear on 
the screen.32 After the video is over, the flooring lights up, revealing an open-view 
floor that is a replica of the excavation site, replete with bones and miscellaneous 
materials. 
 This floor is not just any random excavation site, but rather a specific site on 
Baekseok Mountain. The title of this exhibition is “Reunion of the Fallen Brothers 
after 60 Years.” The following description reads: 
 
In late October 2010, the Remains Recovery Team of the ROK MND excavated 
the remains and identification tag of a dead soldier on Baekseok Mountain. 
According to a DNA test, the remains turned out to be those of Sergeant First 
Class Lee, Cheon Woo of the 3rd Btn., 3rd Regt. of the ROK 7th Div. 
																																																								31	“Chayunŭn	kŏjŏ	chuŏjinŭn	kŏshi	anida.”	32	“Chayunŭn	kŏjŏ	chuŏjiji	annŭnda.”	
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  Sergeant Lee volunteered to join the Army in Sept 1950, following 
his older brother who joined the army one month earlier. Sergeant Lee 
participated in the Seoul Recovery Operation and the northward advancement 
and was killed on the battlefield on 25 Sept. 1951 at the age of 20. 
  His older brother, Staff Sergeant Lee, Man Woo who had been killed at 
the Bongilcheon battle in May 1951 and buried at Seoul National Cemetery. 
The remains of Sergeant Lee, Cheon Woo were buried next to his brother’s in 
June 2011. The two brothers were reunited after 60 years. 
 
The video introducing the Korean War to museum visitors ends both with the 
recovery of soldiers’ remains and a replica of a specific site in which the remains of a 
soldier were found. Additionally, the motif of brothers reunited in death echoes 
Taegukgi, although there the younger brother ultimately outlives his older brother and 
is reunited only with bones and material remains at the end. 
 In Taegukgi, the older brother defects to the North Korean side as he believes 
his brother has already perished in a deadly fire. Furthermore, his fiancé is executed 
by South Korean soldiers in an anti-communist roundup, a scene that sheds some 
complexity and moral ambiguity to South Korean soldiers during the Korean War. 
Nevertheless, when he encounters his younger brother again on the battlefield, this 
time on opposing sides, he ends up sacrificing his life and turning against the North 
Koreans to protect his younger brother’s retreat. At the end of the film, Lee Jin-t’ae’s 
(the older brother) dead body on the battlefield dissolves into his skeletal remains in 
the same position in the present-day, and younger brother Lee Jin-sŏk is left with the 
reality that he will never be reunited with his brother in life. He can only embrace the 
bones of his dead brother. Both museum and film texts begin their entry into the 
Korean War through the recovery of dead bodies and reunion of missing family 
members, specifically brothers. The ending phrase of the museum video, “Freedom is 
not free,” reflects onto the glass floor, emphasizing the sacrifices and costs of war, as 
well as echoing the commander from Taegukgi. 
 The theme of brotherhood shows up in another prominent example at the War 
Memorial of Korea: the Statue of Brothers. The 11-meter tall Statue of Brothers 
depicts two soldiers embracing one another. One soldier is noticeably larger than his 
younger brother, with both standing upon a dome-shaped exhibition space33 with a 
crack running through it into which visitors can enter. Depending on where the visitor 
enters the War Memorial of Korea complex, the Statue of Brothers can be one of the 
first or last stopping points in a visit. 
 The statue is emblematic of the theme of division and reconciliation, which is 
often represented symbolically through brothers separated and coming back together. 
The exhibit plaque for the Statue of Brothers reads: 
 
The Statue of Brothers is an 18 meter wide and 11-meter high symbol of the 
Korean War. It consists of the upper part, lower part and inner part. The upper 																																																								33	Sheila	Miyoshi	Jager	points	out	that	the	tomb	is	in	the	shape	of	a	Silla-era	burial	mound,	which	is	confirmed	by	the	artist	Choi	Young-jeep:	“‘My	idea	of	using	a	(Silla)	tomb	as	a	pedestal	was	not	intended	to	evoke	the	idea	of	death.	On	the	contrary,	it	was	intended	to	evoke	ideas	of	hope	and	rebirth,	the	cycles	of	history,	so	to	speak.	The	two	brothers	are	reborn	out	of	the	womb	and	of	the	past	to	be	one	again	in	the	future.’”	Sheila	Miyoshi	Jager,	“Monumental	Histories:	Manliness,	the	Military,	and	the	War	Memorial,”	Public	Culture	14.2	(2002):	407.	
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part of the statue depicts a scene where a family’s older brother, an ROK 
officer, and his younger brother, a North Korean soldier, meet in a battlefield 
and express reconciliation, love, and forgiveness. The lower tomb-shaped dome 
was built with pieces of granite collected from nationwide locations 
symbolizing the sacrifices made by our patriots. The crack in the dome stands 
for the division of Korea and the hope for reunification. Objects inside the dome 
include a mosaic wall painting that expresses the spirit of the Korean people to 
overcome the national tragedy and a map plate of the 16 UN Allied Nations that 
dispatched troops to the war. The links of iron chain on the ceiling signify the 
unbreakable bonds of a unified Korea. 
 
The statue, as a symbol of the Korean War, embodies the themes of “reconciliation, 
love, and forgiveness,” keywords that are not necessarily reflected within the museum 
space in the Korean War exhibits at the War Memorial of Korea. 
 Furthermore, Sheila Miyoshi Jager’s critique of the Statue of Brothers places it 
within the politics of legitimacy that structure the Cold War and its afterlives by 
reading the body positions of the brothers as showcasing South Korean state 
legitimacy and broader claims of the state’s inheritance of a unified Korean 
nationality and patriotic lineage. She writes: 
 
…the meeting between brothers – one strong and one weak, one elder and the 
other younger – is portrayed in such a way that the genealogy of the ancestral 
bloodline is never questioned: South Korea is the elder son, the legitimate heir 
of Korea’s patriotic warrior tradition, whose forgiveness of his weaker, 
wayward brother becomes the condition upon which North Korea is finally 
allowed to return to the “arms” of the family/nation.34 
 
While the Statue of Brothers depicts South Korea as the older brother and North 
Korean as the younger, this is subverted within the film Taegukgi, as it is the older 
brother who defects to the north. The hypothetical meeting between two brothers on 
an imaginary Korean War battlefield portrayed in the statue also plays out differently 
from Taegukgi, which stages a similar meeting between brothers on a battlefield. 
 At first, the older brother, Lee Jin-tae attacks his younger brother, Lee Jin-
seok, in a frenzy; in fact, this entire battlefield scene is particularly brutal as the North 
Korean and South Korean soldiers tend to brandish their guns as clubs and bayonets 
rather than firing them. This results in scenes of hand-to-hand combat that accentuate 
the brutal conditions of the battleground and the tragedy of brothers. On a 
metaphorical and literal level, the soldiers appear to be fighting amongst themselves 
for ideologies that seem increasingly muddled, themes that show up in 2000s South 
Korean cinema about the Korean War discussed in chapter 2. 35 Jin-tae cannot 
recognize his brother at first, but eventually comes to his senses as Jin-seok 
desperately attempts to drag him back to the south during the South Korean soldiers’ 
retreat. Promising that he would be reunited with Jin-seok, Jin-tae turns his gun on the 
North Koreans and eventually dies on the battlefield. The transition back to the 
present happens as Jin-tae’s dead body surrounded by artillery shells become nothing 																																																								34	Ibid,	405.	35	This	is	supported	by	earlier	scenes	in	which	South	Korean	soldiers	are	also	shown	to	commit	particularly	brutal	war	crimes	and	crimes	against	civilians.	
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but skeletal remains, leaving a devastated present-day Jin-seok to cry out upon 
their “reunion”: “I’ve waited for so long. What happened to your promise? Say 
something! I’ve been waiting to see you for 50 years.” 
 The hope and promise of reunification between two brothers is shown in three 
different yet similar ways in the museum, memorial, and film texts. The Statue of 
Brothers is a commentary upon South Korean political legitimacy during the Cold 
War, which extends to a legacy and inheritance of “Koreanness,” as well as 
symbolizes an imagined promise of reunification that does yet exist in reality, further 
examined in chapter 5. It is unclear if the battlefield on which the two brothers meet is 
a battlefield from the Korean War or a future war, but the promise of reconciliation 
and reunification is an imaginary scene culminating in a “loving embrace.”36 The 
Statue of Brothers speaks to the affective aspects of the Korean War, and the 
devastating human costs of the war in which not just brothers, but also family 
members across generations were separated from one another.37 The opening video 
and exhibit in the first Korean War room of the War Memorial of Korea portrays the 
repatriation of the body of Sergeant Lee Cheon Woo to the Seoul National Cemetery, 
interned next to his brother, as a reunion after 60 years; however, the reunion seems to 
ring hollow as both brothers were killed within months of each other in 1951 and are 
only able to be reunited through death and incorporation into the national military 
cemetery. Enveloped in the green letters making up the phrase “Freedom is not free,” 
the belated reunion of the two brothers after 60 years, when such a reunion was 
seemingly impossible in life outside of war, is enfolded into the logics of military 
sacrifice that make up the tone of the museum. 
 Taegukgi, on the other hand, questions the logics of reunification as 
reconciliation – reconciliation as in making meaning of the death of the brother – in 
its penultimate scene, as the reunion is portrayed as a crowning moment of tragedy 
and a failed promise. What good is reunification if it means the foreclosure of Jin-
seok’s belief that his brother may still be alive somewhere in North Korea or 
elsewhere? While he is able to find closure for his brother’s death, it is at the expense 
of the broken promise of reunification. All three texts represent reconciliation and 
reunification of brothers in slightly different ways, yet what lingers is the repeating 
imagery that makes its way through Korean War memorial texts, from memorials to 
museums to films. The remain chapters of this dissertation continues to explore these 
themes – history and memory, reconciliation, imagined reunification, and temporality 
– in other memorial texts of the Korean War in the “post”-Cold War. 
 
Chapter Outlines 
 
 The first chapter takes up built space as corollary to popular culture 
representations of Korean War memory in relation to nationalism and 
transnationalism. It traces how discourses of freedom and gratitude to the U.S. and 																																																								36	Daniel	Y.	Kim,	“Nationalist	Technologies	of	Cultural	Memory	and	the	Korean	War:	Militarism	and	Neo-Liberalism	in	The	Price	of	Freedom	and	the	War	Memorial	of	Korea,”	
Cross-Currents:	East	Asian	History	and	Culture	Review	4.1	(May	2015):	55.	37	See	also	Nan	Youngnan	Kim-Paik,	Liminal	Subjects,	Liminal	Nation:	Reuniting	Families	
and	Mediating	Reconciliation	in	Divided	Korea	(PhD	diss.:	University	of	California,	Berkeley,	2007)	and	Soo-Jung	Lee,	Making	and	Unmaking	the	Korean	National	Division:	
Separated	Families	in	the	Cold	War	and	Post-Cold	War	Eras	(PhD	diss.:	University	of	Illinois	at	Urbana-Champaign,	2006).	
	 xix	
UN (in contrast to the 1990s-2000s Korean War films that displace the role of 
enemy from North Korea to the U.S. as the barrier to reunification) are represented 
and reconciled in the flagship war memorial complex in South Korea, the War 
Memorial of Korea in Seoul. These discourses, which draw transnationally from the 
Korean War Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., are then compared to the 
Nogunri Peace Park, which was the site of a U.S. massacre of Korean civilians during 
the first months of the war. How are memories of the U.S. as both liberator and 
perpetrator reconciled in museum and memorial space? 
 The second chapter focuses on contemporary South Korean cinema from the 
1990s-2010s, coinciding with South Korean President Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine 
Policy,” which reflected a generally less hostile view towards North Korea and paved 
the way for inter-Korean exchanges such as the reunion of separated family members 
and the development of areas such as Kaesong in North Korea to anticipate future 
reunification. Thus, films of the period shifted as well to showcase Korean War 
narratives in which enemy combatants come together as friends or allies, although 
only temporarily, as the structures of Korean War and Cold War divisions ultimately 
make these relationships unsustainable. This chapter explores how these films depict 
these doomed friendships as well as how they memorialize the loss of friendship 
through cinematic techniques such as the freeze frame and the flashback. I also 
demonstrate how the films point to the U.S. as one of the architects of Korean 
division by subtly or overtly portraying the U.S. as enemies. 
 The third chapter examines post-2010s South Korean cinema about the Korean 
War. Extending from the thematic focus on memorialization and photography in the 
preceding chapter, this chapter focuses on the prevalence of archival images that 
begin to stand in for memory images. Why does contemporary South Korean cinema 
about the Korean War end with a photograph, archival memorial documentation, or 
memorialization of the main characters? Why is it necessary for these films to 
function as memorial texts, specifically using the photographic and archival index as a 
functional form of memorialization within film narratives? Films about the Korean 
War from the 2010s onwards shift from memorializing an imagined future or past that 
can never come to pass to using photographs, archival videos, or images as 
straightforward techniques to literally represent history, becoming memorials. 
 The fourth chapter focuses on the government-funded art collective REAL 
DMZ PROJECT to explore alternate methods of memorializing the Korean War and 
South Korean artist Minouk Lim’s Navigation ID, which was exhibited at the 2014 
Gwangju Biennale. The REAL DMZ PROJECT closely follows the itinerary of a 
security tourism trip in Cheorwon County in Gangwon-do, and focuses on various 
site-specific art exhibitions that provide critical interpretations of the Korean War and 
its legacies. Minouk Lim’s Navigation ID is a powerful video, performance, and art 
piece that tracks two shipping containers filled with the remains of Bodo League 
massacre victims on their journey from individual family graves to the Gwangju 
Biennale space. The surviving family members of the massacres were then greeted by 
mothers of victims of the Gwangju Massacre in a public ceremony at the opening of 
the Biennale. What new insights about the Korean War can be gained by reading the 
historical events of the Bodo League Massacre in the summer of 1950 alongside the 
Gwangju Massacre (May 18th – May 27th, 1980)? How does the concept of Korean 
War memorialization gain new ground through the inter-referencing of multiple 
temporalities and spaces of the Korean War and state violence? Drawing from 
theories on the “ends” of the Cold War and the Korean War, this chapter explores the 
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overlapping temporalities that occur in the “locally specific” sites of the DMZ-
bordering areas in which art, security tourism, museums, and memorials intersect and 
overlap, drawing attention to the messiness of memorializing a war not yet reconciled 
or resolved in the “post”-Cold War period. 
 The fifth chapter and conclusion considers the future of Korean War 
memorialization by exploring reunification memorials in South Korea that anticipate 
an event that has yet to occur. What does it mean to set aside space for 
memorialization of reunification in advance, even as it seems to inevitably be deferred 
into the future? While memorials are generally dedicated to past events and figures, 
the memorials that I focus on in this chapter are dedicated to an event that is yet to 
come. This chapter explores the various iconography of memorials used to signify 
division and reunification and reflects on the temporality of the Korean War and Cold 
War under continual division. 
	 1	
Chapter 1 
 
“Freedom is not free”: Tracing Transnational Korean War Discourses in the 
Post-Cold War Conjuncture 
 
 At the Korean War Veterans Memorial (hereafter: KWVM) in Washington, 
D.C., there are two memorial phrases that represent U.S. national memory of the 
Korean War. These phrases are “Freedom is not free” and “Our nation honors her 
sons and daughters, who answered the call to defend a country they never knew and a 
people they never met,” found on the wall and plaque of this memorial. These two 
phrases speak to U.S. understandings of the Korean War; while there are many local 
memorials that preceded the KWVM throughout the country, 1  the memorial’s 
particular location on the National Mall speaks to its position as part of the U.S. 
nation’s lieux de mémoire.2 
 Meanwhile, in South Korea, the representative war memorial complex in the 
heart of Seoul in the Yongsan District is the War Memorial of Korea (hereafter: 
WMK). While there are different memorial vocabularies at this museum complex, the 
same two phrases found at the KWVM are also found here.3 “Freedom is not free” is 
on the entrance plaque and throughout the museum exhibitions, including the 
introductory film for the first Korean War exhibition room, and “Our nation 
honors…” is embossed on the outdoors wing of the museum, along lists of names of 
war dead for U.S. and UN soldiers, and also throughout the exhibition text. What is 
the significance of this transpacific travel of memorial phrases? And, what can these 
phrases reveal about the broader Cold War memorialization tactics and dialectics of 
remembering and forgetting in both the U.S. and South Korea in the post-Cold War 
conjuncture? Specifically, post-Cold War memory is not just a force but also 
processes with transpacific connections, actors, and mobilities that move beyond the 
boundaries of the nation-state, and thus necessitate transpacific Asian American 
critique. 
 Phrases that appear at the KWVM and that reappear in South Korean 
memorials emphasize the necessity of gratitude for and indebtedness to U.S. (and UN) 
military sacrifices for attaining what Asian American Studies scholar Mimi Thi 																																																								1	Levi	Fox,	Not	Forgotten:	The	Korean	War	in	American	Public	Memory,	1950-2017	(PhD	diss.:	Temple	University,	2018).	2	Pierre	Nora	writes	that	“lieux	de	mémoire	originate	with	the	sense	that	there	is	no	spontaneous	memory,	that	we	must	deliberately	create	archives,	maintain	anniversaries,	organize	celebrations,	pronounce	eulogies,	and	notarize	bills	because	such	activities	no	longer	occur	naturally”	and	that	“without	commemorative	vigilance,	history	would	soon	sweep	them	away.”	Pierre	Nora,	“Between	Memory	and	History:	Les	Lieux	de	Mémoire,”	Representations	no.	26,	Special	Issue:	Memory	and	Counter-Memory	(Spring	1989):	12.	Elsewhere,	Erika	Doss	describes	the	U.S.	context	in	which	there	existed	a	rush	of	memorial	planning	and	construction	since	the	1990s	as	“memorial	mania.”	Erika	Doss,	Memorial	Mania:	Public	Feeling	in	America	(Chicago:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2010).	3	In	particular,	“fatherland/patriot”	(hoguk)	and	“war	hero”	(yŏngŭn)	are	prominently	featured	keywords	throughout	the	memorial	complex.	Sheila	Miyoshi	Jager	also	points	out	“solidarity,”	“unity,”	“strength,”	and	“trust”	as	behind-the-scenes	vocabularies	in	the	planning	documents.	Sheila	Miyoshi	Jager,	“Monumental	Histories:	Manliness,	the	Military,	and	the	War	Memorial,”	Public	Culture	14.2	(Spring	2002):	387-409. 
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Nguyen refers to as the “gift of freedom.”4 The “gift of freedom” constitutes not 
only the results of Cold War (attaining freedom for other nations), but also the 
justification for waging liberal war in the first place (wars fought on behalf of 
freedom). Furthermore, Jodi Kim connects settler modernity with militarization 
(specifically in Asia and the Pacific) to make an argument about the role of debt as 
both a structure of relations and an “instrument of violence” between the U.S. as 
creditor/debtor nation and other countries as debtors to the U.S.5 As Kim writes, 
“Militarization exceeds the temporal parameters of war, the spatial demarcations of 
military bases, the functional ends of military institutions, and the enlistment of 
military personnel.”6 However, the “gift of freedom” blurs not only reason and result, 
but also the temporality that leads to continual and unending military alliances and 
relations with the U.S. Freedom is not only gift but also debt. In the circular 
relationship that constructs Cold War and post-Cold War relations between the U.S. 
and its allies and territories in the Asia-Pacific, freedom is the currency exchanged 
and the costs for continuing militarization in the region, as well as the results of 
“victory.” 
 Within this theoretical conversation, I specifically focus on memorial cultures 
in relation to this “gift-debt” structure and how discourses of gratitude and sacrifice 
travel across both U.S. and South Korean memorial contexts. I am particularly 
invested in the “gift-debt” relation between the U.S. and South Korea in the post-Cold 
War conjuncture within national and popular cultures of commemoration of the 
Korean War. The Korean War is not just a static temporal event that took place from 
June 25th, 1950 – July 27th, 1953; the war itself is part of the “regimes of militarism” 
that “generates a proliferation of military logics beyond formal military institutes and 
sites, and beyond the war-making, peacemaking, and security functions of the military 
itself.”7 I read memorialization and memorial cultures in South Korea as directly 
engaging with and part of the “regimes of militarism” that exceed the temporal event 
of the Korean War itself. 
 Particularly, South Korea, as a nation that has been both liberated by the U.S. 
and a debtor nation as a result of U.S. military projects in WWII and the Cold War, 
necessarily is embroiled in the politics of national liberation and legitimacy politics 
stemming from the results of these conflicts.8 Therefore, South Korea and the Korean 
War, while a locally specific civil war within the global Cold War, 9  is also 
simultaneously interlocked in networks of U.S. militarism across Asia and the Pacific, 
as well as the Middle East10 and other “frontiers” of U.S. imperialism.11 As Kim 																																																								4	Mimi	Thi	Nguyen,	The	Gift	of	Freedom:	War,	Debt,	and	Other	Refugee	Passages	(Durham:	Duke	University,	2012).	5	Jodi	Kim,	“Settler	Modernity,	Debt	Imperialism,	and	the	Necropolitics	of	the	Promise,”	
Social	Text	36.2	(2018):	41-61.	6	Ibid,	51.	7	Ibid,	52-53.	8	Bruce	Cumings,	The	Origins	of	the	Korean	War,	Volume	1:	Liberation	and	the	Emergence	
of	Separate	Regimes,	1945-1947	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1981).	9	For	discussion	of	the	locally	specific	Cold	War,	see	especially	Heonik	Kwon,	The	Other	
Cold	War	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press)	and	Masuda	Hajimu,	Cold	War	Crucible:	
The	Korean	Conflict	and	the	Postwar	World	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	2015).	10	Jodi	Kim,	“Settler	Modernity,	Debt	Imperialism,	and	the	Necropolitics	of	the	Promise,”	
Social	Text	36.2	(2018):	41-61.	
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demonstrates, “U.S. debt imperialism” and its necropolitics create both the 
conditions of, as well as justification for, incurred debt among “liberated” countries12 
– “the gift of freedom.”13 Here, the gift is simultaneously a debt, as freedom is both 
result and justification for entering wars in Asia in the first place, and for maintaining 
military installations in the region and in the Pacific. 14  In fact, Korean War 
memorialization often blurs this connection between freedom as result and 
justification, and this can be shown specifically through the transpacific connections 
and discourses found in both U.S. and South Korean memorial spaces. 
 Through tracing the discourses of freedom in U.S. and South Korean 
memorials about the Korean War, I show how war memorials in the U.S. and South 
Korea attempt to reconcile memory of the war through the repetition of key memorial 
phrases. Reconciliation is the action or act of bringing things to an agreement; in the 
museum and memorial context, it is a suturing of histories and memories into 
coherent narratives, simultaneously a method against forgetting yet also analogous to 
forgetting in its creation of new narratives, depending on the context of the narratives 
and memories created in processes of memorialization. In this attempt at 
reconciliation and making sense of conflict for the purposes of memorialization, both 
the “Forgotten War”15 and “Forgotten Victory”16 discourses in the U.S. create new 
“forgettings.” After all, the “victory” of this war is a belated one – connected to South 																																																																																																																																																														11	Chih-ming	Wang	and	Yu-Fang	Cho,	“Introduction:	The	Chinese	Factor	and	American	Studies,	Here	and	Now,”	American	Quarterly	69.3	(September	2017):	443-463.	12	Jodi	Kim,	“Settler	Modernity,	Debt	Imperialism,	and	the	Necropolitics	of	the	Promise,”	
Social	Text	36.2	(2018):	41-61.	13	Mimi	Thi	Nguyen,	The	Gift	of	Freedom:	War,	Debt,	and	Other	Refugee	Passages	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2012).	14	See	especially	Bridget	Martin,	“From	Camp	Town	to	International	City:	US	Military	Base	Expansion	and	Local	Development	in	Pyeongtaek,	South	Korea,”	International	
Journal	of	Urban	and	Regional	Research	42.6	(November	2018):	967-985	and	Setsu	Shigematsu	and	Keith	L.	Camacho,	eds.,	Militarized	Currents:	Toward	a	Decolonized	
Future	in	Asia	and	the	Pacific	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2010).	15	The	Korean	War	has	often	been	referred	to	as	the	“Forgotten	War”	in	U.S.	contexts	by	historians	and	veterans	of	the	war,	particularly	in	comparison	to	WWII	and	the	Vietnam	War,	which	have	seen	more	representation,	especially	in	popular	culture.	See	Suhi	Choi,	
Embattled	Memories:	Contesting	Meanings	in	Korean	War	Memorials	(Reno:	University	of	Nevada	Press,	2014).	As	she	has	pointed	out,	there	are	multiple	reasons	for	why	the	Korean	War	has	gained	this	moniker	in	the	U.S.:	“The	question	of	why	the	war	has	been	forgotten	can	invite	many	plausible	speculations:	the	unclear	ending	of	the	war,	its	sandwiched	timing	of	occurrence	between	two	major	wars,	its	unpopularity	in	the	mass	media,	the	constraint	of	Cold	War	ideology,	and	the	closed	dialogues	between	South	and	North	Korea”	(Ibid,	74).	Rather	than	as	the	“Forgotten”	or	the	“Unknown	War,”	it	is	clear	that	from	the	position	of	critical	Asian	American	memorial	studies,	U.S.	wars	in	Asia	continue	to	matter	for	the	lived	realities	of	Asian/Korean	Americans	and	the	Korean	diaspora.	16	It	is	difficult	to	pinpoint	exactly	if	there	was	a	shift	from	“Forgotten	War”	to	“Forgotten	Victory”	in	U.S.	discourses,	but	the	Korean	War	National	Museum’s	website	(now	defunct	with	the	museum’s	closing	in	2017)	had	referred	to	the	Korean	War	as	the	“forgotten	victory.”	(The	museum	was	established	in	1997	in	Springfield,	IL).	Both	U.S.	and	South	Korean	contexts	refer	to	the	Korean	War	as	“Forgotten	Victory”	in	the	context	of	containment	of	communism	to	only	North	Korea	and	attainment	of	freedom	for	South	Korea.	
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Korea’s status as one of the leading economies in the Asia-Pacific region since the 
1970s-1980s and a “vibrant democracy” since the 1990s, long after the “end” of the 
war in 1953. In the long-term contestation for Cold War legitimacy, it can be argued 
that South Korea has indeed emerged “victorious.”17 Yet, on a larger conceptual level, 
reconciliation is a memory technique engaged in gift/debt relations between South 
Korea and the U.S., and a manifestation of “U.S. debt imperialism.”18 
 I begin with clarifying the concept of critical Asian American memorial 
studies as a reading methodology and critical genealogy. Then, I provide an analysis 
of the Korean War Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C. Following, I trace the 
repetitions of Korean War memorial phrases from the KWVM in South Korean 
memorial contexts and introduce the transnational nature of memorial discourse, 
paying particular attention to the War Memorial of Korea, the flagship war memorial 
in South Korea. Specifically, I follow how affective registers of freedom and gratitude 
are deployed in South Korean contexts to illuminate processes of forgetting and 
remembering in national and local memorialization. 
 As tracing discourses of freedom and gratitude in South Korean memorials 
and museums necessitates a privileging of nationalist spaces in which reconciliation 
of historical narratives work to either suppress or minimalize counter-readings or 
counter-memorials (a form of forgetting), I conclude by asking, what happens when 
affective discourses of freedom and gratitude rub up against memoryscapes of 
wartime civilian massacre,19 particularly those directly perpetrated by U.S. soldiers 
during the Korean War? To this extent, I analyze the Nogunri Peace Park in order to 
understand how concepts of truth and reconciliation in this peace memorial complex 
cohere, as well as fail to cohere, with war memorial phrases such as “freedom is not 
free.” In this peace memorial, reconciliation and justice are reasons and results for 
memorialization, mirroring the concept of “freedom” in war memorial spaces. In its 
attempt to bring peace and closure for past atrocities to the present, the Nogunri Peace 
Park is emblematic of irresolutions inherently found in projects of memorialization 
and the failure of reconciling history and justice when the perpetrators of civilian 
massacres become blurred with notions of the perpetrators as saviors. 																																																								17	Ironically,	this	is	also	the	basis	upon	which	North	Korea	and	China	can	claim	victory	as	well,	particularly	through	the	framework	of	resistance	to	U.S.	imperialism.	This	is	reflected	in	the	names	for	the	Korean	War	in	North	Korea	and	China:	“Fatherland	Liberation	War”	and	“War	to	Resist	America	and	Aid	Korea.”	18	Jodi	Kim,	“Settler	Modernity,	Debt	Imperialism,	and	the	Necropolitics	of	the	Promise,”	
Social	Text	36.2	(2018):	41-61.	19	Wartime	civilian	massacres	have	been	discussed	extensively	in	literature,	particularly	in	South	Korea	after	the	democratization	of	the	country	in	1988	and	into	the	1990s.	Specifically,	for	more	information	on	the	Nogunri	Massacre	and	interviews	with	survivors	see	Suhi	Choi,	Embattled	Memories:	Contested	Meanings	in	Korean	War	
Memorials	(Reno:	University	of	Nevada	Press,	2014)	and	The	Korean	War	caught	in	
history	and	memory:	Examining	United	States	media	coverage	of	the	No	Gun	Ri	incident	
(1999-present)	and	Korean	survivors’	testimonies	(PhD	diss.:	Temple	University,	2006).	The	Nogunri	Peace	Park	and	Peace	Foundation	has	published	a	report	with	findings,	data	about	the	incident,	and	the	process	by	which	the	memorial	came	to	be	constructed	through	the	passing	of	a	special	law	in	2004	in	the	absence	of	official	compensation	from	the	U.S.	See	also	Suhi	Choi,	“Can	a	Memorial	Communicate	Embodied	Trauma?:	Reenacting	Civilian	Bodies	in	the	No	Gun	Ri	Peace	Park,”	Rhetoric	&	Public	Affairs	19.3	(Fall	2016):	465-489.	
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 Various modes of reconciliation within memoryscapes of the Korean War 
become entangled with one another, pointing to spaces of rupture and alternative 
critical readings of Korean War memorialization beyond dichotomies of 
“remembering” and “forgetting.” To this extent, I examine how critical Asian 
American memorial studies as methodology to study memorialization can bring out 
transnational narratives and allow for the multiple subjectivities of museum/memorial 
visitors to disrupt and enable readings beyond Cold War frameworks and dialectics of 
gratitude and debt. In doing so, the critical project of this chapter and dissertation is to 
show how the Korean War is not just one-dimensionally the “Forgotten War,” but 
also how memorialization of the Korean War, as a method of reconciling the 
unending war in a “post”-Cold War period, is the very condition for how the Korean 
War has come to be understood as “forgotten” in the U.S. context. 
 
Critical Asian American Memorial Studies: Reading Methodology and 
Genealogy for Analyzing Korean War Memorialization 
 
 My reading and study of memorial cultures in the U.S. and South Korea are 
informed by Asian American cultural studies scholars who not only delineated the 
gift-debt relationship formed by U.S. militarism, but also take into account Asian 
American subject formations created by U.S. empire.20 From “freedom is not free” to 
the phrase referenced by Asian American Studies scholars that “we are here because 
you were there,”21 these are discourses that are not entirely negative constructions, 
because through the new subject formations engendered by these discourses, there 
arise the possibility of alternative readings and imaginings of U.S. empire, particularly 
through cultural critique and cultural productions.22 Rather than enacting critiques of 																																																								20	Some	of	these	scholars	include	Victor	Bascara,	Model-Minority	Imperialism	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2006);	Vernadette	Vicuña	Gonzalez,	
Securing	Paradise:	Tourism	and	Militarism	in	Hawai’i	and	the	Philippines	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2013);	Jodi	Kim,	Ends	of	Empire:	Asian	American	Critique	and	the	Cold	
War	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2010);	Jodi	Kim,	“Settler	Modernity,	Debt	Imperialism,	and	the	Necropolitics	of	the	Promise,”	Social	Text	36.2	(2018):	41-61;	Lisa	Lowe,	Immigrant	Acts:	On	Asian	American	Cultural	Politics	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2006);	Mimi	Thi	Nguyen,	The	Gift	of	Freedom:	War,	Debt,	and	Other	
Refugee	Passages	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2012).	21	The	phrase	is	not	directly	coined	by	Asian	American	Studies	scholars;	however,	I	use	it	in	the	context	of	recognition	of	U.S.	wars	in	Asia	that	directly	and	indirectly	affected	Asian	immigration	to	the	U.S.	(while	recognizing	that	this	phrase	can	also	speak	to	other	colonial	and	neocolonial	contexts).	As	Daniel	Y.	Kim	and	Viet	Thanh	Nguyen	write,	“The	Asian	presence	in	America	that	is	signaled	by	the	works	we	discuss	affirms	the	motto,	
we	are	here	because	you	were	there;	the	Asian	American	sensibilities	expressed	in	these	writings	emerge	from	diasporic	communities	that	have	been	forged	by	U.S.	military	violence	and	revolutionary	conflict	in	their	homelands.”	Daniel	Y.	Kim	and	Viet	Thanh	Nguyen,	“The	Literature	of	the	Korean	War	and	Vietnam	War”	in	The	Cambridge	
Companion	to	Asian	American	Literature,	edited	by	Crystal	Parikh	and	Daniel	Y.	Kim	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2015):	59.	22	In	particular,	see	Kuan-Hsing	Chen,	Asia	as	Method:	Toward	Deimperialization	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2010);	Jodi	Kim,	Ends	of	Empire:	Asian	American	
Critique	and	the	Cold	War	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2010);	Heonik	Kwon,	The	Other	Cold	War	(New	York:	Columbia	Universiy	Press,	2010);	Lisa	Lowe,	
	 6	
U.S. militarism and imperialism as arguments based on foreclosure – for example, 
that there is nothing that can be done beyond just recognizing that these are powerful 
social structures and gaining some illumination from the recognition that the U.S. is 
not unilaterally benevolent or a giver of freedom without any strings attached23 – I 
explore how the new subject formations that emerge from this critique can have life of 
their own as well. This is the radical potentiality of Asian American critique. 
 Furthermore, I approach Asian American cultural critique as not only an 
intellectual genealogy,24 but also methodology. In working with the enduring legacies 
of the Korean War and Cold War, I also align myself with scholars like Heonik 
Kwon, who examines the ends of the Cold War, particularly the “locally specific” 																																																																																																																																																														
Immigrant	Acts:	On	Asian	American	Cultural	Politics	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2006).	23	While	this	is	not	the	focus	of	this	dissertation,	it	is	important	to	recognize	that	Cold	War	power	structures	were	indeed	contested	and	maintained	by	countries	on	the	receiving	sides	of	U.S.	Cold	War	aid.	In	other	words,	it	is	important	to	recognize	the	agency	of	gift-receiving	countries	as	well.	For	more	scholarship	on	this	see:	John	DiMoia,	“Atoms	for	Sale?:	Cold	War	Institution-Building	and	the	South	Korean	Atomic	Energy	Project,	1945-1965,”	Technology	and	Culture	51.3	(July	2010):	589-618;	John	DiMoia,	“In	Pursuit	of	‘Peace	and	Construction’:	Hyundai	Construction	and	Infrastructure	in	Southeast	Asia,	1965-1973,”	in	Engineering	Asia:	Technology,	Colonial	Development,	and	
the	Cold	War	Order,	edited	by	Hiromi	Mizuno,	Aaron	S.	Moore,	and	John	DiMoia	(London:	Bloomsbury	Academic,	2018);	James	Lin,	“Sowing	Seeds	and	Knowledge:	Agricultural	Development	in	Taiwan	and	the	World,	1925-1975,”	East	Asian	Science,	Technology	and	
Society	9.2	(2015):	127-149;	Masuda	Hajimu,	Cold	War	Crucible:	The	Korean	Conflict	and	
the	Postwar	World	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	2015);	Dongmin	Park,	Free	
World,	Cheap	Buildings:	U.S.	Hegemony	and	the	Origins	of	Modern	Architecture	in	South	
Korea,	1953-1960	(PhD	diss.:	University	of	California,	Berkeley,	2016).	24	Victor	Bascara,	Model-Minority	Imperialism	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2006);	Mark	Chiang,	The	Cultural	Capital	of	Asian	American	Studies:	Autonomy	and	
Representation	in	the	University	(New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	2009);	Kandice	Chuh,	Imagine	Otherwise:	On	Asian	Americanist	Critique	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2003);	Vernadette	Vicuña	Gonzalez,	Securing	Paradise:	Tourism	and	Militarism	in	Hawai’i	
and	the	Philippines	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2013);	Allan	Punzalan	Isaac,	
American	Tropics:	Articulating	Filipino	America	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2006);	Laura	Kang,	Compositional	Subjects:	Enfiguring	Asian/American	Women	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2002);	Elaine	H.	Kim,	Asian	American	Literature:	An	
Introduction	to	the	Writings	and	their	Social	Context	(Philadelphia:	Temple	University	Press,	1982);	Elaine	H.	Kim	and	Lisa	Lowe,	“Guest	Editor’s	Introduction,”	positions	5.2	(Special	Issue:	New	Formations,	New	Questions:	Asian	American	Studies)	(Fall	1997):	v-xiv;	Jodi	Kim,	Ends	of	Empire:	Asian	American	Critique	and	the	Cold	War	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2010);	Lisa	Lowe,	Immigrant	Acts:	On	Asian	American	
Cultural	Politics	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2006);	Mimi	Thi	Nguyen,	The	Gift	of	
Freedom:	War,	Debt,	and	Other	Refugee	Passages	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2012);	Caroline	Chung	Simpson,	An	Absent	Presence:	Japanese	Americans	in	Postwar	American	
Culture,	1945-1960	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2001);	Lisa	Yoneyama,	Cold	War	
Ruins:	Transpacific	Critique	of	American	Justice	and	Japanese	War	Crimes	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2016);	Ji-Yeon	Yuh,	Beyond	the	Shadow	of	Camptown:	Korean	Military	
Brides	in	America	(New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	2002);	Ji-Yeon	Yuh,	“Moved	by	War:	Migration,	Diaspora,	and	the	Korean	War,”	Journal	of	Asian	American	Studies	8.3	(October	2005):	277-291.	
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sites of hot wars within the broader Cold War period.25 Examining the “ends”26 of 
the Cold War and Korean War necessarily entails looking into memorialization 
practices as well, and to ask the question of, how do memorial texts reconcile an 
unfinished war in a so-called “post”-Cold War period? While the museum and 
memorial texts examined in this chapter can be read as sites of nationalism, 
conservatism, or universalism, reading these texts from the vantage point of Asian 
American cultural critique can bring to light new questions in relation to memorial 
form and memorialization techniques within Korean War memoryscapes. 
 Furthermore, Asian American cultural critique intersects with scholarship on 
Cold War subject formations in Asia. For example, Chen Kuan-Hsing gives space to 
theorizing Cold War subjectivities as a starting point, methodological approach, and 
intervention; particularly, he points to the possibilities that arise from “inter-
referencing” conditions in Cold War and “post”-Cold War (East) Asian contexts.27 He 
writes: 
 
The effects of the cold war have become embedded in local history, and simply 
pronouncing the war to be over will not cause them to dissolve. The complex 
effects of the war, mediated through our bodies, have been inscribed into our 
national, family, and personal histories. In short, the cold war is still alive within 
us.28 
 
Jodi Kim makes a similar argument, from the framework of Asian American cultural 
critique, in writing of the “double injunction” for Korean Americans in regards to 
memory of the Korean War: “to forget (as assimilated Americans) and to remember 
(as gendered racial Korean immigrants and postimperial ‘exiles’).”29 Kim points to 
the complicated discourses within Asian/Korean America as also contributing another 
perspective to the Korean War as “forgotten war,” as tension exists between the will 
to remember and recognition of the reason for immigration to the U.S. (which Kim 
refers to as a “dirty secret”30 for Korean Americans) and the need to forget in order to 																																																								25	Heonik	Kwon,	The	Other	Cold	War	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2010).	26	Jodi	Kim	defines	“ends”	as	a	concept	that	is	temporal,	spatial,	functional,	and	alluding	to	“fragments	and	remnants.”	Jodi	Kim,	Ends	of	Empire:	Asian	American	Critique	and	the	
Cold	War	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2010):	4.	Heonik	Kwon	points	to	the	Cold	War	as	a	process	of	“slow	decomposition.”	Heonik	Kwon,	The	Other	Cold	War	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2010).	For	a	theory	of	ruins	in	relation	to	colonialism,	see	Ann	Laura	Stoler,	ed.,	Imperial	Debris:	On	Ruins	and	Ruination	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2013).	27	Kuan-Hsing	Chen,	Asia	as	Method:	Toward	Deimperialization	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2010).	28	Ibid,	118.	29	Jodi	Kim,	Ends	of	Empire:	Asian	American	Critique	and	the	Cold	War	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2010):	146.	30	The	“dirty	secret”	is	that	“the	majority	of	Korean	America’s	post-1945	formation	can	be	attributed	to	chain	migrations	set	into	motion	by	Korean	military	brides	who	sponsored	(extended)	family	members	but	who	were	shunned	for	marrying	‘foreigners,’	especially	when	those	foreigners	were	black	Americans”	(Ibid).	See	also	Ji-Yeon	Yuh,	
Beyond	the	Shadow	of	Camptown:	Korean	Military	Brides	in	America	(New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	2002)	for	more	on	the	history	and	lives	of	Korean	military	brides.	Grace	M.	Cho	traces	the	ghostly	specter	of	the	“yanggongju”	(“Western/Yankee	
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become “proper” U.S. subjects or “model minority subjects.” 31  This “double 
injunction” and “cold war is still alive within us” points not only to the importance of 
Asian American subjectivity in the “post”-cold war but also to how dialectics of 
remembering and forgetting are constitutive of Asian American cultural productions 
and politics in this cultural conjunction. 
 As Elaine H. Kim writes, 
 
What most Americans know about Korea has been told from the point of view 
of a U.S. military member or a missionary, about prostitutes, beggars, and 
orphans, many of them mixed race children, never speaking but always spoken 
for and about, souls being saved by the civilizing missions of neocolonialism 
and evangelism. No doubt they would have found it difficult to imagine that one 
day the voice of the native, having returned to the imperial center, might speak 
back – in English – from its very different positionality.32 
 
This speaks to the potential of Asian American cultural critique and cultural 
productions to question Cold War binaries and non/alignments. Korean Americans, 
and by extension Asian Americans who have also been affected by cold war/hot war 
migrations, exile, forced displacement or adoption, and refugeehood, are not just 
objects for study (as is often the case for fields that emerge from Cold War national 
security concerns such as most “area studies”) but have subjectivities and 
positionalities that can “speak back” (or even “speak for” 33  empire). 34  These 
sentiments can be found in the adage “We are here because you were there,” which 
traces the conditions of possibility for migration to the U.S. to U.S. imperialism and 
neocolonialism, whether through direct processes such as war or colonialism, or 
through indirect cultural processes such as soft power domination of U.S. popular 
																																																																																																																																																														princess,”	the	pejorative	name	used	by	Koreans	to	refer	to	women	who	work	in	U.S.	military	camptowns	as	prostitutes	as	well	as	women	who	associate	with	U.S.	soldiers	or	civilians)	through	“postmemory”	autoethnography	from	the	lens	of	secondary	or	intergenerational	trauma	marked	by	silence,	shame,	and	secrecy.	Grace	M.	Cho,	
Haunting	the	Korean	Diaspora:	Shame,	Secrecy,	and	the	Forgotten	War	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2008).	31	Ellen	D.	Wu,	The	Color	of	Success:	Asian	Americans	and	the	Origins	of	the	Model	
Minority	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2015).	32	Elaine	H.	Kim,	“Myth,	Memory	and	Desire:	Homeland	and	History	in	Contemporary	Korean	American	Writing	and	Visual	Art”	in	Holding	Their	Own:	Perspectives	on	the	
Multi-Ethnic	Literatures	of	the	United	States,	edited	by	Dorothea	Fischer-Hornung	and	Heike	Raphael-Hernandez	(Tubingen,	Germany:	Stauffenberg-Verlag,	2000).	33	See	especially	the	chapter	“Race	Wars,	Patriot	Wars”	in	Mimi	Thi	Nguyen,	The	Gift	of	
Freedom:	War,	Debt,	and	Other	Refugee	Passages	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2012).	34	Kuan-Hsing	Chen,	Asia	as	Method:	Toward	Deimperialization	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2010);	Yên	Lê	Espiritu,	Body	Counts:	The	Vietnam	War	and	Militarized	
Freedom:	War,	Debt,	and	Other	Refugee	Passages	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2012);	Mimi	Thi	Nguyen,	The	Gift	of	Freedom:	War,	Debt,	and	Other	Refugee	Passages	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2012);	Hairong	Yang	and	David	Vukovich,	“Guest	Editor’s	Introduction:	What’s	Left	of	Asia,”	positions:	east	asia	cultures	critique	15.2	(Fall	2007):	211-224;	Ji-Yeon	Yuh,	“Moved	by	War:	Migration,	Diaspora,	and	the	Korean	War,”	
Journal	of	Asian	American	Studies	8.3	(October	2005):	277-291.	
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culture.35 This critique and recognition of Asian American diaspora that can be seen 
as “refuge migrations”36 fills in a critical gap in Chen Kuan-Hsing’s book, which does 
not include engagement with Asian American scholarship. What types of possibilities 
could emerge from “inter-referencing” not just Taiwan with Korea as in Chen’s text, 
but “Asian America” with “(East) Asia” in the critical project of “de-cold war”? Chen 
lays out the process of “de-cold war” as entailing a need to “de-Americanize”: 
 
To de-cold war in East Asia, it will be necessary to reverse the trend of leaving 
Asia for America, which has been the dominant tendency during the postwar 
era. Now, the trend must become leaving America for Asia. At this historically 
critical time, to de-cold war is to de-Americanize. This means to examine the 
consequences of the United States’ role as a central component in the formation 
of East Asian subjectivity.37 
 
What would it mean for the process of “de-cold war,” in the East Asian context, to 
encounter Asian American critique? Does “leaving America” (epistemologically, 
methodologically, literally) necessarily mean leaving Asian America? 
 These questions can be answered through returning to the relation between 
memory and subjectivity in Asian American critique. For example, Victor Bascara 
writes that “Asian American cultural politics unburdens the emergences of U.S. 
imperialism and thereby burdens the present with a past it once needed to forget.”38 
Lisa Lowe has also written specifically of the distinctiveness of contemporary (post-
1965) immigration to the U.S.: 
 
Another distinguishing feature of the post-1965 Asian immigration is the 
predominance of immigrants from South Korea, the Philippines, South 
Vietnam, and Cambodia, countries deeply affected by U.S. colonialism, war, 
and neocolonialism. Despite the usual assumption that Asians immigrate from 
stable, continuous, “traditional” cultures, most of the post-1965 Asian 
immigrants come from societies already disrupted by colonialism and distorted 
by the upheavals of neocolonial capitalism and war. The material legacy of the 
repressed history of U.S. imperialism in Asia is borne out in the “return” of 
Asian immigrants to the imperial center. In this sense, these Asian Americans 
are determined by the history of U.S. involvements in Asia and the historical 
racialization of Asians in the United States….Once here, the demand that Asian 
immigrants identify as U.S. national subjects simultaneously produces 
alienations and disidentifications out of which critical subjectivities emerge. 																																																								35	Victor	Bascara,	Model-Minority	Imperialism	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2006).	36	Ji-Yeon	Yuh	defines	“refuge	migrations”	as	“those	seeking	refuge	from	the	consequences	of	the	Korean	War.	This	migration	–	although	spurred	by	the	nationalist	struggle	embodied	in	the	war	and	division	–	leads	to	community	and	identity	configurations	that	rely	on	shared	memory	and	experience	rather	than	nation-state	ties.”	Ji-Yeon	Yuh,	“Moved	by	War:	Migration,	Diaspora,	and	the	Korean	War,”	Journal	of	
Asian	American	Studies	8.3	(October	2005):	277-291.	37	Kuan-Hsing	Chen,	Asia	as	Method:	Toward	Deimperialization	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2010):	365.	38	Victor	Bascara,	Model-Minority	Imperialism	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2006):	xvii.	
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These immigrants retain precisely the memories of imperialism that the U.S. 
nation seeks to forget.39 
 
The emergence of “critical subjectivities” mirrors Chen Kuan-Hsing’s assertion that 
the “cold war is still alive within us” while also complicating the need to leave “Asia 
for America.” Memory40 and “critical subjectivities” borne out of experiences of 
migration, war, imperialism, and colonialism cannot be constrained by the bounds of 
the nation-state or even of disciplinarity.41 The tensions that arise from the “double 
injunction” of forgetting and remembering, and assimilating or resisting or refusing, 
give rise to new “critical subjectivities.” Thus, I utilize ‘critical Asian American 
memorial studies’ as methodology to read Korean War memorialization in the “post”-
Cold War conjuncture. 
 
“Forgotten No More”: The Korean War Veterans Memorial in Washington, 
D.C. 
 
 Upon first glance, the Korean War Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., 
located on the National Mall, seems to reference the Vietnam Veterans Memorial 
Wall (hereafter VVMW) with its usage of black reflective walls, a common 																																																								39	Lisa	Lowe,	Immigrant	Acts:	On	Asian	American	Cultural	Politics	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2006):	16-17.	40	In	the	context	of	Korean	War	memorialization,	the	issue	of	temporality	has	played	a	major	theoretical	concern	as	Korean	War	memorials	attempt	to	reconcile	the	unending	Korean	War	with	nationalist	claims	of	an	ended	Cold	War.	For	a	lying	out	of	these	theoretical	concerns	and	an	intervention	in	the	form	of	analyzing	memorial	texts,	see	Suzy	Kim	and	the	special	issue	on	“(De)Memorializing	the	Korean	War:	A	Critical	Intervention”	and	the	individual	essays	that	read	various	national	memorials	in	conversation	with	one	another.	Suzy	Kim,	“Introduction	to	‘(De)Memorializing	the	Korean	War:	A	Critical	Intervention,’”	Cross-Currents:	East	Asian	History	and	Culture	
Review	14	(March	2015):	51-62;	Keun-Sik	Jung,	“China’s	Memory	and	Commemoration	of	the	Korean	War	in	the	Memorial	to	Resist	America	and	Aid	(North)	Korea,”	Cross-
Currents:	East	Asian	History	and	Culture	Review	14	(March	2015):	63-90;	Daniel	Y.	Kim,	“Nationalist	Technologies	of	Cultural	Memory	and	the	Korean	War:	Militarism	and	Liberalism	in	‘The	Price	of	Freedom’	and	the	War	Memorial	of	Korea,”	Cross-Currents:	
East	Asian	History	and	Culture	Review	(March	2015):	91-123;	Suzy	Kim,	“Specters	of	War	in	Pyongyang:	The	Victorious	Fatherland	Liberation	War	Museum	in	North	Korea,”	
Cross-Currents:	East	Asian	History	and	Culture	Review	(March	2015):	124-151;	Sunghoon	Han,	“The	Ongoing	Korean	War	at	the	Sinch’ŏn	Museum	in	North	Korea,”	Cross-Currents:	
East	Asian	History	and	Culture	Review	(March	2015):	152-177;	Seunghei	Clara	Hong,	“Silenced	in	Memoriam:	Consuming	Memory	at	the	Nogŭnri	Peace	Park,”	Cross-Currents:	
East	Asian	History	and	Culture	Review	(March	2015):	178-203;	Brendan	Wright,	“Politicidal	Violence	and	the	Problematics	of	Localized	Memory	at	Civilian	Massacre	Sites:	The	Cheju	4.3	Peace	Park	and	the	Kŏch’ang	Incident	Memorial	Park,”	Cross-
Currents:	East	Asian	History	and	Culture	Review	(March	2015):	204-233.	Other	special	issues	of	journals	have	addressed	the	Korean	War	and	the	issue	of	temporality,	especially	the	special	issue	on	“The	Unending	Korean	War”	in	positions	journal,	edited	by	Christine	Hong.	See	Christine	Hong,	“The	Unending	Korean	War,”	positions:	asia	critique	23.4	(Fall	2015):	597-617. 41	Laura	Kang,	Compositional	Subjects:	Enfiguring	Asian/American	Women	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2002).	
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representational strategy for war memorials since the impact of Maya Lin’s 
influential design. After all, the construction of the KWVM was somewhat belated – 
it was dedicated on July 27, 1955, 42 years after the end of the Korean War and 13 
years after the opening of the VVMW in 1982 (the Vietnam War ending in 1975). 
Therefore, the design of the KWVM, to a certain extent, had to respond to the design 
of the VVMW as it was the next major war memorial to be built on the National 
Mall.42 
 Specifically, the Korean War Veterans Memorial Wall consists of two parts: a 
black wall separated into two sections43 and on the opposite side of the wall, nineteen 
statues of soldiers from various branches of the military and representing different 
ethnicities. The walkway for visitors follows a “V”-shaped path. The first segment of 
the wall consists of sandblasted photographic images of soldiers and other support 
military personnel including women, which are meant to be representative images of 
people who took part in the war. The images are slightly indented and touching of the 
memorial is allowed. The surface of this wall is reflective. The second segment of the 
wall consists solely of an etching in the same reflective material, which reads 
“Freedom is not free.” The memorial gradually becomes shorter as it reaches closer to 
the Pool of Remembrance, where the “Freedom is not free” wall segment rests in. 
 However, the most unique aspects of the memorial are the nineteen larger-
than-life soldier statues. Unlike the more realistic Three Soldiers statue or the 
Vietnam Women’s memorial statue at the VVMF, the vague impressionistic facial 
features (particularly the eyes) of the gray Korean War memorial soldier statues and 
their accompanying military ponchos give off the appearance of ghosts. They are not 
presented as conventionally heroic, as most of the faces on the soldiers seem to 
register fear, confusion, or anger. Kristin Hass describes the statues in similar ways: 
 
The figures’ faces are not uniform, like the language of the inscriptions, and 
they are not generic. They are hollow-eyed, tense, and often contorted. They 
are, in fact, painful to look at. The rough finish, the blank eyes, the sheer bulk of 
them, the distracted scatter of their postures – all make the figures both 
powerfully present and hard to read. Their ghostly, sometimes twisted faces are 
																																																								42	Kristin	Ann	Hass,	Sacrificing	Soldiers	on	the	National	Mall	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	2013):	21.	See	also	CFA	26/JUL/89-1,	Korean	War	Veterans	Memorial,	between	the	Reflecting	Pool	and	Independence	Avenue,	S.W.,	Ash	Woods,	near	Lincoln	Memorial.	Preliminary	design.	Specifically,	the	document	states	that	“There	were	five	major	points	made	in	the	statement	of	concept:	(1)	The	Korean	War	was	waged	in	the	cause	of	freedom;	(2)	Unlike	Vietnam,	there	was	a	victory	in	geo-political	terms;	(3)	The	memorial	will	pay	homage	to	all	those	who	participated;	(4)	While	Korea	will	be	the	focus,	tribute	will	also	be	paid	to	those	who	served	in	all	wars;	(5)	Although	the	memorial	will	be	American,	it	will	also	recognize	the	contributions	of	the	United	Nations	forces.”	43	Kristin	Ann	Hass	describes	three	major	design	elements	instead	of	two:	the	soldiers,	the	wall	running	parallel	to	the	soldiers,	and	the	Pool	of	Remembrance	with	the	other	wall.	Kristin	Ann	Hass,	Sacrificing	Soldiers	on	the	National	Mall	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	2013):	24-25.	I	consider	the	two	reflective	walls	together	because	in	all	my	visits	to	the	KWVM,	I	have	never	seen	the	Pool	of	Remembrance	filled	with	water	due	to	various	construction	or	maintenance	issues.	
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remarkably moving – they seem to express not platitudes but something of 
the anguish of the soldiers’ experience.44 
 
As a whole, the soldiers are not meant to be engaged with: the area where they are is 
roped off so that visitors can only approach them from a distance, unlike the wall.45 
The sense of distance is not just a physical distancing of spectator from object, but 
there also appears to be a temporal distancing as well, which is indicated by the 
stances of the soldiers: they look paused or interrupted as if they were in the middle of 
a mission, simultaneously in their own time (as if they were still in Korea) and out of 
time in a sterile museum-like way (visitors cannot engage with them except to take 
photographs or to look). The soldiers retain a quality of powerlessness not only 
because of their inability to see,46 which adds to the impression that the soldiers are 
not conventionally heroic statues, but also the “empty eyes” of the statues speak to 
their existing on a different temporal plane. Although they are on the same spatial 
plane as visitors to the memorial, the impression of the statues existing within a 
different time gives them an additive ghostly presence. 
 Furthermore, whether intentional or not, the statues poignantly speak to the 
Korean War as a “stalemated” or ongoing war, as representations of its inconclusive 
ending. After all, what also makes these statues ghost-like is conveyed by the 
memorial architecture – the statues are reflected in the opposite walls. The 
superimposition of the visitors’ faces in the reflective surface of the wall along with 
the statues of the soldiers and the sandblasted faces all create a blurring of 
temporalities between the soldiers seemingly “stuck” in the past and the spectators’ 
present positionality, creating a ghostly superimposed image. Furthermore, the choice 
of nineteen soldiers is intentional – by looking at the reflection of the statues in the 
wall, there will be a total of thirty-eight soldiers, which alludes to the 38th Parallel that 
initially divided the Korean peninsula into North Korea and South Korea. While using 
nineteen soldiers was in part logistical (it was decided that thirty-eight soldiers would 
create for a too cluttered memorial site47), the symbolic gesture of including the 38th 																																																								44	Ibid,	27.	45	This	is	different	from	the	initial	winning	design	proposal	in	which	“the	visitor	would	have	the	feeling	of	being	part	of	the	memorial	as	he	walked	between	the	figures,	moving	toward	the	horizon.”	CFA	26/JUL/89-1,	Korean	War	Veterans	Memorial,	between	the	Reflecting	Pool	and	Independence	Avenue,	S.W.,	Ash	Woods,	near	Lincoln	Memorial.	Preliminary	design.	For	a	detailed	description	of	the	Korean	War	Veterans	Memorial	design	process	see	also	Patrick	Hagopian,	“The	Korean	War	Veterans	Memorial	and	Problems	of	Representation,”	Public	Art	Dialogue	2.2	(2012):	215-253.	My	visit	to	the	archives	of	the	Fine	Arts	Commission	in	Washington,	D.C.	and	the	National	Archives	and	Records	Center	in	Suitland,	Maryland	in	August	2017	confirms	the	information	laid	out	in	Hagopian’s	article.	46	“The	soldiers,	to	be	honored,	to	be	finally	remember,	have	no	capacity	to	look.”	Kristin	Ann	Hass,	Sacrificing	Soldiers	on	the	National	Mall	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	2013):	27.	47	The	official	website	of	the	KWVM	explains	that	the	reflection	that	creates	38	soldiers	not	only	represents	the	38th	Parallel	but	also	the	38	months	the	U.S.	spent	fighting	the	war:	http://www.koreanwarvetsmemorial.org/memorial?from=national.	I	first	learned	of	the	logistical	problems	of	having	38	soldier	statues	at	the	memorial	site	from	Duery	Felton,	the	curator	of	the	Vietnam	Veterans	Memorial	Collection,	in	2012	on	a	research	trip.	While	Mr.	Felton	was	showing	me	around	the	Landover	National	Park	facility	in	
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Parallel within the memorial space is particularly striking as it alludes to the 
continual division of the peninsula along the Military Demarcation Line 48  and 
surrounding Demilitarized Zones (DMZ) in what are now two separate countries, 
North Korea and South Korea.49 Not representing one side of the division except 
through reflection speaks to how the discourse of North Korea exists in both the U.S. 
and South Korea as a “ghostly other.”50 
 Furthermore, the 38th Parallel is displaced in this context from its material 
realities on the Korean Peninsula to a metaphorical division of U.S. soldiers in order 
to make up a whole. The metaphorical division in this memorial is not a division at 
all, but rather a mirror that constructs a whole – uniting the soldiers together along 
with the other faces on the wall and presumably joining together with the memorial 
visitors’ own faces. In this way, the memorial functions as a literal evocation of the 
processes of reconciliation that are found in projects of memorialization: the mirror-
like qualities allows for a suturing of division and its narratives, bringing together 
fractured divisions into a whole. The soldiers and the visitors are brought together into 
a cohesive whole by the reflection, suturing the different temporalities at the 
memorial marked by the placement of the statues and faces in the wall (which remain 
still and frozen in time) and the dynamic movement of the visitors (moving through 
memorial space), reconciling in an architectural sense the experience of soldiers with 
visitors who are spatially and temporally removed from the experience of war. 
 Turning to the inscriptions used at the memorials, the overarching rhetoric at 
this memorial, and perhaps for representations of the Korean War in U.S. memorial 
culture in general, is embodied by the phrase “Freedom is not free.” Furthermore, 
there is a panel etched into the ground next to the statues that reads: “Our nation 
honors her sons and daughters who answered the call to defend a country they never 
knew and a people they never met.” These two inscriptions draw attention to the 																																																																																																																																																														Landover,	Maryland,	where	the	Vietnam	War	memorial	collections	are	stored,	I	came	across	the	plaster	casts	of	the	other	nineteen	soldiers	in	this	storage	facility	and	asked	him	about	them.	The	official	book	that	accompanies	the	KWVM	sheds	greater	light	on	the	stylistic	choice	of	reducing	the	soldier	statues	by	half	as	well:	“The	original	concept	called	for	thirty-eight	troopers,	symbolizing	the	38th	Parallel	and	the	thirty-eight-month	duration	of	the	war.	But	the	number	proved	too	large	for	the	allotted	space	and	put	the	soldiers	much	too	close	together	to	accurately	represent	troops	on	patrol.	The	memorial’s	second	element,	a	polished	granite	wall,	helped	to	solve	the	numbers	problem:	The	nineteen	soldiers	would	each	be	reflected	in	the	wall	to	achieve	the	symbolic	thirty-eight	number.”	Carol	M.	Highsmith	and	Ted	Landphair,	Forgotten	No	
More:	The	Korean	War	Veterans	Memorial	Story	(Washington,	D.C.:	Chelsea	Publishing,	Inc.,	1995):	59.	48	However,	the	current	Military	Demarcation	Line	is	not	exactly	along	the	38th	Parallel.	The	confusion	between	the	38th	Parallel	division	of	the	Korean	peninsula	in	1948	and	the	Military	Demarcation	Line	created	after	the	armistice	was	signed	in	1953	points	to	the	static	imagery	of	the	Korean	War	in	U.S.	memory.	49	For	more	on	the	DMZ	and	its	significance	in	memory	and	representation	in	South	Korean	and	critical	Asian	American	contexts	see	Terry	K.	Park,	De/militarizing	Empire:	
The	Korean	DMZ	(PhD	diss.:	University	of	California,	Davis,	2014)	and	Jeffrey	A.	Tripp,	
Contentious	Divide:	The	Cultural	Politics	of	the	Korean	Demilitarized	Zone,	1953-2008	(PhD	diss.:	University	of	Hawaii,	Manoa,	2010).	50	For	more	elaboration	on	North	Korea	as	the	“ghostly	other”	for	South	Korea	see	Theodore	Q.	Hughes,	Literature	and	Film	in	Cold	War	South	Korea:	Freedom’s	Frontier	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2012).	
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sacrifices of veterans who fought for freedom and democracy (Cold War logics that 
still ring true in this contemporary moment) while also foreclosing any type of 
emotion besides gratitude. Despite the generic tone of the memorial, these statements 
are still politically charged. As Kristin Hass explains, 
 
The words Korea, communism, containment, and Cold War are not 
used….More information about the Korean War might have complicated the 
memorial’s statement that “Freedom Is Not Free.” The shift to the soldier avoids 
the vital interests of the past to address the vital interests of the present.51 
 
There is nothing in the descriptions that speak to the Korean War as a specific war 
that took place in a specific geographic locale (what Heonik Kwon describes as 
locally specific cold war52), nor does it delve into what was at stake in the war, even 
though the individual stakes could be alluded to in the faces of the soldier statues. The 
phrase “country they never knew and a people they never met” coupled with the 
temporal boundaries of the Korean War as taking place from June 25, 1950 – July 27, 
1953 obscures the U.S.’s involvement in Korean affairs before this date, as well as the 
continual waves of Korean immigration to the U.S. in the aftermath of the war as well 
as the existence of a Korean diaspora.53 These inscriptions take “freedom” at face 
value, leaving it as the rationale for why war in Korea was necessary as well as 
justification for the destructiveness of U.S. forces in the peninsula, which was waged 
on both civilians and land.54 
 The guidebook to the memorial sheds more light on the choice of inscriptions: 
 
Because of the multiple messages already inherent in the design, CooperLecky 
and the Advisory Board were reluctant to clutter the memorial with allegorical 
inscriptions. Because of the memorial’s prominent location on the National 
Mall, Kent Cooper had long been concerned that it gave choice to the general 
theme of military service to country, as well as honoring those who served and 
fell in Korea.55 
 
The origin of the “Our nation honors…” phrase is traced to a statement by then 
Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci on the 35th anniversary of the end of the Korean 
War, which was adapted for usage on the memorial. A critical reading of this phrase 
points to the histories that are erased from this statement: from the U.S.’s “liberation” 																																																								51	Kristin	Ann	Hass,	Sacrificing	Soldiers	on	the	National	Mall	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	2013):	26-27.	52	See	Heonik	Kwon,	The	Other	Cold	War	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2010).	53	See	Ji-Yeon	Yuh,	Beyond	the	Shadow	of	Camptown:	Korean	Military	Brides	in	America	(New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	2002)	and	“Moved	by	War:	Migration,	Diaspora,	and	the	Korean	War,”	Journal	of	Asian	American	Studies	8.3	(October	2005):	277-291.	54	For	more	information	on	the	extent	of	the	destruction	waged	upon	Korean	land	and	people	see	Grace	M.	Cho,	Haunting	the	Korean	Diaspora:	Shame,	Secrecy,	and	the	
Forgotten	War	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2008)	and	Kim	Taewoo,	“From	a	hunch	to	a	policy:	a	structure	of	bombing	civilian	areas	by	USAF	fighter-bombers	during	the	Korean	War,”	Yŏksa	wa	hŏnsil:	Quarterly	Review	of	Korean	History	77	(2010):	417-454.	55	Carol	M.	Highsmith	and	Ted	Landphair,	Forgotten	No	More:	The	Korean	War	Veterans	
Memorial	Story	(Washington,	D.C.:	Chelsea	Publishing,	Inc.,	1995):	69.	
	 15	
of Korea from Japanese colonialism after the end of WWII in 194556 to Korean 
American immigration to the exportation of children through the adoption industry as 
legacies of the Korean War.57 Especially since this phrase is accompanied by the dates 
of the war, June 25th, 1950 – July 27th, 1953, the reference to a “country they never 
knew” and a “people they never met” calls forth the glaring exclusion of the 
recognition of U.S. involvement in creating the conditions for the Korean War before 
1950 as well as continuing military presence in South Korea today and structures of 
“debt imperialism.”58 Furthermore, critical readings of the memorial contains space 
for the possibility of return of not only ghosts, but also the very material “returns” of 
Korean/Asian Americans and the existence of critiques that “might speak back – in 
English – from its very different positionality,” as Elaine H. Kim argues.59 
 The phrase “Freedom is not free” is more difficult to trace, perhaps because of 
how generic the phrase is. Levi Fox points out that the original version of the phrase 
(“eternal vigilance is the price of liberty”) is often attributed to Thomas Jefferson, 
although no existing records confirm this statement despite its wide circulation.60 
Furthermore, according to Fox, 
 
the phrase “Freedom Is Not Free” is often credited to Colonel Walter Hitchcock 
of the New Mexico Military Institute, who recalls while “serving on the 
Secretary of the Air Force’s Staff Group in 1988” that he “was tasked to write 
his graduation address for that May” and “the phrase came out of” that part of 
his Secretary’s speech Hitchcock wrote.61 
 
However, even the accompanying guidebook to the memorial recognizes that there is 
no pinpointed reference for the memorial except at the American Legion building in 
Washington, D.C.: “The powerful saying was borrowed from the memorial’s own 
Advisory Board, which saw it above the entrance to the American Legion 
headquarters building in Washington (no one there is completely sure where it 
originated).”62 “Freedom is not free” is the mantra corresponding to the “gift of 
freedom,” and its generic yet loaded registers in the spaces of U.S. memorialization 
carry new and different meanings when translated to South Korean contexts. 																																																								56	See	Bruce	Cumings,	The	Origins	of	the	Korean	War,	Volume	I:	Liberation	and	the	
Emergence	of	Separate	Regimes,	1945-1947	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1981).	57	See	Eleana	J.	Kim,	Adopted	Territory:	Transnational	Korean	Adoptees	and	the	Politics	of	
Belonging	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2010)	and	SooJin	Pate,	From	Orphan	to	
Adoptee:	U.S.	Empire	and	Genealogies	of	Korean	Adoption	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2014).	58	Jodi	Kim,	“Settler	Modernity,	Debt	Imperialism,	and	the	Necropolitics	of	the	Promise,”	
Social	Text	36.2	(2018):	41-61.	59	Elaine	H.	Kim,	“Myth,	Memory	and	Desire:	Homeland	and	History	in	Contemporary	Korean	American	Writing	and	Visual	Art,”	in	Holding	Their	Own:	Perspectives	on	the	
Multi-Ethnic	Literatures	of	the	United	States,	edited	by	Dorothea	Fischer-Hornung	and	Heike	Raphael-Hernandez	(Tubingen,	Germany:	Stauffenberg-Verlag,	2000).	60	Levi	Fox,	“Not	Forgotten:	The	Korean	War	in	American	Public	Memory,	1950-2017”	(PhD	diss.:	Temple	University,	2018):	354.	61	Ibid.	62	Carol	M.	Highsmith	and	Ted	Landphair,	Forgotten	No	More:	The	Korean	War	Veterans	
Memorial	Story	(Washington,	D.C.:	Chelsea	Publishing,	Inc.,	1995):	74.	
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 In relation to the gift-debt relationship with freedom as gift in memorial 
contexts, the guidebook for the KWVM describes the memorial as a veterans 
memorial rather than a war memorial: “Not a war memorial, a veterans’ memorial, to 
at long last thank not just those who fell, but all those who went to an unfamiliar land 
to defend another nation’s freedom, and, therefore, our own.”63 Here, the logic 
becomes circular. Allegorical statements within the memorial were minimized, 
allowing for generic phrases to work better representationally and architecturally, yet 
these statements eventually became self-evident truths for understanding the 
experience of U.S. veterans of the Korean War, as illustrated in the quotation above. 
Similar statements exist at the War Memorial of Korea in Yongsan, Seoul, utilizing 
the framework of gift-debt as a way to institutionalize forgetting in not just the U.S., 
but transpacifically to South Korea as well. 
 
Transpacific Memorial Discourse: Freedom and Gratitude at the War Memorial 
of Korea, Seoul, South Korea 
 
 In turning to the South Korean context, the temporality of gift-debt relations 
functions as a framework for underscoring the memorialization style and tactics found 
within the War Memorial of Korea, the flagship war memorial and museum in South 
Korea. This memorial complex, which includes a war museum, memorial and park 
components, outdoor exhibitions (including an impressive display of various 
weaponry such as tanks and airplanes), and attached amenities such as a wedding hall, 
is located in the heart of the capital city of Seoul in the Yongsan district next to the 
U.S. military base and opened in 1994. The location of the memorial complex is 
particularly significant as well – on land that was occupied by Japanese military 
during the colonial era, transferred to U.S. military, restored back to South Korea and 
utilized as a military base, and after the relocation of the ROK military base to 
Daejeon, appropriated for its current usage as a war memorial complex/park.64 
 Jodi Kim and Mimi Thi Nguyen write that the temporality of the debt for the 
“gift of freedom”65 is perpetually extended into the future in the form of “debt 
imperialism,” “debt that does not yet have to be repaid. Yet still, it continues to 
produce debt for various populations who are vulnerable to crushing indebtedness, or 
what Harvey calls ‘debt incumbency.’”66 What, then, is the debt accrued for the gift of 
freedom granted by the U.S. and UN forces in the aftermath of the Korean War? 
These logics can be found in how freedom and gratitude are discussed at the War 
Memorial of Korea, particularly in the museum exhibition. Specifically, the transition 
from South Korea as developing country to developed country and from receiver of 
freedom to giver of freedom is heavily emphasized in the trajectory of the museum 
from its presentation of premodern Korean wars to the Korean War, the Vietnam War, 
and current military and peacekeeping actions throughout the world. Exhibitions 
focused on the Korean War and the role of the U.S./UN as defenders of freedom, and 																																																								63	Ibid,	51.	64	For	more	context	on	the	Yongsan	Garrison	in	Seoul,	see	this	interview	with	Bridget	Martin,	PhD	Candidate	at	UC	Berkeley’s	Department	of	Geography:	http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Z73-q11eGY&feature=youtu.be.		65	Mimi	Thi	Nguyen,	The	Gift	of	Freedom:	War,	Debt,	and	Other	Refugee	Passages	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2012).	66	Jodi	Kim,	“Settler	Modernity,	Debt	Imperialism,	and	the	Necropolitics	of	the	Promise,”	
Social	Text	36.2	(2018):	54.	
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South Korea’s transition in carrying out the inheritance of this legacy, are found 
specifically in exhibits that emphasize South Korean peacekeeping missions in Africa 
and the Middle East and fighting for freedom for other countries like Vietnam.67 
 Moreover, Korean War memoryscapes continue to be shaped and reshaped at 
the WMK.68 In a revisit to the War Memorial in the summer of 2016, new additive 
memorials have been attached to the Peace Plaza.69 Under each UN participating 
nation’s flag, there are new memorials in the shape of small bowls with black 
reflective surfaces and white text carved into the surface. The U.S.’s memorial reads 
“No Longer the Forgotten War,” reflecting the change in memorial discourse in the 
U.S. about the Korean War.70 What was once a space marking a distinction between 
the everyday use of the park-like memorial complex and the symbolic/sacred space of 
memorialization and honoring of national patriotism has shifted with the new additive 
memorials.71 The space of memorialization has overtaken or become part of the 
everyday usage space, pointing to how memory of the Korean War is continuously 
being shaped and reshaped rhetorically and spatially in South Korea. 
 Furthermore, “Freedom is not free” acquires another meaning when translated 
into Korean at the WMK. The phrase appears in both English and Korean at the 
entrance of the memorial complex engraved on the opening plaque, within museum 
films that introduce the Korean War, and throughout the UN exhibition hall. Although 
not explicitly quoted, the “gift of freedom” is alluded to in the exhibitions on the 
Vietnam War and global military/peacekeeping operations undertaken by the ROK; 
the framing of these exhibitions focus on the ROK fighting on behalf of freedom for 
other countries. Specifically, the phrase is translated as “chayunŭn kŏjŏ chuŏjinŭn 
kŏshi anida,” although translated back into English the phrase then becomes 
“Freedom is not given freely.” This added layer of exchange and the appearance of a 
gift-debt relationship add new light to this otherwise innocuous phrase. Who is the 																																																								67	For	more	on	South	Korea’s	“subimperial”	status	during	the	Vietnam	War,	see	Jin-kyung	Lee,	Service	Economies:	Militarism,	Sex	Work,	and	Migrant	Labor	in	South	Korea	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2010).	68	For	previous	work	on	the	War	Memorial	of	Korea	see	Sheila	Miyoshi	Jager,	“Monumental	Histories:	Manliness,	the	Military,	and	the	War	Memorial,”	Public	Culture	14.2	(2002):	387-410;	Hong	Kal,	Aesthetic	Constructions	of	Korean	Nationalism:	
Spectacle,	politics	and	history	(New	York:	Routledge,	2011);	Daniel	Y.	Kim,	“Nationalist	Technologies	of	Cultural	Memory	and	the	Korean	War:	Militarism	and	Neo-Liberalism	in	
The	Price	of	Freedom	and	the	War	Memorial	of	Korea,”	Cross-Currents:	East	Asian	History	
and	Culture	Review	4.1	(May	2015):	40-70.	69	These	new	memorials	were	dedicated	on	November	23rd,	2015,	and	organized	by	the	War	Memorial	of	Korea,	donated	by	Booyoung	Co.,	Ltd.,	and	built	by	the	Visual	Arts	Institute	at	Seoul	National	University.	The	purpose	of	the	memorials	is	to	commemorate	the	70th	anniversary	of	the	establishment	of	the	UN:	“In	commemoration	of	the	70th	anniversary	of	the	United	Nations,	this	monument	is	dedicated	to	honor	the	ultimate	sacrifices	and	noble	services	of	soldiers	who	valiantly	fought	under	the	UN	flag	in	the	Korean	War.”	The	title	of	the	work	is	“Silence	devoted	to	peace.”	70	Although	it	can	be	argued	that	the	Korea	War	was	never	truly	the	“Forgotten	War”	in	the	U.S.	outside	of	the	national	(Washington,	D.C.)	sphere;	local	states	and	counties	have	constructed	memorials,	highways,	and	other	memorial	markers	for	their	Korean	War	veterans	since	the	beginning	of	the	war.	See	Levi	Fox,	Not	Forgotten:	The	Korean	War	in	
American	Public	Memory,	1950-2017	(PhD	diss.:	Temple	University,	2018).	71	Kim	Chang-su,	“Chŏnjaengginyŏmgwan	hyŏnsangsŏlgye	mit	tangsŏ	nane	taehan	pip’yŏng,”	Kŏnch’uk(Taehan’gŏnch’uk’ak’oe	ji)	34.2	(March	1990):	45-46. 
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giver of freedom? And what is the debt that necessarily entails from this unfree gift 
of freedom? More significantly, does this translated text need to be amended72 by the 
newer ROK memorial at the Peace Plaza that emphasizes military sacrifice with no 
strings attached? This newer memorial reads: “At the outbreak of the Korean War, 
young soldiers from 21 countries participated in support of the freedom and peace of 
Korea with no strings attached. They came to help a country they never knew and a 
people they never met.” Here, it appears that the phrases are repeated so often in the 
War Memorial’s exhibition space that they now shift from quotation to factual 
description in the additive memorial, reflecting a circular logic of memorialization 
and narrative that sutures together as a form of reconciling history and memory, as in 
the Korean War Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C. 
 This erasure of the gift-debt relationship manifests itself in the historical 
erasures of the temporalities of the Korean War in both U.S. and South Korean 
contexts, as well as the memorial’s own militarized history. While militarized logics 
of freedom, gratitude, and sacrifice are overemphasized at the War Memorial, the 
everyday effects of living within close proximity to U.S. military bases are 
unacknowledged. 
 
Nogunri Peace Park: A Critique of Human Rights Discourse and the Limits of 
Reconciliation 
 
 The Nogunri Peace Park was built in 2011 and was put into motion by a 2004 
law, “Special Act on the Review and Restoration of Honor for the No Gun Ri 
Victims,” upon recommendation by the South Korean Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission.73 This memorial complex is intended to preserve and teach memory of 
the Nogunri Massacre, which took place from July 26-29, 1950. The massacre was 
perpetrated by U.S. soldiers, who were unsure if the numerous civilians fleeing from 
North Korea and front line battlefields were actually civilian refugees, or if they were 
North Korean soldiers in disguise. The death toll is estimated to be between 250-300 
people. 
 As a peace park, the Nogunri memorial complex attempts to address 
reconciliation between local and national memories of the Korean War, as counter-
memorial to more official Korean War narratives.74 For example, there is no mention 
of this massacre in the War Memorial of Korea. The Nogunri Peace Park is an 
example of the complicated discourses that come out of the desire for reconciliation – 
the memorial must function as a solution for the government’s acknowledgement of 
the massacre in the process of transitional justice, but in this case, it also has to 
struggle with the complicated role of the U.S. as not just liberator of the (South) 
Korean people or bringer of freedom, but also perpetrator of civilian massacre in the 
name of that freedom. “Freedom is not free” and questions of sacrifice, debt, and 																																																								72	Rather	than	seeing	memorial	spaces	as	including	design	elements	that	are	cohesive	with	one	another	or	contestations,	I	use	the	term	“amended”	to	take	into	account	the	changing	memoryscapes	of	the	Korean	War,	a	memory	that	is	continuously	(re)shaped	depending	on	the	political	situations	in	South	Korea	and	the	U.S.	73	The	documents	can	be	found	here:	http://nogunri.yd21.go.kr/html/kr/nogunri/nogunri_01_09.html.		74	See	Seunghei	Clara	Hong,	“Silenced	in	Memoriam:	Consuming	Memory	at	the	Nogunri	Peace	Park,”	Cross-Currents:	East	Asian	History	and	Culture	Review	14	(March	2015):	178-203.	
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gratitude are further complicated when this messy history becomes coopted by the 
state in the form of the “peace memorial park.” 
 While much of the history of the Nogunri Peace Park and its conception 
centers around one survivor, Chung Eun-yong, who managed to publish his story in 
199475 (after numerous rejections by publishers and only under the condition that his 
book was marketed as fiction rather than nonfiction), major news of the massacre hit 
the U.S. as controversy after a publication by the Associated Press in 1999.76 The 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Korea found reports and 
documentation of the massacre in the National Archives in Washington, D.C., as well 
as corroborations from South Korean survivors and U.S. soldiers who claimed to have 
been involved. Despite the recommendations of the TRC to push for compensation for 
the victims and their families by the South Korean and U.S. governments, as well as a 
formal apology, the U.S. government has not formally apologized nor acknowledged 
that this particular massacre occurred.77 After all, in terms of gift-debt relations, what 
does the U.S. government owe to the South Korean government or civilians when it 
brought the “gift of freedom”? It is not so much that there are “no strings attached” to 
the gift of freedom as the additive memorial to the War Memorial writes, but that the 
“gift of freedom” creates conditions for infinite debt (of gratitude, ongoing military 
presence, etc.) for Koreans while absolving the U.S. of any responsibility for war 
crimes and the crime of the Korean War and the division of the Korean peninsula in 
1945.78 This museum shows that there are indeed “strings attached” to the price of 
freedom. 
 An example of the exhibition tone in the museum can be found in the 
presentation of President Bill Clinton’s statement of regret from 2001 in which he 
says: “On behalf of the United States of America, I deeply regret that Korean civilians 
lost their lives at No Gun Ri in late July, 1950.” While many survivors view the 
statement as an insult since it is not an apology or admission of guilt, the museum 
takes on a more positively ambivalent tone: “The intensive, yearlong investigation 
into this incident has served as a painful reminder of the tragedies of war and the scars 
they leave behind on people and on nations.” The scars are not just South Korea’s, but 
also of the U.S. soldiers who must deal with the painful cost of collateral damage in 
the fight for freedom and security, almost lending equal weight to the perpetrators of 
violence as well as the recipients of violence, or freedom. “Freedom is not free,” 
traveling from Washington, D.C. to Seoul to Nogunri continues to resonate in 
different ways across the transpacific. 																																																								75	Chung,	Eun-yong,	Then,	Do	you	know	our	Pain?	[Kŭdae	uriŭi	ap’ŭmŭl	anŭnda:	nogŭlli	
iyagi]	(Seoul:	Dari	Media,	2011).	76	The	report	was	awarded	a	Pulitzer	Prize	in	2000.	Full	reports	can	be	found	on	the	Pulitzer	Prize	website:	https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/sang-hun-choe-charles-j-hanley-and-martha-mendoza.		77	See	Henry	Em,	Christine	Hong,	and	Kim	Dong-Choon,	“Coda:	A	Conversation	with	Kim	Dong-Choon,”	positions:	east	asia	cultures	critique	23.4	(Fall	2015):	837-849;	Christine	Hong,	“The	Unending	Korean	War,”	positions:	east	asia	cultures	critique	23.4	(Fall	2015):	596-617;	Seunghei	Clara	Hong,	“Silenced	in	Memoriam:	Consuming	Memory	at	the	Nogunri	Peace	Park,”	Cross-Currents:	East	Asian	History	and	Culture	Review	14	(March	2015):	178-203. 78	Jodi	Kim,	“Settler	Modernity,	Debt	Imperialism,	and	the	Necropolitics	of	the	Promise,”	
Social	Text	36.2	(2018):	41-61.	
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 As visitors walk out from the museum at Nogunri and encounter the 
outdoor memorials, as well as the actual site of the Nogunri Massacre, the site-
specificity of the tunnels stands in stark contrast to the ways in which other parts of 
the peace park “are in danger of reinforcing the dominant ideology and obscuring 
responsibility for both past atrocities and current social iniquities.”79 The bullet holes 
on the walls of the tunnels are circled with white chalk – direct evidence of U.S. 
attacks on South Korean civilians, supplementing the testimony of survivors. Yet, 
even the material evidence does not seem to be enough because unclaimed 
responsibility still exists. Across from the twin tunnels, in the park, there is a 
children’s play set situated in between a replica of a tank on one side and a fighter jet 
on the other, calling to mind the outdoor exhibition of the War Memorial of Korea. 
These contradicting landscapes of memory where multiple discourses and narratives 
are able to exist simultaneously together seem particularly poignant as the “gift of 
freedom” can be seen in the juxtaposition of the instruments in carrying out freedom 
alongside the material remains of its costs. 
 
 Differential memoryscapes of the Korean War speak to the inherent 
difficulties in memorializing a war that is not only ongoing, but also that has not quite 
addressed the problems of “de-cold war” raised by Chen Kuan-Hsing. The Korean 
War, while not “forgotten” in the South Korean context, still privileges certain 
narratives and discourses such as the U.S. as liberator and bringer of freedom, which 
obscures other narratives such as the experiences and memories of civilians 
massacred by U.S. soldiers. Yet, in pushing for truth and reconciliation and the 
enfolding of locally specific memories into national memories, peace parks like the 
Nogunri Peace Park also must turn to reconciliatory practices such as calling for a 
universal and generic human rights discourse to coincide with existing Korean War 
memorial narratives.80 It is important to reflect also on Jinsoo An’s discussion of the 
inherent conservatism of Korean War cinema, as his critique speaks to 
memorialization of the Korean War more broadly: 
 
Nihilistic in character, South Korean antiwar films critique war and its 
destruction by highlighting humanistic values. Yet these films are not 
fundamentally different in kind from state-sanctioned, anticommunist war films 
insofar as both promote a pessimistic view towards politics without calling into 
question the structure and practice of the state power in the first place.81 
 
While the contexts are quite different in that the war and peace museums are not 
“nihilistic in character” nor necessarily “pessimistic” in their view towards politics as 
could be argued about Korean War films, An’s point about how both war and antiwar 
films speak to an inherent conservative ethos can be found in both war 																																																								79	Seunghei	Clara	Hong,	“Silenced	in	Memoriam:	Consuming	Memory	at	the	Nogunri	Peace	Park,”	Cross-Currents:	East	Asian	History	and	Culture	Review	14	(March	2015):	146. 80	Hiro	Saito	has	referred	to	this	as	“cosmopolitan	commemoration”	in	the	context	of	peace	memorials	in	Japan.	Hiro	Saito,	“The	A-bomb	victims’	pleas	for	cosmopolitan	commemoration:	Toward	reconciliation	and	world	peace,”	Thesis	Eleven	129.1	(2015):	72-88.	81	Jinsoo	An,	“War	as	Business	in	South	Korea’s	Manchurian	Action	Films,”	positions	23.4	(2015):	785-806.	
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memorials/museums and peace memorials/museums. “Calling into question the 
structure and practice of state power in the first place” is precisely what critical Asian 
American memorial studies aims to do. By reading various transnational Korean War 
memorials and museums together with the repetitions of similar discourses of 
gratitude, freedom, and sacrifice within a framework not necessarily supported by the 
museums/memorials themselves, but present within the meeting of individual 
subjectivities with museum/memorial space, it becomes possible to examine Korean 
War memorializations that attempt to “de-cold war,” and to reimagine alternate 
frameworks for memorialization, challenging and complicating dialectics of 
remembering and forgetting. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Korean War Memorialization and Temporality in “Post”-Cold War South 
Korean Blockbuster Cinema 
 
 In a meeting between South Korean Lee Soo-hyŏk, played by Lee Byung-hun, 
and North Koreans Private Jŏng Wŏo-jin (played by Shin Ha-kyun) and Sergeant Oh 
K’yung-p’il (played by Song Kang-ho) in the film Joint Security Area 
(Kongtongkyŏngpikuyŏk JSA, hereafter referred to as JSA) (Park Chan-wook, 2000), 
after Soo-hyŏk crosses the DMZ over the Bridge of No Return to North Korea, 
Private Jŏng, in his excitement exclaims: “You’ve done a great thing. After half a 
century of division, you have breached our tragic history of agony and disgrace, 
broken the dam to reunify our country.” This scene demonstrates the visualization of 
an imagined situation in which North Koreans and South Koreans meet not as 
enemies, but as friends. Furthermore, unlike the history of the Korean War in South 
Korean museums, which paints the picture of continued North Korean attacks against 
South Korea (from the official beginning of the Korean War in 1950 to the axe 
murder incident in 1976 to the Yŏngpyŏng shelling in 2010), in this film it is the 
South Korean soldier who crosses the border first. This crossing is not an act of war, 
but rather an act of friendship and a desire by the South Korean soldier to know the 
North Korean soldiers on an intimate and human scale. 
 How do South Korean blockbuster films82 in the mid-to-late 2000s83 imagine 
the Korean War? And, how do South Korean filmmakers reimagine the Korean War 																																																								82	The	films	analyzed	throughout	the	chapter	fall	roughly	within	the	genre	of	the	“Korean	blockbuster.”	Youngmin	Choe	argues	that	the	Korean	blockbuster	first	emerged	on	an	international	scale	with	the	release	and	success	of	Kang	Je-gyu’s	film	Shiri	in	1999.	Furthermore,	she	argues	that	the	success	of	Korean	blockbusters	beginning	in	the	late	1990s/early	2000s	also	simultaneously	emerged	alongside	a	“memory	boom,”	which	not	only	popularized	the	Korean	War	as	a	subject	of	blockbuster	cinema,	but	also	depicted	a	general	loosening	of	the	formally	rigid	(and	heavily	censored)	depictions	of	North	Koreans,	humanizing	North	Korean	characters.	See	Youngmin	Choe,	“Postmemory	DMZ	in	South	Korean	Cinema,	1999-2003,”	Journal	of	Korean	Studies	18.2	(Fall	2013):	315-336;	Jinhee	Choi,	The	South	Korean	Film	Renaissance:	Local	Hitmakers,	Global	
Provocateurs	(Middletown:	Wesleyan	University	Press,	2010);	Frances	Gateward,	ed.,	
Seoul	Searching:	Culture	and	Identity	in	Contemporary	Korean	Cinema	(Albany:	State	University	of	New	York	Press,	2007);	Susie	Jie	Young	Kim,	“Korea	beyond	and	within	the	Armistice:	Division	and	the	Multiplicities	of	Time	in	Postwar	Literature	and	Cinema,”	
Journal	of	Korean	Studies	18.2	(Fall	2013):	287-313;	Daniel	Martin,	“South	Korean	Cinema’s	Postwar	Pain:	Gender	and	National	Division	in	Korean	War	Films	from	the	1950s	to	the	2000s,”	Journal	of	Korean	Studies	19.1	(Spring	2014):	93-114;	Darcy	Paquet,	New	Korean	Cinema:	Breaking	the	Waves	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2009);	Chi-Yun	Shin	and	Julian	Stringer,	eds.,	New	Korean	Cinema	(New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	2005). 83	Along	with	Korean	blockbusters’	humanizing	North	Korean	characters,	this	time	period	reflected	changing	politics	towards	North	Korea	in	South	Korea	with	Kim	Dae-jung’s	presidency	(1998-2003)	and	extending	into	his	successor	Roh	Moo-hyun’s	presidency	(2003-2008).	The	Kim	Dae-jung	administration	spearheaded	the	new	“Sunshine	Policy”	toward	North	Korea,	which	built	diplomatic	relations	between	South	Korea	and	North	Korea	and	exhibited	more	tolerance	and	support	towards	North	Korea,	including	allowing	for	reunions	of	divided	families,	with	the	goal	of	reconciliation	and	
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through scenes of affect between enemy soldiers? In other words, how do films 
depict instances in which South Koreans and North Koreans, to borrow from the film 
JSA, “breach the tragic history of agony and disgrace, broken the dam to reunify our 
country?” In order to answer these questions, the chapter analyzes four contemporary 
South Korean films that (re)present the history of the Korean War through imagining 
and imaging as alternate history: 2009 Lost Memories (Lee Si-myung, 2002), 
Welcome to Dongmakgol (Park Kwang-hyun, 2005), Joint Security Area (Park Chan-
wook, 2000), and The Front Line (Jang Hoon, 2011). 
 While these films focus on different eras of history (Japanese colonial period – 
1910-1945 – in 2009 Lost Memories, the Korean War in Welcome to Dongmakgol and 
The Front Line, and the present day in JSA), they all present the “problem” of the 
Korean War in similar ways. With the exception of The Front Line, which is a bridge 
film that connects the early to mid-2000s films to the post-2011s films examined in 
the next chapter, they rewrite dominant narratives of the Korean War (Cold War 
logics of anticommunism v. communism) and instead focus on North Korean-South 
Korean friendship/collaboration as a means by which to reimagine the Korean War. 
Furthermore, 2009 Lost Memories, Welcome to Dongmakgol, and JSA not only 
rewrite the history of the Korean War, but they also rewrite the “enemy” during the 
war as well. Each of the three films also presents similar plot situations in which a 
group of disparate heroes (made up of North and South Koreans) band together to 
fight for a greater goal, which is the circumvention of division, and movement 
towards peaceful reconciliation and unification of the two Koreas. This results in 
changing the very epistemological logic of the Korean War of communism v. 
anticommunism, moving to a discourse of (unified) Koreans v. foreign invaders or 
any party invested in maintaining the system of Korean division. In other words, the 
reimagined enemy of the Korean War is the Korean War itself and those 
states/entities invested in upholding this unending and protracted war.84 Thus, analysis 
of the films points to the radical possibilities of a different Cold War 
future/history/temporality, and the spaces that allow for such a reimagining. 
 Next sections of this chapter explore the possibilities of Cold War 
realignments and reimaginings, and the ways in which each of the three films – 2009 
Lost Memories, Welcome to Dongmakgol, and JSA – utilize temporality and space to 
question dominant Cold War logics of anticommunism v. communism. However, as 
close readings of the films’ endings and usage of the medium of photography in the 
endings demonstrate, ultimately, while they allow for spaces of alternate histories and 
reimaginings of Cold War temporality, the films also demonstrate how these spaces 
and temporalities are doomed to failure and remain in the space of imagination even 
within the film world. The last section of the chapter focuses on The Front Line as a 																																																																																																																																																														reunification.	I	study	the	films	produced	during	the	Sunshine	Policy	era	for	how	they	mirror	the	policies	at	the	time	as	well	as	their	enduring	cultural	legacies	on	audiences	then	and	in	the	present.	In	examining	the	theme	of	reconciliation	as	a	thread	running	through	Korean	War	cultural	memory,	these	films	come	closest	to	portraying	this	in	a	literal	manner	through	the	focus	on	North	Korean-South	Korean	intimate	friendships.	84	As	analyzed	further	in	this	chapter,	in	2009	Lost	Memories	the	main	enemies	are	the	Japanese	colonizers,	in	Welcome	to	Dongmakgol	they	are	U.S.	soldiers	(even	though	the	U.S.	was	the	primary	ally	of	South	Korea	during	the	Korean	War),	and	in	JSA	they	are	the	South	Korean	and	North	Korean	states	that	are	both	invested	in	maintaining	the	division	of	the	Korean	peninsula.	
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transitional film between the films of the 2000s and the post-2011 films, explored 
in the next chapter, which all feature endings that make use of the photograph. 
 
Space of Alternate History, Cold War Temporality, and Korean War as 
Epistemological Problem for Reconciliation 
 
 The Korean War, outside of its historical eventness, is also an epistemological 
rupture predicated on division and Cold War ideologies that leaves no room for non-
alignment or neutrality.85 Yet these seemingly clear-cut ideologies of “us” v. “them,” 
of “communist” v. “anticommunist,” of “North Korean” v. “South Korean” do not 
quite align as comfortably to material bodies as the rhetoric implies. The early-to-late 
2000s Korean War films, then, attempt to portray a different way of understanding the 
Korean War through presenting glimpses of the promise of world(s)/spaces/places 
that do not exist within the current division system.86 To this extent, following along 
scholarship on the Korean War and the Cold War’s “protracted afterlives,”87 I see 
these three films as primarily concerned with the recursiveness of the Korean War and 
an exploration into “division culture,” but with a difference. 																																																								85	I	have	also	encountered	the	Korean	War	as	an	epistemological	problem	at	museum	sites	throughout	the	course	of	my	research,	addressed	in	other	chapters	of	the	dissertation.	The	“problem	of	the	Korean	War”	particularly	becomes	a	literal	problem	at	museum	sites	in	South	Korea	that	focus	on	the	Japanese	colonial	era.	In	those	museums,	the	Korean	War	makes	virtually	no	appearance	because	the	concept	of	national	division	shatters	these	museums’	triumphalist	narratives	of	the	collective	Korean	people’s	will	to	resist	colonial	domination	(oftentimes	told	alongside	a	longer	genealogy	of	Korean	people’s	repelling	of	foreign	attacks,	the	most	famous	narrative	being	the	celebration	of	Admiral	Yi	Sun-shin	and	his	defeat	of	the	Japanese	using	his	famous	“turtle	ship”	during	the	Imjin	Wars).	Kenneth	J.	Ruoff,	in	his	current	research	on	South	Korean	museums,	refers	to	this	as	the	“5,000	years	of	Korean	history”	narrative,	which	is	found	in	many	museums	such	as	the	Independence	Hall	of	Korea.	86	For	more	scholarship	on	the	films	see	Hwang	Yŏngmi,	“Yŏnghwa	e	nat’anan	han’kuk’chŏn’chaengki	mikun	gwa	min’kan’in	ŭi	kwan’kye”	(“The	Relationship	Between	the	U.S.	Military	and	a	Civilian	Population	during	the	Korean	War	as	Depicted	in	Korean	Films”),	Hyŏn’tae	yŏnghwayŏn’ku	18	(2014):	159-185;	Kim	Han’sang,	“Chuhan’mikuk’kongpowŏn	(USIS)	yŏnghwa	ŭi	ŭngsi	mek’ŏnichŭm”	(“The	Mechanism	of	the	Gaze	in	the	USIS	Film	Propaganda	in	South	Korea,”	Yŏk’samun’cheyŏn’ku	30	(2013):	167-201;	Kim	Han’sang,	“Naengchŏn’ch’eche	wa	naesyŏnŏl	sinema	ŭi	hon’chongchŏk	wŏn’ch’ŏn”	(“Cold	War	and	the	Hybrid	Ursprung	of	South	Korean	National	Cinema”),	
Yŏnghwayŏn’ku	47	(2011):	87-111;	Ko	Puŭng	(Koh	Boo	Eung),	“<Welk’ŏmt’u	Tongmakkol>	e	nat’ananŭn	min’chokkongtongch’e”	(“The	Formation	of	National	Identity	in	the	Film	Welcome	to	Dongmakgol”),		(Comparative	Literature)	39	(2006):	191-210;	Ryu	Chaehyŏn,	“Han’kukhyŏn	Pŭlrok’pŏsŭt’ŏ	yŏnghwa	ŭi	Han’kuk	min’chok’chuŭichŏk	t’ŭk’sŏng:	<Kongtongkyŏngpikuyŏk	JSA>	wa	<Han’pan’to>rŭl	chungshimŭro”	(“The	Korean	Nationalist	Characteristics	of	the	Korean	Blockbuster	Films:	Focusing	on	Joint	Security	Area	and	Hanbando”),	Han’kuk’ŏnron’chŏngbohak’bo	59	(2012):	116-137;	Sŏ	In’suk,	“Han’kukhyŏng	Pŭlrok’pŏsŭt’ŏ	esŏ	pun’tan	ŭi	chehyŏn’pangsik:	han	kwa	shinp’a	ŭi	kwihwan”	(“The	Representation	of	Korean	Political	Division	in	Korean	Blockbuster	Film:	The	Return	of	Han	and	Sinpa”),	Mun’hak	kwa	
yŏngsang	(2011):	981-1015.	87	Jodi	Kim,	Ends	of	Empire:	Asian	American	Critique	and	the	Cold	War	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2010).	
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 The Korean War is an epistemological problem, such that it is portrayed in 
the films 2009 Lost Memories, Welcome to Dongmakgol, JSA, and The Front Line as 
an “unnatural” occurrence, brought about by outside influences. The films 
demonstrate the effects and affects of the tragic division of the Korean peninsula and 
people, and that the only “natural” course in rectifying this division is through 
reunification. Furthermore, they focus on relationships between South Koreans and 
North Koreans to portray an assumed desire of Koreans to want to be one people and 
that without the influence of foreign outsiders, unification of the two Koreas would be 
the “natural” historical progression. The Korean War as epistemological problem 
indicates a break in this seemingly natural progression. Yet, the films are not entirely 
able to escape the “problem” of the Korean War and thus resort to depictions of 
alternate temporalities and spaces to reimagine the Korean War. 
 Within the Cold War division system, scenes in the films that showcase the 
affective spaces of imagined community between North Koreans and South Koreans – 
for example, working together in a farming village or illicitly sharing snacks in DMZ 
guard houses – exist in an ambiguous space that is imaged as reality onscreen, yet is 
simultaneously within fantasy cinematic space outside of Cold War temporality. The 
Korean War and all of its attendant discourses of communism/anticommunism are 
reimagined within the films as spaces/places in which these discourses are show to 
not exist or desired not to exist. In particular, 2009 Lost Memories, Welcome to 
Dongmakgol, and JSA are powerful films because they focus on the space/place of the 
local and the intimate in order to reimagine a world beyond division and that takes 
seriously the promise of peaceful (re)unification, even if that promise has to be 
broken. By depicting this promise through the theme of alternate reality, these films 
also allow audiences to visualize future peace reunification with North Korea in 
reality, thus breaking free – if only in the realm of entertainment – from the chains of 
the epistemological confines of the Korean War that can only see North Korea as 
enemy other. 
 Furthermore, the Korean War and the division of the peninsula have often 
been referred to metaphorically through the lens of stalled temporality, a standstill or 
pause in time. Instead, I point to a certain circularity of temporalities within 2009 Lost 
Memories, Welcome to Dongmakgol, and JSA, which commonly manifests in these 
films’ convention of including photographs of the main protagonists, before major 
conflict, in the ending moments or in the credits. This is not so much a slow temporal 
“decomposition” as in Heonik Kwon’s formulation of locally specific Cold War 
histories in The Other Cold War,88  but rather what I call memorial time. The 
memorial time, represented by the photographs, circles back to an imaginary 
beginning point, a point in time and space that can never be returned to. These films 
do not just depict stalled temporalities; rather, they are also memorials to the stalled 
temporality, the time and space that ultimately cannot come to pass. Specifically, 
through the techniques of visual documentation and memorialization, the films all 
visualize alternate histories, which provide brief glimpses of worlds and times freed 
from Cold War divisions, dismantles those worlds, and finally memorializes this loss. 
These films end with the ambivalent desire to “go back” to a time and space before 
Korean War; however, as with the historical and present situation of the Korean War 
itself, these desires are left un-reconciled and unresolved. 
																																																								88	Heonik	Kwon,	The	Other	Cold	War	(New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	2010).	
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 However, film, as immaterial form, could challenge some of these spaces’ 
contested histories/ideologies and propose a new space that exceeds the boundaries of 
Cold War epistemologies, logics, and insistences on reconciliatory frameworks in the 
post-Cold War conjuncture. Alternate history and alternate world-making transcend 
the epistemological notions of the Korean War within the films, and I reconcile this 
through also analyzing alongside the films theories on Cold War and Cold War 
temporalities. In particular, Chen Kuan-Hsing’s Asia as Method: Towards 
Deimperialization89 and Heonik Kwon’s The Other Cold War90 and their discussions 
of the Cold War’s protracted endings, as well as the understudied lived experiences of 
the Cold War, help draw out a theorization of these films as belonging to the 
memorial legacies of the Korean War,91 which reflect both the promise and eventual 
denial of future peaceful reunification through the “locally specific” lives of its 
characters. 
 Chen’s intervention of “de-cold war,” which is analogous to processes of 
decolonization, articulates the necessity of grappling with the specific legacies of the 
Cold War on the lived experiences of people who are still affected by its ideologies 
and divisions. To begin the process of “de-cold war” is to “mark out a space in which 
unspoken stories and histories may be told, and to recognize and map the historically 
constituted cultural and political effects of the cold war.”92 South Korean films 
produced in the contemporary “post”-Cold War era are also grappling with “de-cold 
war,” which primarily manifests in themes relating to North Korean-South Korean 
interactions.93 That these films seek to carve out a space for “unspoken stories and 
histories to be told” can be seen as direct reactions to the Cold War and Korean War 
structures of power and rhetoric that emphasized the disavowal of North Korean 
people94 and familial ties across the DMZ.95 																																																								89	Kuan-Hsing	Chen,	Asia	as	Method:	Toward	Deimperialization	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2010).	90	Heonik	Kwon,	The	Other	Cold	War	(New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	2010).	91	For	more	on	memorial	legacies	of	the	Korean	War	see	Youngmin	Choe,	“Postmemory	DMZ	in	South	Korean	Cinema,	1999-2003,”	Journal	of	Korean	Studies	18.2	(Fall	2013):	315-336;	Suhi	Choi,	Embattled	Memories:	Contested	Meanings	in	Korean	War	Memorials	(Reno:	University	of	Nevada	Press,	2014);	Suk-Young	Kim,	DMZ	Crossing:	Performing	
Emotional	Citizenship	Along	the	Korean	Border	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2014).	Also	see	Cross-Currents	E-Journal’s	March	2015	issue	on	“(De)Memorializing	the	Korean	War:	A	Critical	Intervention,”	which	features	articles	by	Suzy	Kim,	Keun-Sik	Jung,	Daniel	Y.	Kim,	Sunghoon	Han,	Seunghei	Clara	Hong,	Brendan	Wright,	and	Bruce	Cumings.	92	Kuan-Hsing	Chen,	Asia	as	Method:	Toward	Deimperialization	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2010):	120.	93	See	in	particular	Youngmin	Choe,	“Postmemory	DMZ	in	South	Korean	Cinema,	1999-2003,”	Journal	of	Korean	Studies	18.2	(Fall	2013):	315-336;	Susie	Jie	Young	Kim,	“Korea	beyond	and	within	the	Armistice:	Division	and	the	Multiplicities	of	Time	in	Postwar	Literature	and	Cinema,”	Journal	of	Korean	Studies	18.2	(Fall	2013):	287-313;	Daniel	Martin,	“South	Korean	Cinema’s	Postwar	Pain:	Gender	and	National	Division	in	Korean	War	Films	from	the	1950s	to	the	2000s,”	Journal	of	Korean	Studies	19.1	(Spring	2014):	93-114. 94	See	Theodore	Hughes,	Literature	and	Film	in	Cold	War	South	Korea:	Freedom’s	Frontier	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2014).	95	See	Suk-Young	Kim,	DMZ	Crossing:	Performing	Emotional	Citizenship	Along	the	Korean	
Border	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2014).	
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 Kwon also questions the “end” of the Cold War, pointing out that “the 
historical turning point glossed as the end of the cold war is actually an extended 
horizon of ‘what is not yet,’ a field of time-space that is open to creative political 
acting and moral imagining.”96 The films analyzed literally take on the “locally 
specific” Cold War – and Korean War – through the exploration of the “what is not 
yet” by imagining and imaging an alternate history/future that has not yet arrived. 
Kwon also likens the Cold War’s ends as a slow “decomposition,” a time and space 
that is not quite divorced of the past yet still cannot fully imagine a future; it is an 
“unsettling situation in which the living reality is not really free from the immediate 
past and has not reintegrated the past into the time present as a past history – that is, it 
has a kind of spectral existence.”97 The spectral existence of multiple temporalities 
takes form in the alternate futures, histories, and presents found within the 2000s 
South Korean films. While these films present alternate histories, they also depict 
alternate temporalities of the Cold War and the Korean War, as well as an alternate 
epistemology for the Korean War – rethinking and revisualizing the Korean War and 
lives not burdened by Cold War binary constraints. At the same time, the alternate 
temporalities and spaces are shown to ultimately not last and thus are also 
memorialized through cinematic techniques and memorial time within the films. 
 The next sections of the chapter examine how the films 2009 Lost Memories, 
Welcome to Dongmakgol, and JSA depict the spaces of alternate histories of Korean 
War within the diegesis, as well as their ultimate failure in maintaining these spaces 
and the usage of photography within the film media as a form of memorial time. I end 
with The Front Line, which also ends with a photograph, as a bridge between the 
2000s Korean War films and the 2010s Korean War films explored in the following 
chapter. 
 
Alternate Histories, Temporalities, and Spaces of he Korean War in 2009 Lost 
Memories, Welcome to Dongmakgol, and JSA 
 
 Each of the three films – 2009 Lost Memories, Welcome to Dongmakgol, and 
JSA – focuses on the theme of alternate history. On the basic level, the historical 
circumstances presented within the films are different from current historical reality. 
These films present the promise of an alternate history and future, which could lead to 
a different understanding of those historical events for the audience, as well as a 
reevaluation of the legacies of the events of the Korean War. Therefore, the alternate 
histories traced in these films directly speak to alternate epistemologies of the Korean 
War. 
 The films all play around with the rhetorical questions of “what if…?” and 
follow the logics of this alternate line of questioning through their film narratives. 
Thus, they portray the speculations, promises, and failures of an alternate 
history/future that is different from reality and/or does not yet exist. 2009 Lost 
Memories asks the question: What if Japanese colonization of the Korean peninsula 
had never ended? What would be the history/future of the Korean peninsula if 
Japanese colonization had never ended? Welcome to Dongmakgol asks: What if there 
exists a place totally devoid of conflict and war during the Korean War, as well as 
completely unaware of Cold War logics and structures of feelings? What would this 																																																								96	Heonik	Kwon,	The	Other	Cold	War	(New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	2010):	8.	97	Ibid,	33.	
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place look like? JSA asks: What if there is a different method of approaching North 
Korean-South Korean relations that could subvert the current division system? And, 
what would North Korean-South Korean interactions look like in arguably one of the 
most ideologically demarcated spaces on the Korean peninsula, the Demilitarized 
Zone (DMZ)? These “what if” questions deal directly with the issues of temporality, 
place, and space and their relations to history and memory. 
 Therefore, despite the different periods of history in which each film takes 
place, they all posit a rethinking of the Korean War and a questioning of dominant 
Cold War/Korean War allegiances and demarcations, as well as provide glimpses of 
an alternate temporality and space for a peaceful end to the Korean War and future 
reconciliation and reunification with North Korea. As the Korean War is still not 
technically over, these films form part of a continued grappling with memory and 
memorialization of the Korean War and a working through of “de-Korean War.” 
Specifically, the alternate history of the Korean War manifests itself through each of 
the films’ alternate enemies of the Korean War. 
 
 2009 Lost Memories (Lee Si-myung, 2002) is a science fiction/action film 
about a Korea in which Japanese colonization had never ended. Here, alternate history 
is played out literally within the narrative – the film takes place in alternate history 
Seoul in 2009 and follows the stories of two Japanese Bureau of Investigation (JBI) 
officers, one ethnically Korean, as they investigate the terrorist group Hureisenjin, 
who function as modern-day Korean independence fighters. Throughout the film, 
Jang Dong-gun’s character, Sakamoto, who is otherwise almost completely 
assimilated into Japanese society, grapples with his Korean roots and eventually joins 
the Hureisenjin cause. 
 It is later revealed in the film that the alternate history was not a natural 
occurrence; rather, in the “correct” timeline of the film, a Japanese scientist had gone 
back in time to alter Japanese and Korean history. The scientist (in unaltered 2009) 
time traveled to 1909 Harbin and assassinates An Jung-geun before he can assassinate 
Ito Hirobumi, the first governor-general of Korea. This then sets in motion a new 
storyline and history in which the March 1st Movement of 1919 is effectively 
dispersed, the U.S. and Japan end up as allies during WWII, and the atomic bomb is 
dropped on Berlin in 1945 instead of on Japan.98 Preventing the dropping of the 
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki serves as the impetus for why the Japanese 
scientist wanted to travel back in time in the first place. 																																																								98	The	beginning	of	the	film	lays	out	the	altered	history	through	a	visual	timeline	with	faked	archival	photographs	playing	in	the	background.	The	timeline	is	as	follows	(transcribed	from	the	English	subtitles):	“Failed	assassination	attempt	on	Chosun	Governor	Ito	Hirobumi;	Assassin	Choong-Kun	Ahn	shot	and	killed	on	site;	1910	–	Takeover	of	‘Chosun’	–	the	Korean	peninsula;	Ito	Hirobumi	appointed	as	first	governor	of	Chosun;	1919	–	March	1,	illegal	gathering	in	Pagoda	Park	dispersed;	1921	–	Inoue	[the	time-traveling	scientist]	appointed	as	second	governor	of	Chosun;	1932	–	BG	Yoon	killed	in	Honxiao	Park,	Shanghai;	1936	–	US	and	Japanese	soldiers	fight	as	allies	in	World	War	II;	1943	–	Japan	takes	over	Manchuria;	1945	–	Atomic	bombs	dropped	on	Berlin,	World	War	II	ends;	1960	–	Japan	accepted	into	UN	as	a	permanent	member	of	the	UN	Security	Council;	1965	–	Sakura	I	satellite	goes	into	orbit;	1988	–	Olympic	Games	held	in	Nagoya;	2002	–	Soccer	World	Cup	held	in	Japan.”	Note	the	missing	Korean	War	in	the	revised	timeline.	
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 Never mentioned in this film, the Korean War in this alternate timeline 
never occurs because the Soviet Union and the U.S. had never divided the peninsula 
after 1945, as Korea had never become an independent nation. Furthermore, even in 
the corrected timeline, the problem of the Korean War is elided as it is revealed that in 
“proper” timeline 2009 Seoul, North and South Korea had already been reunified. 
Thus, this film’s alternate history posits an altered timeline and corrected timeline that 
are both different from current historical conditions on the Korean peninsula. 
 Even though the film is not explicitly about the Korean War, and the erasure 
of the war could be seen as just another result of the failure of Ito Hirobumi’s 
assassination setting into place a new historical timeline, the film still ends with a 
restored timeline 2009 Seoul in which the Korean War does happen. Even though it is 
not explicitly mentioned, the audience can surmise that the Korean War happened 
because of the film’s ending with the successful reunification between South Korea 
and North Korea. Thus, the problem of the Korean War is resolved without actually 
depicting or mentioning the Korean War. Nevertheless, the Korean War is still 
important because its erasure within the diegetic frames of the film, despite 
addressing reunification, marks it as significant as if the war had appeared visually 
onscreen. 
 Furthermore, the Hureisenjin in the film work together despite their 
knowledge of the correct timeline – they acquired knowledge of the correct timeline 
because a Korean scientist had also followed the Japanese scientist back in time and 
informed future generations of Koreans about the timeline change. While North/South 
division does not demarcate the terrorist/independence fighters, it is assumed that with 
the restoration of the timeline, perhaps they might not be on the same side after all 
because of the impending division of the peninsula that would result from correcting 
history. This results in another difficult hypothetical question: is a future without the 
Korean War, which had resulted in the deaths of millions of people (soldiers, 
civilians, and participants from across the world), even at the expense of continuing 
Japanese colonization, worth it? The film sidesteps the answering of this difficult 
question, eliminating the problem of the Korean War completely. As a senior member 
of the Hureisenjin explains in regards to the “proper” timeline, “[in] 2008, after 60 
years of separation North and South Korea united to become a new nation with a 
strong economy and military. Korea became a new icon in Asia.” The film posits this 
explanation of successful future reconciliation as the ultimate goal and thus, even if 
the Korean War were to happen, successful Korean reunification would justify the 
deaths that resulted from the war.99 The film necessarily has to end with successful 
reunification and (unified) Korea becoming the “new icon in Asia” because anything 
less may lead the viewers to question the dangerous notion of ongoing Japanese 
colonization as being less destructive than the Korean War, a line of alternate what-if 
questioning that subverts nationalist discourses, in which Japanese colonization is one 
of the absolute worst events in Korean history. 
 In the film, there is also little question of who the enemy is – the Japanese who 
continue to colonize Korea. Despite the presence of some sympathetic Japanese 																																																								99	Additionally,	the	deaths	and	displacements	that	resulted	from	the	Korean	War/Cold	War	in	Korea	such	as	the	civilian	massacres	in	Jeju	(the	4.3	Incident),	as	well	as	throughout	the	rest	of	the	Korean	peninsula,	the	sexual	and	gendered	violence	of	military	camptowns,	and	the	“orphans”	from	the	Korean	War	that	were/were	not	adopted	within	the	transnational	and	transracial	adoption	industry.	
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characters, the film overall condemns the Japanese as they indiscriminately and 
brutally kill the Hureisenjin, including a young boy, and exhibit racist attitudes toward 
ethnic Koreans. Furthermore, the “memory wars” that affect contemporary Northeast 
Asian relations is shown in a literal manner in this film: the Japanese not only distort 
events in textbooks or conservative museums such as the Yushukan in Yasukuni 
Shrine, but they also literally change history. Thus, the film is as much about the 
contemporary “memory wars” as it is about the legacy of independence movements in 
Korea and the erasure of the Korean War within that narrative. The film, then, 
through the Hureisenjin’s mission, argues for the rightful and “true” history, although 
true history in this case also comes along with the added fantasy outcome of future 
unified Korea becoming a “new icon in Asia.” 
 However, despite these seemingly clear boundaries between enemy and ally 
within the film, the idea of enemy may not be as clearly delineated as it appears. For 
example, the Hureisenjin could be seen as the main enemies in the film because while 
on a global scale, their mission to fight for Korean independence and future successful 
reunification is a noble endeavor, on the locally specific scale, the Hureisenjin are 
fighting for a history in which the Korean War resulted in the deaths of many Koreans 
and non-Korean combatants as well as the displacement and separation of millions of 
Korean families, which still affect Koreans and Korean diasporic subjects today. 
 Thus, the film sets up a choice between Japanese colonization or unified 
Korean sovereignty (and Korean global economic success) despite the more realistic 
choice lying between continued Japanese colonization or the death toll/destruction of 
the Korean War, which resulted in a still-divided Korea and its traumatic legacies. 
This is an epistemological problem that is too controversial to grapple with in a single 
film and because the film is unable to reconcile the problem of the Korean War, it 
ends up effacing it completely. Even with the erasure of the Korean War as a 
historical event in this alternate history film, the problem of the Korean War continues 
to haunt the film, demonstrating the inescapability of contemporary Cold War 
consciousness. This is manifested in the final photographic scene of the film. 
 In 2009 Lost Memories the photograph appears in the last scene of the film, 
which takes place in a successfully restored timeline Seoul in 2009 and follows a 
group of schoolchildren as they learn about the independence movement from a 
docent at the Independence Hall of Korea. In this final scene, one of the children runs 
back to look at a display and within the display he sees a photograph of Sakamoto and 
his love interest alongside the other independence fighters from the 1930s. The 
presence of the photograph, rather than providing visual evidence of an authentic 
past,100 feels out of place. Sakamoto and his love interest are the only people smiling 
alongside the serious faces of the independence army and appear as if they were 
placed into the photograph post-event. 
 This photograph, which signifies Sakamoto’s success in being able to restore 
the proper timeline, ends up resembling a tourist photograph taken at a museum.101 
The photograph coopts Sakamoto into a history that is, by association with the 
Independence Hall of Korea, even in a timeline that resulted in successful 																																																								100	As	discussed	in	the	next	chapter,	this	is	in	contrast	to	post-2011	Korean	War	films,	which	precisely	use	photographic	or	archival	documents	as	historical	evidence	within	the	narrative.	101	It	is	common	for	most	museums	in	South	Korea	to	allow	visitors	to	take	pictures	of	themselves	with	historical	filters	and	figures	as	background.	
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reunification, a specifically South Korean history. Yet, when Sakamoto chose to 
join the Hureisenjin, disavowing his Japanese collaborator identity, he made the 
choice to represent Korea and not South Korea, as the country had not yet been 
divided. However, the end of the film seems to erase Sakamoto’s choice as the 
photograph, located within a South Korean museum and within the museum tradition 
of photographing oneself as a part of history, seems to eerily insert the question of 
nationality back into the film – a specifically South Korean nationality despite the 
film’s assertion that restored timeline 2009 is the year after North Korea and South 
Korea peacefully reunified. Thus, despite the film’s attempts at envisioning an 
alternate future in which the Korean War is not a problem, the space in which the film 
ends is already inherently embroiled in the politics of Cold War and Korean division. 
 
 Welcome to Dongmakgol (Park Kwang-hyun, 2005) takes place during the 
Korean War. The film follows a group of North Korean soldiers and South Korean 
soldiers as they accidentally discover a hidden village called Dongmakgol.102 The 
film’s portrayal of Dongmakgol in bright vivid colors and with fantastic elements like 
CG-generated huge boars has drawn comparisons to the magical landscapes of 
Japanese animator Hayao Miyazaki, founder of Studio Ghibli, and contribute to the 
fantasy-space of the village.103 Furthermore, Dongmakgol connects a realm between 
fantasy and reality because the villagers within Dongmakgol have no idea that there is 
a war occurring, let along that the country has been divided. The village ultimately 
becomes a meeting point not only for the South Koreans and North Koreans, but also 
a downed U.S. pilot and the rescue group that comes after him under the pretense that 
Communist soldiers captured him. 
 The early parts of the film are comedic and straddle the line between utopian 
fantasy comedy film and realist war film.104 For example, when encountering each 
other for the first time in Dongmakgol, the North Koreans and South Koreans take 
part in a “Mexican standoff” and as both groups threaten to mutually kill each other, 
they also take the villagers hostage. The framing in the standoff scene demonstrates 
the visual logics of division with both sets of combatants on opposite sides of the 
frame and the villagers literally caught in the middle. However, unable and perhaps 
simply unwilling to understand the situation, villagers soon amble off to their own 
daily activities. As they gradually leave and reenter the frame to use the toilet, to 
harvest crops, and to do other daily activities, the villagers demonstrate visual 
opposition to the structures of division by agentially choosing to completely leave the 
scene and screen. The humor arises from the situation in which the villagers 
completely refuse to follow the instructions issued by the opposing military factions, 
as it is unfathomable to imagine a situation like this in other Korean War films (the 
villagers would have probably been immediately killed even before having the 																																																								102	There	is	no	further	specified	location	for	the	village	of	Dongmakgol	in	the	film,	but	the	filming	site	is	in	Gangwon	Province	in	Pyeongchang	Village.	For	more	information	see:	http://english.visitkorea.or.kr/enu/SI/SI_EN_3_1_1_1.jsp?cid=6244-6.	103	Adding	to	the	fantasy	element,	Joe	Hisaishi,	famous	for	working	as	composer	on	Studio	Ghibli	projects,	composed	the	soundtrack	to	Welcome	to	Dongmakgol.	104	Despite	Welcome	to	Dongmakgol’s	falling	within	the	subgenre	of	comedy	film,	the	ending	employs	blockbuster	spectacle	typical	of	other	war	films	and	features	melodramatic	war	film	conventions.	In	fact,	the	affective	qualities	of	the	film,	particularly	in	its	last	arc,	are	similar	to	that	of	the	blockbuster	film	Taegukgi:	The	
Brotherhood	of	War	(T’aekŭkki	hwinalrimyŏ)	(Kang	Je-gyu,	2004).	
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opportunity to question who the invading soldiers are105). The standoff scene 
concludes with a North Korean soldier accidentally sets off a grenade, which results 
in the destruction of the villagers’ food supply shed – a magically absurd scene in 
which the stored corn turns into popcorn during the explosion. 
 The film then follows the soldiers as they end up working together in the fields 
to help replace the villagers’ food supply. Changing out of their military uniforms into 
the white clothes of the villagers, the film demonstrates the soldiers’ transformation 
from wartime enemies to peaceful allies under the aegis of the utopian fantasy of rural 
agricultural life, a life that had been disrupted by war. However, the village is soon 
under attack as U.S. soldiers prepare to bomb Dongmakgol after pinpointing it as the 
location of a Communist hideout. The North and South Korean soldiers band together 
to divert the airplanes away from the village and end up sacrificing their lives for the 
sake of the villagers. 
 The main enemy in this film is thus displaced to the role of the foreign 
outsider, the U.S., whose soldiers attempt to bomb the village and hence bring the 
ideology of the Korean War/Cold War into the peaceful pristine place of 
Dongmakgol. The North and South Korean soldiers, furthermore, disavow106 their 
identity and ideological ties as “North Korean” or “South Korean” and instead 
identify with the villagers, poignantly illustrated by their wearing of the same clothing 
as the villagers and the bright lighting of the scenes involving rural idyllic life. While 
they do don their uniforms again at the end of the film to prevent the U.S. attack,107 
they do so as “allied forces,” but this time as a “North-South Joint Force.” This is 
spoken as a joke by one of the soldiers before their imminent deaths; however, the 
film does rewrite the conflict of the Korean War/Cold War into a miniature war 
between unified Koreans and U.S. forces. 
 Furthermore, Welcome to Dongmakgol, like 2009 Lost Memories, “forgets” 
the Korean War – although forgetting in this film is not literal forgetting but the 
attempt to erase the problem of the Korean War. This is represented in the film’s 
idealization of the rural utopian village of Dongmakgol in which the villagers have 
neither knowledge nor experience of the war, as well as how the film portrays 
agricultural life as enough to break down the ideological barriers between otherwise 
similar peoples. 
																																																								105	The	“shoot	first,	ask	questions	later”	mentality	is	particularly	emphasized	in	dramatic	films	to	emphasize	the	tensions	between	communism	and	anticommunism,	and	historically	civilian	massacres	during	the	Korean	War	point	to	this	tendency	as	well.	This	comes	to	play	in	the	reveal	of	the	“truth”	in	the	film	JSA	as	well.	106	Interestingly,	this	disavowal	appears	earlier	in	the	film,	as	one	of	the	South	Korean	soldiers	is	a	deserter	who	attempts	suicide	and	reacts	with	suicidal	intentions	in	the	film	(for	example,	jumping	on	top	of	a	grenade	before	it	is	ultimately	kicked	into	the	food	supply	shed	as	well	as	stepping	in	the	path	of	a	wild	boar).	107	The	point	at	which	the	U.S.	invades	the	village	is	when	the	film	transforms	from	a	predominately	magical	utopian	fantasy	comedy	film	(marked	by	fantastical	CG	scenes,	bright	lighting,	and	whimsical	camera	pans)	to	a	conventional	war	film.	While	it	is	common	for	South	Korean	films	to	mix	and	blur	generic	codes,	the	change	in	pace	and	mood	conveys	a	disorienting	affect.	For	more	on	South	Korean	cinema,	war	films,	and	genre	intermixing	see	David	Scott	Diffrient,	“‘Military	Enlightenment’	for	the	Masses:	Generic	and	Cultural	Intermixing	in	South	Korea’s	Golden	Age	War	Films,”	Cinema	
Journal	45.1	(Fall	2005):	22-49.	
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 The fantasy-space of Dongmakgol is also the fantasy-space of neutrality. In 
this neutral space of Dongmakgol, which exceeds the boundaries of Cold War 
epistemology in which there is no room for neutrality, it is the North Korean and 
South Korean soldiers’ Mexican standoff that becomes absurd. The comedic elements 
in the film specifically raise from the villagers’ lack of understanding of the conflict 
while the soldiers attempt to bring the war into the locally specific place of the 
village. Dongmakgol holds the promise of a different space, one in which the Korean 
War and its attendant Cold War logics can be read as absurd precisely because they 
are viewed from outside of the contexts by which those alignments can be understood. 
By painting the Mexican standoff – and by extension South Korean-North Korean 
relations – as absurd in the eyes of the villagers in this alternate world of the Korean 
War, film audiences may perhaps also view the reality of division culture as absurd as 
well. The soldiers’ new uniforms – that of the white village clothing – further 
demonstrates their disavowal of both North Korean and South Korean politics for a 
different revisionist position, that of (re)unified Koreans against imperialist U.S. 
forces. 
 The fantasy-space of Dongmakgol does not last, however. Moreover, the film 
memorializes the loss of this fantasy-space through the mechanic of using 
photographs – although in this case, the video camera is specifically used. The 
downed U.S. pilot in Dongmakgol discovers a video camera among the ruins of 
another plane and uses it to capture the celebration of the villagers along with the 
soldiers, before the other U.S. soldiers invade the village. The results of this video are 
shown in the credits as each character/actor smiles and shows off to the camera. The 
documentary-style images of the characters are an attempt to show visual evidence of 
the friendship and camaraderie that has developed among the soldiers, visual 
examples of the disavowal of Korean War/Cold War politics. That the recording 
scene takes place right before the brutal invasion of the U.S. soldiers, and the results 
of the footage are shown after the tragic ending of the film, is further demonstration of 
the film’s idealization of village life and collaborative friendship that exist outside of 
war. 
 The video camera also serves to function as memorial to the events of the film 
as if to commemorate the friendship that is ultimately shattered from the invasion of 
the U.S. forces and the reappearance of Cold War division systems that had been 
gradually broken down in the earlier segments of the film. That the images captured 
by the video camera are only shown in the ending credits points to these images 
functioning as a form of memorial – not to the Korean War itself, but to the 
friendships and allegiances built outside of Cold War boundaries and Korean War 
division. 
 
 Joint Security Area (Park Chan-wook, 2000) takes place in “present-day” 
Korea (around 2000, when the film was released) and follows the story of South 
Korean and North Korean soldiers stationed along the DMZ. The film traces an 
incident in which two North Koreans end up dead inside of a North Korean 
guardhouse and an injured South Korean soldier (Lee Soo-hyŏk, played by Lee 
Byung-hun) escapes back to the South while a firefight breaks out between the two 
countries. It is later revealed that the South Korean soldiers – there were two at the 
scene of the crime – had become friends with the North Korean soldiers and due to 
the boredom of working the night shift of guarding the DMZ, they exchanged letters 
	 34	
and gifts across the border and begin to meet periodically at the North Korean 
guard station, forging forbidden bonds of friendship. 
 The friendship begins when South Korean soldier Soo-hyŏk steps on a 
landmine after his platoon accidentally crosses into North Korea and is subsequently 
rescued by two North Korean soldiers – Private Jŏng and Sergeant Oh. The friendship 
ends, however, when an unintentional discovery of the illicit meetings by another 
North Korean guard results in the shooting incident, which makes up the central 
mystery of the film. The film follows the investigation of the murders and does not 
uncover the truth until the end. 
 Since both surviving soldiers (Soo-hyŏk and Sergeant Oh) present differing 
and contradictory depositions,108 the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, under 
the command of mixed-race Swiss and Korean Sophie (played by Lee Young-ae), is 
brought in to mediate the conflict as a neutral third-party. Throughout the film, Sophie 
becomes increasingly obsessed with uncovering the truth of the incident despite her 
colleague telling her that “here [in Pammunjeom] the peace is preserved by hiding the 
truth. What they both [South Korea and North Korea] really want is that this 
investigation proves nothing at all.” 
 Unlike 2009 Lost Memories and Welcome to Dongmakgol, in JSA the enemy 
is more difficult to discern as the enemy is not only external but also internal. As is 
evident throughout the film, the external enemies are the South Korean and North 
Korean states who, for their own interests, prefer for the investigation to “prove 
nothing at all,” as maintaining the status quo of division is the optimal solution for 
ensuring peace. As the South Korean commander says to Sophie, “Neutral Nations 
Supervisory Commission? There are two kinds of people in this world. Commie 
bastards…and the Commie bastards’ enemies. Neutral has no place here. You have to 
choose sides.” 
 This warning comes to pass as the commander eventually reports to the NNSC 
authorities that Sophie’s father was a North Korean prisoner of war (POW) who 
ended up repatriating to Argentina after refusing the choice between North Korea or 
South Korea, eventually moving to Switzerland. Despite Sophie’s father’s refusal to 
make a decision for either side, by virtue of his being North Korean, Sophie is no 
longer deemed to be a neutral party who can mediate between the two countries and 
must resign from her position. Therefore, this film demonstrates the insidiousness of 
Cold War and Korean War division culture; even the refusal of a choice between two 
sides can be read and coopted as opposition. 
 Furthermore, as the film demonstrates, the DMZ itself is easy to cross – 
multiple times throughout the course of the film, various soldiers cross the DMZ, 
whether by accident or on purpose. The friendships and easy bonds that develop 
between the South Korean and the North Korean soldiers resemble this porous border 
in order to demonstrate that on the individual level, people do not want to be divided. 
This radical reimagining of South Korean-North Korean friendship, itself a form of 																																																								108	Each	deposition	corresponds	to	each	country’s	official	position	about	the	incident.	For	the	South	Korean	perspective,	Soo-hyŏk	had	been	ambushed	by	North	Koreans	and	barely	managed	to	escape	back	to	the	South.	The	North	Korean	perspective	instead	shows	Soo-hyŏk	pretending	to	defect	to	the	North	and	then	attacking	and	killing	the	border	guards	in	cold	blood.	The	depositions	are	visually	similar	to	the	flashbacks	in	Akira	Kurosawa’s	1950	film	Rashomon.	In	fact,	the	central	incident	is	shown	a	total	of	four	times	in	the	film:	1.)	the	South	Korean	perspective;	2.)	the	North	Korean	perspective;	3.)	Soo-hyŏk’s	perspective;	and	4.)	Sophie’s	final	investigation	results.	
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alternate history and alternate world-making, paints a scene that solidifies a 
different image of North Korea to the audience. In this light, Private Jung’s words to 
Soo-hyŏk are a promise of the potential of an alternate world that provides a different 
understanding of Korean War division culture knowledge formations: “After half a 
century of division, you have breached our tragic history of agony and disgrace, 
broken the dam to reunify our country.” When Soo-hyŏk repeats these words to 
Private Nam (the other South Korean soldier), Private Nam has noticeable difficulty 
in “breaching” the division between the countries – as if his body inherently obeys the 
ideology of division. In fact, it is these bodily responses that reappear later in the film 
to destroy the friendships. While border crossing through the space of the DMZ 
remains fluid, ideologies inscribed onto the body still prove too strong to “break down 
the dam.” Hence, the internal enemies within the film manifest in the bodies of the 
South Korean soldiers, emphasizing the close connection between ideology and 
militarization, and the ways in which Korean War division is embedded onto the body 
of the soldier.109 The internal enemy is the self. 
 For example, while the film exhibits several points of tension, the friendship 
that had been cultivated throughout the film is easily shattered through tragic violence 
when danger becomes imminent – in the moment when the soldiers are discovered by 
a different, and unfriendly, North Korean guard. Nevertheless, the film points out that 
despite Cold War discourses and structures that would keep South Koreans and North 
Koreans apart, the soldiers are able to gain each other’s trusts and to develop a 
friendly brotherly bond with one another. Yet, also, at the moment in which tension 
breaks out, the kinesthetic response of the South Korean soldiers, ingrained into them 
through the militarization of South Korean society, overtakes these affective 
allegiances. Throughout the film, the soldiers are seen shooting at cardboard cutouts 
of North Koreans. Thus, the immediate reaction in an emergency situation is to shoot, 
which overtakes the affective allegiances built up among the characters. Therefore, 
while the film shows us the promise of an alternate world through everyday 
interactions with North Koreans, it also shatters the promise by showing that 
ingrained militarized bodily reactions to North Koreans work just as powerfully to 
destroy that friendship. Unlike Welcome to Dongmakgol, in which the soldiers bond 
together in the space of the village, friendship in JSA is shown at its cruel limits – 
when the body upholds Korean War divisions on its own. 
 Furthermore, by the end of the film, both South Korean soldiers attempt 
suicide and Soo-hyŏk success at the end of the film. When Sophie finds out the truth 
that Soo-hyŏk was the first to shoot their friend and reveals this to him, he ends up 
committing suicide. Soo-hyŏk had previously thought that the kill-shot was fired by 
Private Nam, which motivated Private Nam’s unsuccessful suicide attempt, as well as 
the “false” flashback that is shown in the film. The guilt that Soo-hyŏk and Private 
Nam bear show that despite the best intentions of friendship as alternate 
history/world-making, the ideological boundaries of Cold War alignments and their 
bodily inscriptions prove to be more powerful than even the physical border of the 
DMZ itself. In fact, Soo-hyŏk’s and Private Nam’s suicides are perhaps the only way 
to be truly neutral – neutrality taken to its extreme is suicide, in which the self ceases 
to exist. 																																																								109	Elaine	H.	Kim	and	Hannah	Michell,	“Other	as	brother	or	lover:	North	Koreans	in	South	Korean	visual	media”	in	South	Korean	Popular	Culture	and	North	Korea:	Media,	Culture	
and	Social	Change	in	Asia,	Youna	Kim,	ed.	(London:	Routledge,	2019):	135-148.	
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 Cold War epistemologies are also taken up within the film techniques as 
well, visualizing an alternate world through unconventional camera pans and ending 
with a photograph. Perhaps the most unique film technique utilized in Joint Security 
Area and what sets it apart from the other two films discussed is usage of the 360-
degrees camera pan. Specifically, two scenes in the film make use of this unique film 
technique in which all four soldiers – Soo-hyŏk, Private Nam, Sergeant Oh, and 
Private Jŏng – drink and talk with one another. In these scenes the camera pans to 
each character as they speak, eventually resulting in a 360-degree circle. These surreal 
moments inside the basement of the North Korean outpost, in which the camera 
rotates 360 degrees to each soldier as they talk to each other around a circle, reflect 
the promise of an alternate future in which friendship can be seen as a different model 
to existing Cold War alignments. 
 These scenes are particularly significant not only for their unique visuals, but 
also for how these visuals destabilize cinematic identification and spectatorship. 
Taking the classic Hollywood model for example, camera edits should always follow 
the 180-degree rule, which results in logical cause-and-effect movements of the main 
characters as well as establishing logical spatial relations within the frame.110 This 
allows the spectators to maintain identification with a few central characters. 
However, the 360-degrees pan breaks this “rule” of filmmaking, which is usually 
followed in South Korean blockbuster films, destabilizing the spectators’ 
identificatory gaze to include all the characters. More than any other film, JSA allows 
for identification with North Korean characters beyond narrative and sympathetic 
character traits through the 360-degrees pan. By incorporating unique camera 
techniques, the film marries the theme of alternate spaces of Cold War epistemologies 
with alternate modes of visuality that allows not only for imagining what that space 
might look like, but also actually displaying it for the viewers. 
 Another method of imagining alternate spaces and temporalities of the Korean 
War is found within the film’s usage of the photograph. There are two photographic 
scenes in the film. The first is when the soldiers decide to take a commemorative 
photograph of themselves in the guardhouse (like Welcome to Dongmakgol, this takes 
place right before the moment of crisis in which their illicit interactions are 
discovered). Since they are located within the North Korean guardhouse, the portraits 
of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are within the frame of the photograph. The South 
Korean soldier who is taking the photograph, Private Nam, awkwardly attempts to 
maneuver his position in order to avoid capturing the North Korean leaders, but is 
unable to do so. He finally asks the soldiers to put their heads together, which 
succeeds in blocking the portraits. Here, friendship at the expense of ideology is 
shown literally through the clever manipulation of the photograph. 
 Another photographic scene in JSA takes place when at the beginning of the 
film, a tourist on a DMZ tour attempts to take photographs of the soldiers stationed in 
Pammunjeom despite the rules against photography in this heavily militarized zone. 
This photograph is later revealed at the end of the film, before the credits, and depicts 
all four soldiers who would eventually become friends within the frame of the 																																																								110	Classical	Hollywood	cinema	strives	to	main	continuity	(“continuity	editing”)	and	film	studies	scholars	have	also	used	“suture”	to	describe	the	logics	of	this	type	of	cinematography.	See	David	Bordwell,	Janet	Staiger,	and	Kristin	Thompson,	The	Classical	
Hollywood	Cinema:	Film	Style	&	Mode	of	Production	to	1960	(London:	Routledge,	1985)	and	Kaja	Silverman,	The	Subject	of	Semiotics	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1983).	
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photograph. At the time when the photograph was taken, however, they did not 
know each other yet. The film and its last scene that focuses on the photograph 
suggest at the possibility of potential friendship, without the reality of an 
unsustainable friendship, which resulted in multiple murders and suicides throughout 
the plot of the film. Hence, there exists in the film memorialization of an impossible 
time, a time before the Korean War. A time before friendship, that hints only at the 
potential of future intimacy, is the last image the viewers are left with as the credits 
begin to roll. 
 If Welcome to Dongmakgol presents the fantasy of an alternate revisionist 
Korean War in which Koreans work together to expel U.S. imperialist forces (similar 
to the Hureisenjin against the Japanese), JSA depicts the possibility of the political 
power of friendship in order to change the course of history, and then shatters that 
possibility. The concept of neutrality is ultimately shown to be unsustainable in the 
face of stronger cold war structures in place, perhaps only able to exist in fantasy. 
 Remembering Private Jŏng’s words that Soo-hyŏk had “done a great thing” by 
“breaching the tragic history of agony and disgrace, broken the dam to reunify our 
country,” these films that portray an alternate history/future of the Korean War and its 
discourses beyond the framework of communism/anticommunism have also “done a 
great thing.” Jŏng’s words reflect a self-congratulatory ode to films of this time 
period, which have just begun to “breach the tragic history.” Yet, these films, while 
imagining and imaging the Korean War through alternate worlds, seem aware that 
reunification and its promise are fleeting and may not last. They not only self-
memorialize moments of alternate histories and futures in the diegesis through the 
technological apparatus of the photograph, but they also continue to stand as living 
legacies and memorials for the Sunshine Policy era in which the Korean War and 
reunification were not just of an imaginary alternate future, but also one that existed 
right on the cusp of reality. 
 
Photography as Ending: Bridging Two Decades of Korean War Cinema through 
The Front Line (Jang Hoon, 2011) 
 
 The Front Line (Jang Hoon, 2011) follows South and North Korean soldiers as 
they fight on the front lines of Aerok Hill (“Korea” spelled backwards). The film is 
well-noted for its cinematography, particularly in the battle scenes, which show in 
time-lapse the interchanging of Aerok Hill between the North Koreans and the South 
Koreans. In particular, The Front Line contains elements and themes similar to the 
2000s Korean War films, especially JSA, but ends with a photograph that is utilized in 
a different way than films from this period. Rather than functioning as a memorial to 
lost spaces and times that exist in the space of fantasy, the photographs in The Front 
Line emphasize individual soldiers and forecloses the possibility of any reconciliation 
between North Koreans and South Koreans, which are reminiscent of the 2010s 
Korean War films examined in the next chapter. Thus, The Front Line is a bridge film 
that contains themes from 2000s films while anticipating the trend of photographs 
ending war films in the 2010s. 
 While there are many sub-plots within the film, The Front Line takes place in 
the final stages of the Korean War, before the armistice is signed. There is an 
investigation, similar to JSA, as a soldier is called upon to join and investigate 
Alligator Company and the mysterious death of a South Korean platoon leader, as 
higher authorities suspect a double agent in the midst of the group. The investigator, 
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Kang Eun-Pyo, eventually discovers that the South and North Korean soldiers have 
been exchanging letters, alcohol, and other gifts in a box buried at one of the 
checkpoints. Because the hill has changed hands so many times, the checkpoint has 
become a convenient place for the soldiers to exchange gifts and letters, revisiting the 
South Korean-North Korean friendship explored in JSA – parallels between JSA and 
The Front Line can be seen in the framing of the shots, where a group of soldiers sit 
and consume gifts together. Eventually, the war is declared over but the armistice 
does not come into effect for 12 more hours, which leads to the tragic final battle. All 
of the soldiers on both sides, except Kang Eun-Pyo, are killed. 
 Along similar lines as the other films, the ending credits of The Front Line 
feature the various cast members – still in character – in video and photographic stills 
after their onscreen deaths. The photographs are in black-and-white and portrayed as 
archival documents, marking the shift in photographic endings in Korean War cinema 
from the 2000s to the 2010s. Unlike Welcome to Dongmakgol or JSA, these 
photographs do not reflect the friendship of the soldiers, but instead focus on the 
tragedy of the loss of lives, particularly because of the futility of the armistice that is 
not-yet-in-effect. Unlike the other films that hold on to the promise of reconciliation 
or return to the innocent past, The Front Line does not present that hope – rather, the 
hope that this film presents is for just a few more miles of territory in a country that 
will inevitably be divided regardless. The ending credits that focus on the 
individualistic cast members, outside of their relation to each other, is a marked 
departure from JSA and reflects the contemporary historical moment in which 
reconciliation between North Korea and South Korea is indefinitely deferred. 
 2009 Lost Memories, Welcome to Dongmakgol, and JSA all conclude with the 
photograph in order to capture the promise of an alternate history and epistemology of 
the Korean War outside of Cold War ideological divisions. The Front Line’s ending 
photographs, on the other hand, focuses on individual soldiers but does give equal 
space to the South Korean and North Korean characters. These photographs are 
evidence that such a past or future in which North Koreans and South Koreans come 
together as something other than enemies could exist, even if only momentarily. They 
allow the viewers to catch glimpses of a world that is unfamiliar yet suggest at the 
potential for a different praxis beyond Cold War Manichean boundaries of “us” vs. 
“them.” These films suggest that “us” could be “them” and that individual affective 
interactions on the locally specific scale could slowly deconstruct or “de-Cold War” 
these discourses – such as casual crossings of the DMZ that is imagined to be a closed 
border. These films show that perhaps these borders are not so impenetrable after all. 
However, while extending this possibility, the films also eventually demonstrate the 
insidiousness of division culture and thus, the unsustainability of these friendships. 
Thus, the films’ ending photographs also function as memorials to this space and time 
that was never meant to exist, that cannot exist within Korean War. The Korean War 
is a “problem” always haunting the cinema that seeks to create alternate fantasy 
cinematic spaces without Korean War. Until the reality of reunification, viewers of 
South Korean war cinema in the 2000s can settle with its promise and with the still 
frame of the photograph as memorial and material evidence of this (im)possibility. 
 The next chapter explores the new Korean War films that mark a 
“conservative turn” in South Korean cinema, but which also end with photographs. 
Specifically, the films are Ode to My Father (Yoon Je-kyoon, 2014), Northern Limit 
Line (Kim Hak-soon, 2015), and Operation Chromite (John H. Lee, 2016). I discuss 
the theme of not only memorialization within South Korean cinema, but also the 
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museum-like qualities found within 2010s South Korean cinema about the Korean 
War. In doing so, the relation between historical cinema as knowledge production of 
the Korean War and memorialization of the Korean War is called into question as a 
form of reconciling history and memory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 40	
Chapter 3 
 
Post-2010s Korean War Cinema: Responsibility, Misrepresentation, and 
Archival Memory 
 
 Why does contemporary South Korean cinema about the Korean War end with 
the photograph, archival documentation, or memorialization of the main characters? 
Why is it necessary for these films to function as memorial texts, specifically using 
the photographic and archival index as a functional form of memorialization within 
the narrative? This chapter examines the photographic ends of the films Ode to My 
Father (Yoon Je-kyoon, 2014), Northern Limit Line (Kim Hak-soon, 2015), and 
Operation Chromite (John H. Lee, 2016). Unlike the 2000s South Korean films that 
memorialize a time/space outside of Cold War boundaries, the 2010s films continue 
to reify Korean War/Cold War borders and boundaries, emphasizing the skill, 
professionalism, and stoicism of South Korean soldiers and civilians, as well as 
utilizing the photographic ending as historical archival document that provide 
authoritative truth-images to the events that have unfolded within the narrative. In 
fact, 2010s Korean War films utilize the photograph and extra-diegetic information as 
museums do. 
 The photographs that appear at the final scenes are separated from the diegesis 
and are what Youngmin Choe refers to as “moments extracted from the continuity of 
historical time.”111 I refer to these post-2010 Korean War films as enacting a 
“conservative turn,” not necessarily due to their political stances and statements, but 
in their more conservative usage of the freeze frame, in which the photograph often 
has no connection to the main storyline and serves as memorial markers without any 
meaning, the “monuments without memory”: 
 
It is possible to read the disposability, the perishability, of transient monuments 
as an absence of will to endure as well as lack of will to push for its durability. 
But one can also connect the transience of these filmic and historical objects to 
a vision of history that is more attached to the moment, that is, one in which 
filmic time supplements historical time, and one that is quickly discarded after it 
passes. Historical lived experience becomes just another ordinary commodity.112 
 
This seems to be emblematic of not just physical monuments and memorial structures, 
but also of cinema in the contemporary moment in which memory seems to be itself 
remembered differently. This chapter examines the 2010s Korean War cinema and the 
increasing usage of photographic memory and archival documents/visual footage as 
“monuments without memory,” marking a conservative turn to history and memory in 
comparison to the films discussed in the previous chapter. 
 I first discuss Ode to My Father (Yoon Je-kyoon, 2014) and its wide sweep of 
historical time and its portrayal of contemporary Korean history as the first Korean 																																																								111	Outside	of	the	cinematic	realm,	debate	over	whether	representation	of	the	Korean	War	in	monumental	form	should	be	a	“moment”	or	a	“continuum”	at	the	Korean	War	Veterans	Memorial	in	Washington,	D.C.	appears	in	the	archival	documents	in	the	Commission	of	Fine	Arts.	112	Youngmin	Choe,	Tourist	Distractions:	Traveling	and	Feeling	in	Transnational	Hallyu	
Cinema	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2016):	185.	
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War film of the 2010s to turn towards this more “conservative” filmmaking 
technique in referring to Korean War history. Then, I analyze the usage of the freeze 
frame and other historical and extra-diegetic elements in Northern Limit Line and 
Operation Chromite to underscore how Korean War films increasingly turns towards 
museal elements to (re)present and reconcile memory of the Korean War. 
 
Ode to My Father (Yoon Je-kyoon, 2014) and Conservative Turn of Korean War 
Cinema in South Korea 
 
 Ode to My Father (Yoon Je-kyoon, 2014) centers, in a Forrest Gump-like 
way, a somewhat ordinary yet exemplary “everyman” present at important historical 
events within the nation’s history. While the film does not end with a photograph, it is 
representative of the new historical outlook of Korean cinema with regards to the 
Korean War and its place in the wider scope of South Korean history. 
 The protagonist, Tŏksu, experiences several key moments of South Korean 
history; in fact, his story is similar to the narrative told at the National Museum of 
Korean Contemporary History.113 He is a child during the Hungnam Evacuation in 
1950, where he is separated from his father and sister. He lives in Busan as a refugee 
with his remaining family and aunt, who owns a store. Later, he travels to West 
Germany as a miner and meets a nurse, whom he eventually marries. He fights in the 
Vietnam War, where his rescue of Vietnamese refugees is almost a shot-by-shot 
mirror of his experience as a refugee from North Korea during the Hungnam 
Evacuation. In this sense, the narrative also follows South Korean war and history 
museum narratives in which South Koreans repay the debt owed to the U.S. and UN, 
taking their place as “saviors” and “liberators” of other countries. 
 Near the end of the film, Tŏksu is reunited with his younger sister, who was 
adopted to the U.S., through the TV program “Looking for Separated Family 
Members”114 in the 1980s.115 As an old man in the present day, he lets go of his wish 
to reunite with his father and sells his store, which he bought from his aunt and uncle 
and refused to sell because it was supposed to be the meeting point for the family after 
they were separated during the Korean War, to developers who will presumably 
gentrify the historic “international market”116 area of Busan. 
 Tŏksu seems to blindly – and necessarily, given the time period – subscribe to 
South Korean governmental policy to achieve upward mobility. This plays out even in 
the scenes of reunification with long-lost family members, and one of the most 
notable and emotional scenes of the film also conveniently re-enfolds the Korean 
adoptee into the modern South Korean nation-state. 117  This forward-moving 																																																								113	Taehanmin’gukyŏksabangmulgwan.	114	“Isan’gajokŭl	ch’atsŭmnida.”	115	For	a	film	that	focuses	on	the	reunions	of	separated	families	through	the	TV	programs,	see	Gilsoddeum	(Im	Kwon-taek,	1986).	For	more	on	separated	families,	see	Nan	Kim,	Memory,	Reconciliation,	and	Reunions	in	South	Korea	(Lanham:	Lexington	Books,	2017).	116	The	title	of	the	film	in	Korean,	Kukje	Shijang.	117	For	critiques	on	this	discourse	from	adoption	studies	scholars	see	Eleana	J.	Kim,	
Adopted	Territory:	Transnational	Korean	Adoptees	and	the	Politics	of	Belonging	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2010);	Eleana	Kim,	“Human	Capital:	Transnational	Korean	Adoptees	and	the	Neoliberal	Logic	of	Return,”	Journal	of	Korean	Studies	17.2	(Fall	2012):	299-327;	Eleana	Kim,	“Our	Adoptee,	Our	Alien:	Transnational	Adoptees	as	Specters	of	
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temporality of the film, which ends with Tŏksu “moving on” from trauma, serves 
also as allegory for the South Korean nation itself. Furthermore, “moving on” in Ode 
to My Father entails giving in to gentrification and urban displacement as well as the 
logics of South Korean state developmentalism. The Korean War, like the narrative in 
South Korean museums like the War Memorial of Korea, is something to be 
overcome and that has been overcome due to South Korean developmentalism and 
participation in foreign wars – such as the Vietnam War. Thus, the “ode to the father” 
in the English title refers not just to Tŏksu, the quintessential father figure, but also 
perhaps to Park Chung-hee, the shadow father of the modern South Korean 
developmentalist state.118 
 This theme of reunification and reconciliation with a father figure is 
particularly played up for melodramatic effect in Ode to My Father in one of the last 
scenes of the film in which an elderly Tŏksu sits alone in his room crying and 
lamenting to his missing/dead father about the difficulty of his life while the rest of 
his family sits in the next room laughing. The camera pans to the mirror in the room, 
which then reveals an imaginary scene in which child Tŏksu encounters his father, 
who tells him, “I know how hard it was for you. And I’ll always be thankful. You did 
all the things that I couldn’t do.” The camera then zooms out of the mirror back to 
Tŏksu crying in the room hugging his father’s clothing, and zooms further out of the 
window of the house to showcase the disjunctions between Tŏksu and the rest of his 
family. Since much of the film tends toward realism, the camera’s entry in and out of 
the mirror is particularly jarring, and the camera’s whimsical panning and zooming 
out of the house itself as if to sympathize with Tŏksu is particularly striking. The 
camera then pans almost 180 degrees to the cityscape, looking outwards, as if it had 
developed an agency of its own, and taking on the personal of the “father.” 
 The scene then fades out to the same scene that the film begins with in which 
elderly Tŏksu and his wife, Yŏngja, sit on their rooftop, reprising their conversation. 
Tŏksu finally agrees to sell his shop by saying, “Surely by now, he’s [his father] too 
old to come.” The film then ends, fading out after the camera rises above, looking 
over the scenery and Busan. While there was a notable scene of family reunification – 
an emotional reunion on TV with Tŏksu’s long-lost sister Maksun who ended up as an 
adoptee to the U.S. – earlier in the film, the reunification with the father is never 
fulfilled except through the fantastic imaginary realm within the mirror in Tŏksu’s 
room. Tŏksu’s decision to close his shop signals that he is finally able to move on 
from the past, and although the film ending is ambivalently optimistic, the reality of 
family separation in the aftermath of the Korean War still points to a reconciliatory 
framework that, even with the reunion of the sister, hints at the personal tragedy of the 
Korean War. Overall, unlike films of the 2000s, however, the ending of this film is 																																																																																																																																																														Foreignness	and	Family	in	South	Korea,”	Anthropological	Quarterly	80.2	(Spring	2007):	497-531;	Eleana	Kim,	“Wedding	Citizenship	and	Culture:	Korean	Adoptees	and	the	Global	Family	of	Korea,”	Social	Text,	74	21.1	(Spring	2003):	57-81;	Kimberly	D.	McKee,	
Disrupting	Kinship:	Transnational	Politics	of	Korean	Adoption	in	the	United	States	(Champaign:	University	of	Illinois	Press,	2019);	Kimberly	D.	McKee,	“Monetary	Flows	and	the	Movements	of	Children:	The	Transnational	Adoption	Industrial	Complex,”	
Journal	of	Korean	Studies	21.1	(2016):	137-178;	SooJin	Pate,	From	Orphan	to	Adoptee:	
U.S.	Empire	and	Genealogies	of	Korean	Adoption	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2014).	118	Seungsook	Moon,	Militarized	Modernity	and	Gendered	Citizenship	in	South	Korea	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2005).	
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more positive, much like South Korean economic development during the Park 
Chung-hee era in the aftermath of the Korean War. 
 Moreover, this new conservative turn in South Korean cinema can be seen in 
the representation of the father in Ode to My Father, marking a shift since the 
“Korean New Wave” and the rise of the Korean blockbuster and hallyu stardom that 
Korean film studies scholar Kyung Hyun Kim theorizes: 
 
If the cinema in the 1970s vied to inscribe an unimpaired masculine icon, one 
that forged a “dominant fiction” out of collective historical memory, the cinema 
that was touted in the Western film festival circuits during the late 1980s and 
the 1990s as the New Korean Cinema attained its status, I argue, by 
demythologizing the name of the national father for the sake of issuing a new 
modern masculinity….The New Korean cinema’s contestation was waged not 
only against the official historiography of South Korea that consistently invoked 
nationalist agencies but also against the new minjung (people’s) history that 
claimed to be the “collective will of the people” while countering the 
government’s version.119 
 
Characters like Yong-ho, the protagonist from the film Peppermint Candy (Lee 
Chang-dong, 1999) that similarly follows a wide sweep of South Korean history as 
Ode to My Father, or the disaffected working class laborer and youth in Chilsu and 
Mansu (Park Kwang-su, 1988) were emblematic of this “new” masculinity and 
portrayal of modernity that centered male perspectives and the failure of men to live 
up to the standards of capitalist modernity and state violence required of proper 
national subjectivity and citizenship. For example, Kim writes of Peppermint Candy: 
 
Turning back the clock is only possible in the fantastic realm of the movies, 
where Peppermint Candy ends with the young Yong-ho holding a flower in his 
hand and wondering about the origin of his “deja-vu” at the river by the railroad 
track, the very spot where he will die twenty years later. But the Korean 
cinema’s misogynistic hope of recovering a wholesome maleness and purity 
from a fantasy, as if it can be transposed to be absolutely real, is, in the final 
analysis, impossible.120 
 
In 2014, however, it seems like this hope is possible through Tŏksu, a successor to 
Yong-ho’s traumatic movement through South Korea’s modern history. Ode to My 
Father, as a film that portrays a similar sweeping of time through the life of a male 
protagonist, seems to reflect the new trend of Korean cinema that portrays the 
“wholesome maleness and purity from a fantasy” that previously seemed impossible. 
Following along with this trend, Korean War films in this contemporary period also 
portray similar male characters as Deok-soo. The next sections examine specifically 
how the photograph and freeze frame make similar appearances in these films, 
continuing with the trope of Korean War temporality intersecting with the temporality 
of memorialization. 
																																																								119	Kyung	Hyun	Kim,	The	Remasculinization	of	Korean	Cinema	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2004):	19-20.	120	Ibid.	
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 Ode to My Father, while taking on a wide sweep of South Korean history, 
reflects the more contemporary trend in films about the Korean War in portraying 
South Korea in a more straightforward positive fashion. The end of Ode to My Father 
seems to imply that Tŏksu’s finally being able to move on and not waiting for his 
father is healthy and allows him to move in a future-oriented, upward trajectory much 
like the South Korean nation itself as traced throughout the film. While his generation 
may have suffered from family division, his successful reunion with his younger sister 
and the coming together of his immediate and extended families seems to imply that 
the future is indeed different for generations who have not lived through the Korean 
War. Similar to the fantastic camera movements in and out of the mirror, and out of 
the apartment, the ghosts of the past seem to depart from the film, freeing Tŏksu to 
move on past the traumas of the Korean War. 
 Ode to My Father seems to present the desire to return to the past and to 
memorialize loss as holding Tŏksu back and thus, ends on the optimistic tone of 
Tŏksu agreeing to let go of his store (and hopes of reunited with his father), allowing 
for the gentrification and development of the historic Kukje Market. As in museums 
like the Contemporary History Museum of Korea, the rapid pace of modernization 
and developmentalism celebrated in the film serves as a metric for how far South 
Korea has come since the time of the Korean War, and does not allow for a dwelling 
upon the past that is already gone. Memory itself is increasingly pushed behind and 
instead what come to the forefront are archival technologies and photographic 
memorializations within the films that strive to function as an authoritative gaze 
directing audiences how to think about the war. In other words, these recent films 
become more like museums, serving as both entertainment and pedagogical tool. The 
next section of the chapter examines two films – Northern Limit Line and Operation 
Chromite – that, like the films discussed in the previous chapter, end with the film 
memorialization technique of ending with photographs. 
 
Archival Memory and Historical (Mis)Representation in Northern Limit Line 
(Kim Hak-soon, 2015) and Operation Chromite (John H. Lee, 2016) 
 
“I sometimes dream that those who died come back, and we fight the battle again.” 
- Former 357 PO2 Kim Seung-hwan (Chŏn 357 Kapp’anbyŏng Kim Sŭnghwan) 
 
Northern Limit Line (Kim Hak-soon, 2015) and Operation Chromite (John H. 
Lee, 2016) are two of the most recent South Korean film blockbusters to come out in 
the last few years, and continue a “conservative turn” in Korean War films that was 
apparent in Ode to My Father (Yoon Je-kyoon, 2014). While Northern Limit Line is a 
“post”-Korean War film that focuses on the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong in 2002 
during the World Cup,121 much like JSA, the film addresses the unfinished Korean 
War conflict through battles along the disrupted maritime border between North 
Korea and South Korea known as the Northern Limit Line.122 Operation Chromite 																																																								121	For	the	significance	of	the	2002	World	Cup	see	Rachael	Miyung	Joo,	Transnational	
Sport:	Gender,	Media,	and	Global	Korea	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2012).	122	Both	films	also	overlap	with	several	cycles	in	contemporary	South	Korean	cinema:	while	on	the	surface,	it	would	appear	that	both	films	would	fit	within	the	naval	battle	or	naval	thriller	film	trend,	Northern	Limit	Line	fits	more	comfortably	in	this	genre.	Popular	South	Korean	films	in	this	cycle	include	The	Admiral:	Roaring	Currents	(Kim	Han-min,	2014),	The	Pirates	(Lee	Seok-hoon,	2014),	and	Sea	Fog	(Shim	Sung-bo,	2014). 
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takes its title from the military operation run by General Douglas MacArthur on 
September 1950, which staged a successful amphibious landing in Incheon Harbor, 
successfully cutting off North Korean supply lines and turning the tides of the Korean 
War in favor of the ROK, U.S., and UN forces after being driven southwards to the 
Busan Perimeter. The film focuses less on General MacArthur and the actual landing 
operation, reserving the landing only for the finale of the film; instead, most of the 
film focuses on the South Korean intelligence unit responsible for going undercover 
in North Korea-occupied Incheon and acquiring and communicating necessary 
information and maps of the Incheon Harbor so that the operation can be enacted 
successfully.123 
Like the films explored in the previous chapter, Northern Limit Line and 
Operation Chromite end with a freeze frame of a photograph, but tend to insert other 
archival imagery or photographs throughout the film as well, in a similar way in 
which historical events and famous people are placed into the film Ode to My Father. 
Unlike JSA, 2002 Lost Memories, and Welcome to Dongmakgol, which take place in 
more fantastic or imagined settings, Northern Limit Line and Operation Chromite 
focuses more on realism and utilizing specific archival images within the film text to 
assert authenticity on history and memory of the Korean War. In this sense, The Front 
Line (Jang Hoon, 2011), which also ends with photographic images of its main cast, 
reflects a transition period connecting these sets of films. In The Front Line, the film 
ends with a photographic images of its main cast in grainy quality black-and-white; 
however, unlike JSA, 2002 Lost Memories, and Welcome to Dongmakgol, there is no 
specific scene within the diegesis of the films showing when these photographs were 
taken. Yet, like those films, these “archival” photographs are very clearly the actors 
and not real historical figures. Northern Limit Line and Operation Chromite reflect a 
trend in realism by combining archival imagery, historical content, and the 
photograph as memorialization technique in a filmic context that resembles a museum 
experience. The museumification of Korean War memories in these films signals a 
turning point in the representation of the Korean War in popular blockbuster cinema, 
as film techniques blur together with memorial techniques to create a process of 
memorialization all within the narrative contexts of these films. 
Northern Limit Line follows the narrative of a typical war film – a new Navy 
crewmember, Park Dong-hyuk, joins the patrol boat 357 and slowly bonds with his 
fellow crewmembers and commanders. This takes place against the backdrop of 
increasing tensions with North Korea as well as the excitement of the 2002 FIFA 
World Cup, co-hosted by South Korea and Japan, in which South Korea advanced to 
the semifinals for the first time, causing massive “World Cup fever” to ripple 
throughout the country. In between crew bonding scenes, patrols, and navy drills, 
during one of their patrols, the crew encounters North Korean fishermen who cross 
over the Northern Limit Line, and are clearly suspicious, but due to the rules of 																																																								123	The	majority	of	the	plot	invokes	the	spy	thriller	film	and	the	theme	of	traitors/collaborators/double	agents/spies	that	is	popular	in	the	post-2010s	South	Korean	cinema	(although	this	genre	has	always	been	popular).	Recent	Korean	films	in	this	cycle	include	Assassination	(Choi	Dong-hoon,	2015)	and	The	Age	of	Shadows	(Kim	Jee-woon,	2016).	Although	this	current	cycle	tends	to	focus	on	the	Japanese	colonial	era,	
Operation	Chromite	centers	Cold	War	tensions	and	its	overlap	with	spy	thriller	films,	which	was	explored	in	earlier	Korean	blockbusters	such	as	Shiri	(Kang	Je-gyu,	1999)	and	
Silmido	(Kang	Woo-suk,	2003),	and	in	films	of	the	Golden	Age	periods	such	as	The	Hand	
of	Destiny	(Han	Hyeong-mo,	1954). 
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engagement and the command of his superiors, the commander of the ship is forced 
to allow them to return to North Korea. Eventually, one of the fishermen is revealed 
to be a commander of a North Korean warship, who used the opportunity to be 
detained by the South Koreans to scope out the functionality of their warship. 
Furthermore, he is the first to directly engage in battle with the South Koreans later in 
the film, which is the cinematic depiction of the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong. 
Northern Limit Line begins with an intertitle about the historical events that it 
portrays: “This film is based on the real-life Naval clash between North and South 
Korea near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea during the 2002 
Korea/Japan World Cup.” It then moves on to video footage of the 2002 World Cup, 
including the immense crowds wearing red and cheering in the public square at City 
Hall and Han River Park. The footage then cuts to heavily injured soldiers being 
rushed to the emergency room and the voice of a soldier – the main character Pak 
Tonghyŏk – narrating: “We wanted everyone to return home alive. It was a desperate 
battle for survival. We screamed, and fought alone.” Interspersed with scenes of 
World Cup crowds, he continues, “Saturday, June 29, 2002, Date of the consolation 
match against Turkey,” while one of the fans in the crowd looks upward at the 
military helicopters flying overhead. Pak Tonghyŏk (although the viewers at this point 
are unaware of who he is) is seen flat-lining in the hospital and upon resuscitation the 
film transitions to an introductory film that provides expository information about the 
Korean War. 
These exposition films-within-a-film about historical events are becoming 
increasingly common and is the same opening technique used in Operation Chromite. 
Using digital renderings of maps and timelines followed by text-heavy information, 
these introductory historical videos resemble the type of short films that would be 
playing at a museum exhibit and would not appear out of place in someplace like the 
War Memorial of Korea in their short distillation of major historical events and 
contextual background. The usage of these films is perhaps the clearest example of 
how contemporary Korean War films increasingly utilize museum techniques to share 
knowledge with audiences. 
In the case of the introductory video of Northern Limit Line, the background 
graphics include a dynamic map of the Korean peninsula interspersed with Korean 
War archival videos and several facts, illustrated by graphics demarcating borders 
such as the NLL and important areas relevant to the content of the text. The text in 
this part of the film reads: “The 1953 Armistice Agreement gave control of islands on 
NLL to United States Command and South Korea. Any lands above Northern Limit 
Line belonged to China and North Korea. By taking control of the islands, the North 
accepted the NLL.” The film then shows the title screen and begins in June 2002 with 
the introduction of the main characters, Pak Tonghyŏk’s first day on duty, and 
meeting all of his fellow crew. The introductory video separates the beginning of the 
film – after the battle is over – and the beginning of the events that lead up to the 
soldiers becoming inured, creating a disjuncture in the typical seamless connection 
between the “present” and the flashback. 
Furthermore, the text in the film, coupled with the dynamic background 
imagery that resembles museum exhibition graphics, establishes the context with 
historical authority that would not exist solely from representing the events alone. 
However, the text does not address that the Northern Limit Line is a contested 
maritime demarcation line; rather, the NLL as depicted in the background map is 
taken as a de facto maritime boundary agreed upon by both South Korea and North 
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Korea. The reasoning is also somewhat suspect – North Korea’s occupation of 
several key islands is given as justification for recognition of the NLL, but if North 
Korea truly recognized the NLL as the border, would that not be enough to mention? 
There is a leap in logic in assuming that because North Korea occupied certain 
islands, it is an implicit recognition of the NLL when North Korea could very well be 
occupying those islands because the country may believe that the borders of the NLL 
do not bind them. This is the basis for why Yeonpyeong Island (and the areas around 
it), controlled by South Korea but sitting very close to the NLL and the North Korean 
mainland, has seen so many maritime and land conflicts, most recently in 2010 with 
North Korean shelling of the island and the sinking of the Cheonan warship. 
Notably, the armistice agreement does not mention a specific maritime 
demarcation line with coordinates, but it does mention the coordinates of the islands 
specifically under control. Nevertheless, despite the contested nature of the NLL 
either after the signing of the 1953 armistice or in more recent years, the film makes a 
matter-of-fact statement that places the events of the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong 
squarely upon the responsibility of North Korea predicated on a clear and 
unambiguous understanding of the borders and boundaries of the NLL. In this way, 
the film sets up from the beginning sympathy for the South Korean characters and 
grants little humanity to the North Koreans unlike previous Korean War films like 
JSA and Welcome to Dongmakgol, and mirrors the language used in national war 
memorial exhibition texts that points to archival evidence as clear examples of North 
Korean provocation on South Koreans as evidence for beginning of Korean War. 
Another notable difference in the film Northern Limit Line is in its portrayal of 
the moral superiority of the South Koreans as opposed to more ambivalent or 
downright negative portrayals of the South Korean military during the Korean War or 
“post”-Korean War-related conflict. Most notably, this portrayal is done through 
showcasing strict military discipline even in the soldiers’ downtime or when they are 
bending the rules; whereas, in previous films, where soldiers are oftentimes openly 
subversive of military authority, Northern Limit Line toes the line between discipline 
and fun, yet ultimately emphasizes the professionalism of the soldiers despite their 
personal flaws or collective playtime. A downplayed example is shown early in the 
film when several soldiers gather to cook and eat their ship’s specialty, blue crab 
noodles (the Yellow Sea where the boats patrol is particularly famous for blue crabs) 
together and are caught by their commander, who immediately punish them for their 
actions. When the CPO (one of the chefs) carries out the punishment of “100 
punishments,” the soldiers first shout out the proper orders and eventually devolve 
into shouting out “blue crab” and “noodles” during their push-up rounds, but return to 
the proper orders by the end of the scene, showcasing that while the soldiers are able 
to have some fun, overall they maintain the disciplinary regime of the ship and 
military. 
Perhaps the most important form of entertainment on the ship, which also 
marks the passage of time, is their enthusiasm for watching the World Cup, 
particularly the South Korean matches. Despite shirking their duties momentarily to 
watch the games, this form of entertainment is a nationally-sanctioned activity, as it is 
imbued with national pride – the crewmembers even embrace the World Cup fever by 
drawing Korean flags on their stomachs and faces and erupting into the famous 
“Taehanmin’guk” cheer. Notably though, the soldiers still immediately spring back 
into duty as their viewing of the game is interrupted by emergency drills, emphasizing 
not only their patriotism when it comes to entertainment, but also their devotion as 
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soldiers. Later in the film, the newest crewmember also asks the commander for 
permission to watch the game as reward, particularly after they perfect their practice 
drills, reaching a low of 26 seconds. Receiving permission, the entire crew is able to 
watch and enjoy the game together, celebrating in style along with the archival 
footage of the crowds and the South Korea v. Germany match. In this film, despite the 
soldiers’ enjoyment of downtime and fun, and it is always in connections with scenes 
showing their military prowess and preparation, nationalism and national pride, and 
respect for the chain of command. 
This marks a significant departure from earlier Korean War films that 
oftentimes portrayed South Korean soldiers in more ambivalent ways. As David Scott 
Diffrient writes in his article, it was not uncommon for Korean War films to portray 
soldiers carrying out dubious actions or to eschew military discipline completely: 
 
However, this is not because of the ship’s condition as the men’s lack of 
discipline – namely, their failure to conform to the preconceived notions of 
social decorum and public etiquette held by government officials as well as 
audience members….Whether groping the breasts and legs of barmaids or 
brushing each other’s teeth to get rid of the stench of alcohol, their insouciance 
says a great deal about the corporeal demands of war (and the war film).124 
 
While the films that he discusses originate from an earlier period and make extensive 
use of blending multiple genres – comedy, melodrama, the musical, etc. – within the 
war film genre, this type of military (un)discipline can be seen in more contemporary 
films as well such as JSA, Welcome to Dongmakgol, and The Front Line.125 While 
much of the hesitation and ignoring/subversion of military protocols that appear in 
these films serve to emphasize the tragedy of war, this newer cycle of Korean War 
films portray military service members who are always capable and even continue to 
fulfill their duty even to the point of extreme bodily incapacitation or death, which is a 
trope heavily – and graphically – played up in Northern Limit Line, as the 
crewmembers still continue their duties despite missing limbs and multiple gunshot 
wounds. 
 Furthermore, the soldiers’ sense of duty and discipline are shown in scenes in 
which they engage directly with North Koreans. In the scene near the beginning when 																																																								124	David	Scott	Diffrient,	“‘Military	Enlightenment’	for	the	Masses:	Generic	and	Cultural	Intermixing	in	South	Korea’s	Golden	Age	War	Films,”	Cinema	Journal	45.1	(Fall	2005):	32.	125	While	JSA	does	end	with	the	shooting	of	the	North	Korean	soldier	due	to	instinctive	training	reflexes,	much	of	the	content	of	the	film	involves	a	direct	subversion	of	Korean	War/Cold	War	structures	of	division	through	the	meeting	and	development	of	friendship	among	the	North	Korean	and	South	Korean	DMZ	border	guards.	That	each	official	documentation	of	the	“true”	events	of	the	film	contradicts	one	another	(South	Korean	account,	North	Korean	account,	Lee	Soo-hyŏk’s	account,	and	finally	Sophie’s	investigation	results)	demonstrate	the	pointlessness	of	the	investigation	(confirmed	within	the	film	too	by	one	of	the	characters)	and	the	artifice	of	military	protocols.	
Welcome	to	Dongmakgol’s	South	Korean	soldiers	are	shown	to	be	particularly	incompetent	soldiers,	and	one	of	the	character’s	introduction	is	his	attempt	at	suicide	after	desertion.	Furthermore,	like	in	JSA,	the	North	Korean	and	South	Korean	soldiers	form	friendships	and	even	remove	their	military	uniforms	to	briefly	become	farmers	in	the	village,	finally	re-donning	their	uniforms	only	to	take	on	U.S.	forces	together.	
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the crew encounter and capture the North Korean “fisherman,” the commander, 
despite recognizing that something is off, has to let the group return to North Korea 
due to a command from his superior. The man who eventually turns out to be a 
commander of the North Korean warship that attacks even pointedly tells the South 
Korean commander to get this gun “out of his face,” even removing his blindfold, 
confident that the South Koreans will not shoot. A mantra is repeated throughout the 
film that makes clear that South Koreans are not to engage first with the North 
Koreans. The superior fleet commander tells the South Korean captain to let the North 
Koreans go by relaying his orders: “They could be intruders, but there’s a no-clash 
order, so release them.” Even when another soldier remarks that “it’s obvious they’re 
not fishermen” the commander responds by saying, “Did you not hear the order?” 
This allows the North Koreans to use their capture to acquire intelligence about the 
structure of their ship and the weapons on board, leading directly to the formation of 
the military strategy that would be unleashed later in the film. Even in the actual battle 
near the end of the film, although the soldiers notice something off with the approach 
of the North Korean battleship, as well as the people in the Navy headquarters in 
Pyeongtaek monitoring the situation, the order is to “not fire first.” Repeated only a 
few minutes later, another order is given: “Listen, until they fire first, do not fire your 
weapons.” While this is standard military protocol, it is also repeated to emphasize 
that the sole responsibility for the military conflict lies with North Korea, as in the 
opening text of the film where North Korea’s understanding and acceptance of the 
boundaries of the Northern Limit Line is emphasized. Even as the soldiers recognize 
that an attack is eminent and there is no immediate order from the HQ, the South 
Korean ship commander again emphasizes that, “We cannot open fire first. Rules of 
engagement in effect.” This eventually leads to the ship sustaining a direct cannon 
attack from the North Koreans. 
 While the following of military protocol is important in preventing an 
outbreak of war, the emphasis on the North Korean ship attacking first throughout the 
film, coupled with the South Korean soldiers’ adherence to not attacking first despite 
knowing that something is off, calls back to the emphasis of the beginning of the 
Korean War as happening on June 25, 1950, in which North Koreans first crossed the 
border and began the attack on the South. This is repeated throughout the War 
Memorial of Korea, laying full culpability of the Korean War to the North Koreans 
with the backing of the USSR and the PRC, represented in museum exhibits with 
large renderings of the heads of Kim Il-sung, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Zedong. The 
plaque explaining the most prominent outdoor monument at the War Memorial of 
Korea, the Monument in Remembrance of the Korean War, which sits at the entrance 
of the museum memorial complex, also references the beginning of the Korean War 
as an “illegal invasion of the South” on the morning of June 25, 1950. The 6.25 
narrative emphasizes the beginning of the Korean War with this invasion, and is the 
dominant historical understanding of the war as well as the narrative utilized in 
national museums and memorials in South Korea. The repetition and showcasing of 
North Korea’s initial attack in the film Northern Limit Line seems to also refer to the 
outbreak of the Korean War as well. 
 In fact, a replica of the Chamsuri 357 sits in the outdoor exhibition of the War 
Memorial of Korea, and visitors can climb onto the boat and look through some of the 
interior as well. In a recent revisit to the War Memorial of Korea in July 2018, the 
exhibit was expanded to include a small exhibition hall with testimonies of the 
surviving soldiers and a movie theater within the replica ship that shows a video about 
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the incident and advertisements that tie in with the film Northern Limit Line. In this 
sense, the film/memorial/museum complexes are explicitly interconnected. Film 
representations are shown within memorial replicas of the ship within the larger war 
memorial and museum complex. Furthermore, on the replica ship, bullet holes are 
emphasized with an outline of red tape. Alongside other military machinery in the 
outdoor exhibition, the Chamsuri 357 stands out as an example of the evidence of 
North Korea’s brutal attack as it is the only exhibit to feature damages as part of the 
exhibit content. The plaque also references the suddenness of the attack: 
 
In the midst of the World Cup co-hosted by Korea and Japan on June 29, 2002, 
North Korean patrol boats crossed the Northern Limit Line. South Korean patrol 
boats were immediately dispatched and warned them to turn back. Without 
warning the North Korean patrol boats opened fire sinking PKM 357 and killing 
six sailors. South Korean patrol boats countered the attack sinking two North 
Korean vessels and inflicting 30 casualties on them. 
The exhibit PKM 357 is a life-size replica. The original PKM 357 is exhibited at 
the park of the Second Fleet Command, ROK Navy. 
 
As the visitor moves through the exhibit, the extent of the damage is evidenced by the 
outline of red throughout the ship, as there is virtually no space untouched on the 
ship’s walls by the red tape. Within the film, this damage is shown in intense and gory 
detail – not just on the ship’s mechanical body, but also on the bodies of the soldiers. 
While war films in general utilize spectacularized violence, what makes the violence 
in Northern Limit Line particularly striking is that the accounts are based on real 
stories and are later described in detail by the surviving soldiers of the attack in the 
credits roll. 
 In fact, Northern Limit Line’s ending, similar to Operation Chromite, as I will 
discuss, sets it apart from other Korean War films because while it uses similar 
memorialization techniques as these previous films, the usage of photography/video is 
not just premised on an imagined past or imaginary point before conflict, but also are 
supplemented by actual archival footage, blurring the lines between the war film as 
memorial and memorials themselves who utilize similar techniques in Korean War 
memorialization efforts. In particular, the last scenes of the film after the battle scene 
depict the aftermath of the conflict, and the memorial service of the soldiers, although 
the film at this point itself becomes a memorial to the soldiers and the events of the 
2nd Battle of Yeonpyeong as well. 
 In fact, the film presents multiple different “endings” and multiple different 
forms of memorialization: archival news footage, memorial service footage, narrative 
remembrances by surviving family members and soldiers and excavation of the ship, 
alternate reality photograph and video memorialization, and lastly, credits-roll 
interviews with the actual survivors. Taken together, the film’s narrative alone is not 
just allegorically a memorial to the events, but also the variety of film techniques 
transforms the film itself into a memorial quite literally. Aside from the narrative 
portions of this “memorial ending,” the last twenty minutes of this film could fit 
comfortably within the context of a museum exhibit, and would not feel out of place 
at the War Memorial of Korea. Walking through these different film memorial 
techniques in Northern Limit Line, I point out the significance in this change from 
earlier Korean War films to the present in the process of memorialization of the 
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events and the usage of archival images to create a new form of memorialization 
that points to the museumification of Korean War cinema. 
 After the portrayal of the battle, the television reports within the film also 
seems to draw attention to the ambiguity of recognition of the severity of the battle. 
Scenes of World Cup fans celebrating are interposed with captions that read: “Clash 
with North at NLL near Yeonpyeong Island. 24 sailors involved at skirmish. Patrol 
boat 357 sunk.” Despite the importance of the news, all attention is focused on 
cheering fans, emphasizing the disparity in emotions between the grieving family 
members and the general population. The television is also turned on in the memorial 
hall honoring the dead soldiers; before the ceremony, surviving family members and 
fellow officers wait and watch the news. These news reports also seem to play up the 
disparity in recognition by showing news that seem to lack respect for the victims. 
One reporter states: “Despite deadly combat in the Yellow Sea yesterday, tours of 
Mount Kumgang in North Korea continued. 589 tourists completed their tour, and 
departed for the South Korean harbor.” The next story then plays: “In order to attend 
the final game of the World Cup in Yokohama stadium, President Kim departed for 
Japan this morning, after being greeted by the Prime Minister.” The father of the 
commander of Chamsuri 357 seems particularly perturbed by the news as he stands 
up to watch this report. 
 In these three news reports that are played diegetically, there is an emphasis on 
the lack of respect for the victims and an implication that the sacrifices made by these 
soldiers in the line of duty are not fully respected. Given that tourist visits to certain 
areas of North Korea are heavily regulated, the continuation of the Mount Kumgang 
tours seems to imply that the Yeonpyeong battle was of little significance so as to not 
affect inter-Korean relations. Perhaps more condemning is that the president at the 
time, Kim Dae-jung, was not present at the memorial service for the soldiers who died 
in this conflict, putting the World Cup events ahead in significance rather than lending 
his presence to the memorial for the dead soldiers. The reaction by the commander’s 
bereaved father in which he suddenly becomes invested in the news report and wears 
a particularly disappointed look can be read as a larger condemnation of not only the 
presidential actions, but also more broadly of the Sunshine Policy era in which inter-
Korean reconciliation is often seen as more important than specific North Korean 
crimes and corruption. 
 Youngmin Choe writes of the significance of representation of inter-Korean 
relations in blockbuster cinema: 
 
…the cinematic narrative of North/South Korean relations, as told through the 
depositions of suspects and investigators’ reports against the background of 
believable historical circumstances, can also be said to constitute a history of 
how popular culture imagines these political relations. Given this environment, 
in which popular art is bestowed with the serious task of transmitting historical 
material, one can see how conditions become ripe for transformations, 
distortions, and realignments in the work of postmemory.126 
 
Choe also writes of Korean cinema’s focus on globalization to Asianization, shifting 
from more history-focused texts to memory-focused texts that focus on reunification 																																																								126	Youngmin	Choe,	“Postmemory	DMZ	in	South	Korean	Cinema,	1999-2003,”	Journal	of	
Korean	Studies	18.2	(Fall	2013):	317.	
	 52	
and inter-Asian cooperation. Particularly, the DMZ as referenced in these films 
becomes more metaphorical in its allusions to borders that exist not just in 
geographical space, but also as borders preventing inter-Asian relations and 
transnational alliances. Choe alludes to the DMZ as represented in these films, 
specifically Yesterday and 2009: Lost Memories as a memorial space: “The DMZ in 
these films, in its various forms, functions as a kind of museum space, one that 
functions less in the geospatial terms sketched out in JSA, as a border between nations 
with a specific history, and more in onto-spatial terms as a trope that helps one probe 
and negotiate the changing coordinates of the relationship between self and other.”127 
However, with the current trend in Korean War cinema, the DMZ and the Korean 
War seems to have re-embraced the historical trend – for example, Northern Limit 
Line bookends the narrative elements of the film with informational graphics and 
archival images. In this sense, the conflict within the film no longer “functions as a 
kind of museum space,” as in the films that Choe discusses; rather, it is the film itself 
that becomes the museum space. 
 Perhaps one of the most striking ways in which the film makes use of museum 
techniques is the insertion of archival footage besides diegetic news reports. Most 
notably, this is seen in the funeral service for the crewmembers. It begins with the 
actors performing a military funeral and after lingering on the faces of the main 
characters, suddenly shifts to archival video of the funeral service – the quality of the 
video image changes quite suddenly so the transition is made apparent. The military 
procession is shown, as well as the laying of flowers by surviving family members 
onto the offering table in which the memorial photographs of the dead soldiers rest. 
One woman, perhaps the mother of one of the soldiers, is physically carried by two 
soldiers to the memorial altar after she collapses with grief. The footage goes on for 
several minutes, including the soldiers’ burial at the Seoul National Cemetery. The 
film then goes on to narrative segments after this portion, but the inclusion of the real 
memorial service, instead of a representation of the memorial service, speaks to the 
increasing focus on incorporating historical archives in contemporary Korean War 
films. The archival video footage lends authenticity to the film’s conveying of 
knowledge and also blurs the line between narrative entertainment film and 
documentary, reinforcing the narrative claims on the part of the fictional film but also 
the imaginary representation of historical events of where there exist no immediate 
images, such as the battle. This is the technique that is used in museums to most 
effectively convey historical facts while providing entertainment to visitors, and it is 
particularly striking to see the transition from usage of archival videos in the 
background such as news reports to the full-scale transition to archival video, which 
does not make use of the same actors but uses the real faces of survivors and family 
members. The materiality of memory, and its emphasis in film, points to the 
similarities between museum displays and narrative presentations of memorialization 
in Korean War cinema. 
 The other significant narrative scene of memorialization, which ties together 
military discipline as well as perhaps unintentionally alluding to contemporary events 
through its news reports,128 is in the new recruit Tonghyŏk’s death scene. Throughout 																																																								127	Ibid,	332.	128	The	diving	and	rescue	scenes	seem	to	parallel	the	news	reports	on	the	sinking	of	the	Sewol	ferry	a	year	before	the	release	of	the	films,	although	at	the	time	of	the	film’s	release	in	2015,	some	of	the	students’	bodies	were	still	not	fully	recovered	and	the	ship	
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the ending of the film, he is shown to be slowly recovering, eventually waking up 
from the coma to news of the recovery of his superior’s body from the sunken 
remains of the Chamsuri 357. The news reporter states: “The Navy assumed that due 
to extreme tidal activity the search mission would be delayed, but they decided to 
continue the search for Chamsuri 357’s CPO Han Sang-guk thanks to milder sea 
conditions.” While Tonghyŏk and his mother watch the news report, the scene then 
cuts to the rescue divers who mention that because of the ship’s straight position, 
“someone must’ve manned the vessel while it was sinking.” In fact, CPO Han’s death 
was played up as one of the most tragic throughout the battle, as he has a condition 
that causes his hand to be shaky, which would have eventually led to his forced 
transfer – although without mention of the condition because of his loyalty – if it had 
not been for the fateful battle. Despite his condition and taking numerous bullet and 
shrapnel wounds, he maintains a steady hand on the wheel, and when his body gives 
out, he forcibly ties his hand to the wheel ensuring that he will take the soldiers home 
at any cost, which is what would allow for the ship to be recovered in South Korean 
waters. When the divers discover the body, his hand is still tied to the wheel, 
emphasizing the connection between the soldier’s body to the machine and 
metaphorically to his duty to the nation. The diver is visibly emotional as he unties 
Sang-guk and takes him “home.” Back in the hospital, Tonghyŏk watches the archival 
news reports that indicate: “CPO Han Sang-guk found.” Despite wrapped up in tubes 
and bandages and appearing to be in great pain, Tonghyŏk forces himself to sit up and 
salute the television in memory of his friend and superior. After the transition to a 
narrative scene in which the t’aegukki is draped over the remains of CPO Han, the 
next scene shows Tonghyŏk flat-lining and despite attempts at resuscitation, he is 
pronounced dead. His last action of a salute right before his death only drives home 
the intense sense of duty among the soldiers, reinforced in all earlier portions of the 
film, and the pronounced tragedy of the soldiers’ sacrifice during the World Cup 
events. 
 Yet, the World Cup is not entirely vilified; rather, it seems as if it is only the 
fans and the President’s actions (or lack thereof) that seem to be subtly questioned. 
Furthermore, this film does not completely abandon the alternate reality endings that 
seem to be particularly prevalent in Korean War films since the early 2000s. In fact, 
the last diegetic scene of the film is precisely an alternate future ending, which 
bypasses the memorialization technique used in films such as JSA, Welcome to 
Dongmakgol, and The Front Line – memorializing characters and relationships before 
major events – to fully allow audiences to imagine the “what could have been” for the 
soldiers of Chamsuri 357 if the conflict had never happened. 
 In this scene, the commander asks the soldiers, “What day is today?” to which 
they respond “The Turkey game!” The commander then tells them to “cheer your 
heart out.” The soldiers then all gather together, along with the commander, who 
finally joins them in watching and has his face painted with a taegukgi, to watch the 
game. They give the final cheer and the film ends on a freeze frame of this moment, 
which gradually fades into grayscale, resembling the photographic ends that are 
common for Korean War cinema. What is particularly unique about Northern Limit 
Line’s ending is that it is purely imaginary and the freezeframe exists solely as film 																																																																																																																																																														had	not	been	raised.	For	more	on	representations	of	the	Sewol	disaster	see	Hong	Kal,	“The	Art	of	Witnessing:	The	Sewol	Ferry	Disaster	in	Hong	Sung-dam’s	Paintings,”	Korean	
Studies	43	(2019):	96-119.	
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technique, rather than as a revelation of a photograph or videos taken in an earlier 
part of the film. In fact, the soldiers were attacked before this match and were unable 
to watch. Unlike the theme of going back to the past to prevent the mistakes of the 
future as in the memorialization scenes in JSA, Northern Limit Line instead ends on 
an imaginary alternate future ending in which the attack had never happened and the 
soldiers are able to fulfill their wish of watching the historic Turkey-South Korea 
semifinals World Cup game. 
 The transition from memorialization within the film taking place in the 
diegesis to the film functioning as memorial itself of futures lost precisely marks the 
turning point in Korean War filmic representation. While JSA points to an ending in 
which the memorial is to a time before the North Korean and South Korean soldiers 
meet one another that lends equal culpability to both North Koreans and South 
Koreans for attempting small-scale reconciliation and reunification (and in which 
South Koreans often provoke the first shot such as crossing over the border or 
shooting first), Northern Limit Line memorializes the lost futures of soldiers who 
would have survived were it not for an unprovoked North Korean attack, devoting 
themselves even in their entertainment preferences to national (South Korean) pride – 
the taehanmin’guk cheer echoes on even during the freezeframe – rather than to a 
spirit of inter-Korean reconciliation. 
 As if the variety of endings were not enough to mark the museumification of 
the film, the post-diegesis ending and credits continues onwards to incorporate more 
informational text, as well as interviews with the survivors of the Chamsuri 357. The 
informational text reads: 
 
The sailors of Chamsuri 357 dedicated their lives to patrol the Northern Limit 
Line. Rules of engagement were updated for quicker responses, in order to 
ensure the safety of all soldiers. CPO Han Sang-guk’s wife currently resides and 
works in Gwangju, Gyeonggi Province. CPO Park Kyung-soo survived the 2nd 
Battle of Yeon-pyeong but was later killed in 2010 on a different battleship. 
This movie honors Lt. Cdr. Yoon Young-ha, CPO Han Sang-guk, CPO Cho 
Chun-hyung, CPO Hwang Do-hyun, CPO Suh Hu-won, Petty officer Park 
Dong-hyuk and the 22 soldiers that risked their lives on that fatal day. Thank 
you to all who supported the making of this film. 
 
Additional archival footage is then presented of Navy soldiers celebrating while 
watching the historic World Cup games, and a news anchor announcing: “As Park Ji-
sung scores the game-deciding goal, the sailors in the base erupted in joy. This is the 
roar of our soldiers who are guarding the Yellow Sea. Their joyous cheers have 
reached the Incheon stadium. In order for the games to continue without a hitch, they 
are on full alert.” The commander of the ship, 357 Lt. Cdr. Yoon Young-ha, is also 
shown in an archival interview (looking different from the actor) about his World Cup 
pride: “Even though we cannot be at the stadium in person, we’ll cheer our team 
toward the quarter-finals.” This archival footage reinforces the narrative elements 
throughout the film, and the ending honors the names of the dead soldiers as in a 
memorial that incorporates a wall of names, and also includes the imaginary scene 
that provides some wish fulfillment for the soldiers, living and dead, which is to cheer 
on the South Korean team while working to defend its borders. Thus, this is a very 
different type of film that marks different political tensions of the time – while the 
events took place during the Sunshine Policy period and when films like JSA and 
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Welcome to Dongmakgol were being made, the 10-year gap in the making of these 
films marks a significantly different understanding of this period and of inter-Korean 
relations and the promise of reunification. 
 As the credits roll, surviving soldiers describe the battle in their own words, 
lending more authenticity to the events portrayed in the film. They describe in gory 
detail what the viewers saw with their own eyes, confirming that the images of 
violence were accurate and not spectacularized for dramatic effect as in other war 
films. Former 357 Comm. Officer Kim Young-tae describes: “Radar specialist PO3 
Cho Hyun-jin was so badly injured that I was in shock. He was hit with shrapnel in 
the head, and his intestines were coming out from a wound in his side, he asked what 
it was, and tried to put it back in, and we held him close.” Former 357 Artillery CPO 
Jeon Chang-sung describes further: “Lt. Commander had a pool of blood under him, 
behind him, PO2 Kwon Ki-hyung’s…hand was torn apart. He was screaming. Lt. Lee 
Hee-wan’s leg was blown up, but he kept giving us orders in that state.” These are 
events that were shown in great detail earlier in the film, and the interviews together 
with the film narrative work together as a process of memorialization for these events, 
similar to what might occur in a museum space or exhibition. 
 The epigraph that begins this section in which PO2 Kim Seung-hwan 
discusses his dream about the soldiers who died coming back and fighting again, and 
the interviews in which other survivors of the attack discuss their survivor guilt, and 
how they miss their fellow soldiers, coupled with photographs of the dead soldiers on 
the ship or in family photographs, serve as a specific form of memorialization that is 
often featured in museum exhibitions – talking head interviews of survivors who 
describe their experiences and memories of the events, as well as memorabilia that 
honors the lives of those who died. The film is able to fulfill the wishes of the 
survivors – it does indeed relive the battle and preserve the moving-image of the 
fellow soldiers before their deaths in a way that would not be possible in reality. 
Furthermore, the film grants the imaginary wish of the soldiers in being able to watch 
the games, which they were unable to fulfill due to the timing of the attack. For the 
real soldiers to exist together in the same space as fictional representations, archival 
news footage and photographs, videos of the memorial service, and imaginary future 
marks the changing functions of memorialization in Korean War cinema and the turn 
towards historicity while at the same time the blurring of the boundaries between 
history and memory, coming together in a film that is neither solely film nor museum, 
but a memorial to the events of the 2nd Battle of Yeonpyeong. 
 
“What I mean is…when a man is dying in pain, would he admire the beautiful sky?” 
- Captain Chang Haksu 
 
Unlike Northern Limit Line, Operation Chromite takes place during the 
Korean War, focusing on the events that led to the Battle of Incheon and the famous 
Incheon Landing, which changed the tide of the Korean War in 1950 in favor of the 
U.S., UN, and ROK forces. Like Northern Limit Line, this film also has a more 
conservative bent in its representation of the war and inter-Korean relations. While 
the film does not rely on archival footage in quite the same way as Northern Limit 
Line because of the earlier time period, Operation Chromite does rely on archival 
images and backdrops and treats the soldiers as documentary subjects in the absence 
of survivors to interview. Like other Korean War films, this film also ends with the 
photographic image as memorial, as well as beginning and ending with museum-like 
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graphics and text like in Northern Limit Line, continuing the trend of the 
museumification of Korean War cinema. 
The film also follows the cycle of collaboration/double spy/espionage thriller 
films of the 2010s, and the leader of the mission to gather intelligence on Incheon 
Harbor is Chang Haksu, played by Lee Jung-jae who plays a similar character in the 
film Assassination (Choi Dong-hoon, 2015). In Operation Chromite, Chang Haksu is 
a North Korean defector who joins the ROK after witnessing the execution of his 
father; he pledges his loyalty wholeheartedly to General Douglas MacArthur and does 
everything in his power to ensure the successful completion of his mission, along with 
his small 7-man X-Ray unit. He finds immediate trouble when confronted by North 
Korean Commander Rim Gyejin, who suspects him from the beginning, and much of 
the film focuses on the successful carrying out of the espionage operation along with 
the unit’s alliances and collaboration with other North Koreans in Incheon. 
Similar to Northern Limit Line, most of the narrative content of Operation 
Chromite focuses on the legitimation of the South Korean nation either through 
dialogue in which North Korean ideology and Communism is directly questioned or 
challenged, or through the usage of sets that emphasize South Korea’s lineage of 
independence fighters (a lineage that is also invoked by North Korea). This mirrors 
the narrative of patriotic lineage that can be found in the War Memorial of Korea as 
well.129 In particular, scenes in which the X-Ray unit plan out their missions is often 
done in basements of houses that used to belong to independence fighters during the 
Japanese colonial era and signs featuring the phrase “Korean independence” can be 
seen in the backdrops.130 One of the North Koreans who works as an informant 
explains: “Freedom fighters hid here during the Japanese imperialism.” These 
backdrops feature the Korean independence flag – similar to the modern t’aegukki in 
design – and are found in the background every time Chang Haksu is in a position of 
leadership, the flag remaining just out of focus while reminding viewers of his 
allegiances. Scenes in which the platoon members are crowded around a table with 
Haksu leading, and with the flag in the background, only serve to reinforce and 
legitimize South Korean’s moral hegemony and legacy of patriotism and 
independence during the Korean War period, as well as drawing a clear genealogical 
line between independence fighters and South Korean soldiers during the Korean 
War. 
Furthermore, Chang Haksu and his main antagonist, Rim Gyejin, often 
disagree with each other about North Korean politics from the beginning of the film. 
Rim Gyejin is shown to behave ruthlessly and oftentimes his “evilness” is played up 
to almost cartoonish hyperbolic proportions that would feel out of place in earlier 
films like JSA and Welcome to Dongmakgol, which emphasizes similarities between 
North Koreans and South Koreans. The final showdown between the two at the end of 
the film, in which both are heavily injured and continue to shoot at one another, 
resembles a similar showdown in an earlier Korean War blockbuster film, Shiri (Kang 
Je-gyu, 1999), but with a far less sympathetic North Korean soldier. Rim Gyejin asks, 
“What’s there to communism? It’s all about wanting a better life together, isn’t it? … 
No matter what you Yankee puppets do, the red flag will march forward!” However, 																																																								129	Sheila	Miyoshi	Jager,	“Monumental	Histories:	Manliness,	the	Military,	and	the	War	Memorial,”	Public	Culture	14.2	(2002):	387-410.	130	These	scenes	of	planning	would	not	seem	out	of	place	in	a	Japanese	colonial-era	spy	thriller	like	Assassination	or	The	Age	of	Shadows	(Kim	Jee-woon,	2016).	
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throughout the film, the brutal actions of Rim are shown in great detail – from 
stringing up the bodies of the unit members and civilians that he executed to not even 
hesitating to shoot his own subordinates for mistakes they made. In contrast, despite 
Rim’s guessing that General MacArthur is only interested in pursuing the Incheon 
Operation because of future plans to become president, MacArthur’s motivations are  
shown, in black-and-white flashbacks, to be altruistic and motivated by the Korean 
people that he met, including Chang, who want to fight for a “better life.” 
However, in this film, it is clear that South Korea’s vision of the future better 
life is in contrast to North Korean brutality. This is reinforced with the recapture of 
Incheon and the replacement of North Korean Communist slogans with the t’aegukki 
and civilians cheering on the U.S. and ROK soldiers. Before the film fades out to the 
“archival” talking head portions at the end, Haksu’s mother, who is in the crowd, 
looks out for her son and temporarily hallucinates him in the crowd of soldiers only to 
realize that the face belongs to someone else. Nevertheless, as her face takes on a 
pained expression, she never stops waving the t’aegukki and continues to do so with 
increased fervor and desperation as the film fades out. This last image serves to 
reinforce patriotism and nationalism familiar in earlier scenes of Haksu speaking in 
front of the flag, as well as the devotion to the South Korean flag in Northern Limit 
Line. 
The beginning and ending of the film, like Northern Limit Line, also utilizes 
archival-like documents and photographs to memorialize the events within the film, as 
well as to educate the audiences about the Korean War. Like the introductory graphics 
and text of Northern Limit Line, the introductory segment of Operation Chromite also 
resembles a video that would not be out of place in a museum exhibition. After the 
introduction of the phone call showcasing Liam Neeson as General Douglas 
MacArthur gearing up in preparation for the risky Incheon Operation Landing, the 
opening museum-like informational graphics and text begins, setting the context for 
the Korean War: 
 
June 25, 1950. With the Soviet Union’s support, North Korea invades the South. 
June 27, 1950. USA President Truman deploys the U.S. Army and assigns 
General Douglas MacArthur as the Commander-in-chief of the UN Command. 
However, the rest of South Korea, north of the Nakdong River, falls in a month. 
In order to turn the tide of war, Gen. MacArthur orders a covert operation 
involving 8 men. 
 
The high-quality graphics with maps, photographs, and dynamic text demonstrate the 
new trend in Korean War films; unlike earlier films that may rely on intertitles only to 
describe battles, locations, and dates, the new introductory video with graphics akin to 
museum text seems to be a pattern that is beginning to be used in recent war films. 
Compared to the flashbacks that portray the “truth” in a film like JSA where four 
different accounts yield vastly different stories to the point that the viewer may 
question if the last “truth” may actually be accurate at all,131 Ode to My Father, 
Northern Limit Line, and Operation Chromite make clear that they are portrayals of 
authoritative truth-claims. 
																																																								131	This	type	of	re-presented	story	is	similar	to	the	Japanese	film	Rashomon	(Akira	Kurosawa,	1950).	
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 This is reinforced at the end of the film when, absent of surviving talking 
head interviews, the unit members – via their actors – are temporarily resurrected 
from death to discuss their motivations for joining the cause. As none of the soldiers 
featured in the film end up surviving the operation, it is particularly striking to see 
their talking head interviews as if they were taking part in a documentary project, 
mirroring the post-diegetic end of Northern Limit Line. This talking head interview 
format takes the place of the ending video or photograph in earlier films, as each 
character describes their individual motivations, which functions as a memorial for 
each character. The answers range from mundane motivations (wanting to prove 
oneself) to survival (receiving rice to feed family) to upholding a family lineage 
(coming from a line of independence fighters), and there is a bit of humor to the 
soldiers’ answers, as well as tragedy, since the audience knows that no one survives. 
Together with Haksu, they then end up taking a commemorative photograph, which 
quickly fades from color to an archival sepia-toned coloring. This is then overlaid 
with an actual archival photograph of the soldiers who took part in this operation 
followed by a dedication: “To the 15 men who died during Mission X-RAY, 
including Lieutenant Lim Byung-Re, Sergeant Hong Si-Wook and members of KLO, 
and those who sacrificed their lives for Korea’s freedom and peace, we dedicate this 
film to them and their families.” A post-script is also added, continuing on from the 
introductory information: “13 days after the successful landing operation of Incheon, 
on September 15, 1950, the UN Allied Forces reclaimed Seoul. They went on to take 
Pyeongyang, but the Chinese army drove them back. On July 27, 1953, an armistice 
was reached, drawing the war to an end after 3 years with over 3 million casualties.” 
The intermixing of narrative elements with archival documents and specific 
dedications and historical information speaks to the film’s functioning as a memorial 
similar to the ending of Northern Limit Line. 
 Furthermore, it is assumed that the talking head interviews and 
commemorative photograph at the end of the film take place before the events of this 
film, but it is also entirely possible to read these last scenes as imaginary endings akin 
to the World Cup scene in Northern Limit Line, in which the soldiers had survived the 
operation and are able to talk about their motivations in a humorous manner because 
they were able to see their end goal, which is “Korea’s freedom and peace.” As 
discussed in the previous chapter on Korean War transpacific memorials, “sacrifice,” 
“freedom,” and “peace” in this film are seen as outcomes of a successful and 
victorious Korean War that ended in 1953. 
 This is perhaps most evident in Chang Haksu’s dying scene. For context, at 
the beginning of the film, before he murders a North Korean official in order to 
replace him and take his identity, he asks the soldier about the book that he is reading 
and ominously asks him about the dying moments of the character in the book: “At 
the end, the protagonist gets shot, and while dying, he looks up at the blue sky. 
But…Sholokhov describes the blue sky with a beautiful metaphor, and I’m saying 
that is a lie. What I mean is…when a man is dying in pain, would he admire the 
beautiful sky?” Ironically, Haksu’s death scene ends in precisely this way. As Haksu 
is dying from his wounds, he looks up towards the sky to see U.S. airplanes flying 
overhead and has flashbacks of his dead unit members. He gazes up not just to only 
see the sky, but also the U.S. planes flying overhead that signify the success of his 
mission, ending up dying a romanticized death akin to the protagonist in the novel. 
 This scene is particularly noteworthy not just for the circularity of the 
narrative, but also for the scene’s similarity to the ending scenes of Welcome to 
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Dongmakgol. In that film, the soldiers see similar images of U.S. planes flying 
overhead; however, these images signify immediate threat as the planes shoot to death 
each soldier in the North Korean-South Korean joint task force, eventually raining 
bombs upon the surviving soldiers. It is the last facial expressions of fright, which 
turns into happiness (because of their success in averting the death of innocent 
villagers), on the faces of the “joint task force” as opposed to the peace and security in 
Chang Haksu’s eyes in Operation Chromite that mark the greatest difference in the 
ten-year span of Korean War films. The collective smiles and intimate gazes of the 
North Korean and South Korean soldiers, directed at one another, as opposed to the 
look that Chang Haksu gives to the U.S. airplanes, speaks to the changing depictions 
of inter-Korean relations in contemporary South Korean cinema. 
 The impending doom in this scene in Welcome to Dongmakgol changes to 
happiness, reflected in the interchanging of glances between the soldiers and their 
defiant gazes back at the U.S. airplanes, signifies the imaginative power of inter-
Korean intimacy and the fantasy of South Korean-North Korean friendships that are 
found in the Korean War blockbuster films in the 2000s discussed in the previous 
chapter. In stark contrast, Chang Haksu dies alone on the beach, gazing up at the 
“beautiful sky” and the U.S. airplanes flying above, knowing that he has successfully 
carried out the mission that paved the way for the successful Incheon Landing 
Operation, which allowed for turning the tides of war. His facial expression gives off 
an affect of relief, but also of gratitude, and reflects the growing trend towards South 
Korean resiliency and cooperation with U.S. forces in the post-2010s Korean War 
blockbuster films, which math the affects found in museum and memorial complexes 
– the “freedom is not free” mantra – discussed in the first chapter. By documenting 
the changing trends in blockbuster Korean War cinema, these chapters work to 
showcase how memory of the Korean War is continually contested and re-presented, 
showcasing the dynamic flows of memory and memorialization in the contemporary 
“post”-Cold War era. The next chapter examines memorial texts beyond the spaces of 
films and museums by focusing on representations of the temporality of the Korean 
War, and participatory and site-specific art projects and exhibitions that open up 
possibilities for engaging directly and indirectly with memory of the Korean War in 
the present conjuncture. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Broadening the Temporal and Spatial Scope of the Korean War: Performing Art 
and Trauma at the Civilian Control Line (CCL) and Gwangju, South Korea 
 
 Kuan-Hsing Chen, in his 2010 book Asia as Method: Toward 
Deimperialization, asserts that East Asian nations must undergo a process of “de-cold 
war.” Drawing from examples in Taiwan and South Korea, he argues that similar to 
decolonization, “de-cold war” means to grapple with the specific legacies of the Cold 
War on the lived experiences of people who are still affected by these Cold War 
ideologies and divisions. Heonik Kwon in The Other Cold War (2010) points to the 
spaces of the “locally specific” to problematize the singularity of Cold War narratives 
and also calls into question the ends of the Cold War as a slow “decomposition.” In 
other words, the Cold War did not end in 1989 as conventional histories indicate but 
still continues to linger on in the present as “an extended horizon of ‘what is not yet,’ 
a field of time-space that is open to creative political acting and moral imagining.”132 
 Building off of the scholarship of Chen and Kwon, I specifically locate culture 
as an understudied yet significant site of inquiry in understanding the global Cold 
War. Furthermore, the imaginative space of cultural productions is ripe for gleaning 
insight into the “what is not yet” of the unending Cold War, as shown in the previous 
chapters of the dissertation on Korean War cinema, memorials, and museums. To this 
extent, this chapter shifts to a different form of cultural production and focuses on two 
performance art exhibitions that grapple with the ongoing legacies of the Korean War 
and its locally specific realities beyond the hegemonic periodization of June 25, 1950 
– July 27, 1953: the 2014 iteration of the REAL DMZ PROJECT and South Korean 
artist Minouk Lim’s Navigation ID at the 2014 Gwangju Biennale. 
 Both projects straddle the lines between traditional museum exhibition and 
performance art. The REAL DMZ PROJECT spans several locations across the 
Civilian Control Line (CCL) in South Korea, although the majority of the exhibitions 
are located in the city of Cheorwon. Minouk Lim’s Navigation ID is a powerful video, 
performance, and art piece that tracks two shipping containers filled with the remains 
of Bodo League massacre victims on their journey from individual family graves to 
the Gwangju Biennale space. The surviving family members of the massacres were 
then greeted by mothers of victims of the Gwangju Massacre in a public ceremony at 
the opening of the Biennale. 
 These projects allow for the communication of trauma by visual and 
performance artists affected by Korean division as well as by families of victims 
whose voices are often not accounted for in traditional museum spaces and historical 
narratives. However, what is most significant about these projects is that for the artists 
involved and for the person experiencing the exhibitions, Cold War and Korean War 
temporalities are further complicated than in the “new” Cold War studies scholarship. 
In other words, I argue that Cold War and Korean War temporalities are not just in the 
process of decomposing as in Kwon’s argument nor is this temporality recursive as in 
Jodi Kim’s 2010 book Ends of Empire: Asian American Critique and the Cold 
War.133 Rather, the Korean War – and by larger extension the Cold War – and its 																																																								132	Heonik	Kwon,	The	Other	Cold	War	(New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	2010):	8.	133	Jodi	Kim,	Ends	of	Empire:	Asian	American	Critique	and	the	Cold	War	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2010).	
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temporalities are multiple, brushing up against other historical events. These 
temporalities exist palimpsestically along various other forms of state violence and 
wartime violence in South Korea that exceeds the Korean War. In fact, these 
exhibitions call forth a reading of the Cold War/Korean War temporality through 
referential understandings of other historical events, memories, and legacies – an 
inter-trauma referencing, borrowing from Kuan-Hsing Chen’s “Asia as method,” a 
call for “inter-Asian referencing.”134 
 Thus, this chapter asks, what new insights would be gained about the Korean 
War through reading the historical events of the Bodo League Massacre in the 
summer of 1950 alongside with the Gwangju Massacre, which occurred from May 
18th – May 27th, 1980? How does the concept of Korean War memorialization begin 
to gain new ground through the inter-referencing of multiple temporalities and spaces 
of the Korean War? And how can we further complicate Korean War temporality in 
order to take into account the lived experience of the Korean War? By reading 
oppositional spaces to Cold War narratives through the artistic productions by 
survivors and descendants of survivors can we begin to imagine alternate 
undertakings of the Korean War and Cold War. 
 
Cultural Productions and the New Cold War Studies Scholarship 
 
 This chapter contributes to the “new” Cold War studies scholarship that has 
been emerging from various fields, including scholars such as Kuan-Hsing Chen,135 
Heonik Kwon,136 and Masuda Hajimu,137 and extends the points of inquiry into the 
study of cultural productions that exceed Cold War historical time yet are part of Cold 
War temporalities. Furthermore, in addition to the scholarship of the “new” Cold War 
that has incorporated anthropological, historical, and sociological perspectives, the 
study of the Cold War also benefits from the interdisciplinarity of a field such as 
ethnic studies and Asian American studies. Asian American studies scholars have also 
interrogated the Cold War and its legacies, most notably Jodi Kim who argues that the 
Cold War “continues to enjoy a persisting recursiveness when seen as a structure of 
feeling, a knowledge project, and a hermeneutics for interpreting developments in the 
‘post’-Cold War conjuncture.”138 This chapter acknowledges the work that has been 
done by area studies scholars and seeks to bridge the gap between scholars of “Asia” 
(and specifically Korean Studies) and Asian American studies. Furthermore, I also 
stress the importance of culture in order to understand the global Cold War and 
grapple with Cold War ideologies in the contemporary moment. After all, the 
imaginative space of cultural productions allows for wider readings of Cold War 
temporalities beyond the historical, sociological, or anthropological spheres. In this 
section, I delve in further detail into some of this “new” Cold War theoretical 
scholarship and connect it to recent work that reexamines the Korean War and state 
violence in South Korea. I particularly focus on the scholars’ discussion of the Cold 																																																								134	Kuan-Hsing	Chen,	Asia	as	Method:	Toward	Deimperialization	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2010).	135	Ibid.	136	Heonik	Kwon,	The	Other	Cold	War	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2010).	137	Masuda	Hajimu,	Cold	War	Crucible:	The	Korean	Conflict	and	the	Postwar	Period	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	2015).	138	Jodi	Kim,	Ends	of	Empire:	Asian	American	Critique	and	the	Cold	War	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2010):	3.	
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War and its protracted endings, as well as their discussions of the lived experiences 
of the Cold War, in order to further draw out the differential ways in which memory 
of the Korean War/Cold War period in South Korea continue to affect the present. 
 In this contemporary conjuncture, it is still necessary to explore how 
effects/affects of the Cold War continue after its proclaimed “end” in 1989 and into 
the 1990s with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
However, it is also important to not just understand the Cold War as a slowly 
“decomposing” process, but also point to how the cultural productions – the REAL 
DMZ PROJECT and Minouk Lim’s Navigation ID – also call forth a reading of the 
Cold War and Korean War temporalities through referential understandings of other 
historical events, memories, and legacies. 
 Heonik Kwon, in The Other Cold War, writes of how histories of the Cold 
War tend to privilege Western histories and thus ignore that the Cold War was in fact 
a “hot war” for many countries in Asia and the global South. The Cold War was thus 
not just an ideological conflict between the Soviet Union and the U.S., but could be 
seen as a “global cold war” in which multiple other nations and states were implicated 
in these tensions that boiled over into “hot wars”: “In a wide definition, however, the 
global cold war also entails the unequal relations of power among the political 
communities that pursued or were driven to pursue a specific path of progress within 
the binary structure of the global order.”139 Furthermore, the (global) Cold War also 
“consists of a multitude of these locally specific historical realities and variant human 
experiences, and this view conflicts with the dominant image of the cold war as a 
single, encompassing geopolitical order.”140 Therefore, moving beyond non-Western 
or non-binary perspectives of the Cold War necessitates scholars to take into account 
“whose” and “which” cold wars, as well as the “locally specific resonances” of the 
Cold War. The case of South Korea, as an example of a geographic locale in which 
the Cold War has become “hot” through the Korean War, and with its “locally 
specific” contexts – the civil war within the larger international war141 – complicates 
Cold War historicism.142 
 In relation to Cold War temporality, Kwon questions the “end” of the Cold 
War as well as much of Cold War historiography, which marks an end to the Cold 
War and the beginning of a new global era after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 
He argues that “the historical turning point glossed as the end of the cold war is 
actually an extended horizon of ‘what is not yet,’ a field of time-space that is open to 
creative political acting and moral imagining.”143 In earlier chapters, I argued that 
South Korean films from the late 1990s – mid-2000s attempt to showcase the “what is 
not yet” through visualizing alternative histories of the Korean War. Furthermore, the 
open-endedness of this “creative political acting and moral imagining” can be found 
through the innovative artistic works of the REAL DMZ PROJECT and Minouk 
Lim’s Navigation ID. These artistic projects push this concept further through also 																																																								139	Heonik	Kwon,	The	Other	Cold	War	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2010):	2.	140	Ibid,	6-7.	141	See	Masuda	Hajimu,	Cold	War	Crucible:	The	Korean	Conflict	and	the	Postwar	World	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	2015).	142	Kwon,	in	his	text,	also	points	to	examples	such	as	Vietnam,	where	he	conducted	much	of	his	fieldwork	and	on	which	he	has	published	extensively,	and	Greece.	Within	South	Korea,	he	draws	on	the	example	of	Jeju	Island,	site	of	a	civilian	uprising	and	massacre	(the	4.3	Incident)	before	the	official	beginning	of	the	Korean	War	in	1948	–	1949.	143	Heonik	Kwon,	The	Other	Cold	War	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2010):	8.	
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utilizing geographic space and movement of bodies, as well as by actively 
subverting the power of the visual, specifically through incorporating sounds and 
performative gestures. 
 Furthermore, Kwon’s theory of “decomposition” is particularly useful for 
describing Cold War temporality in relation to cultural productions. Kwon writes that 
the end of the Cold War is a slow “decomposition,” time and space that is not quite 
divorced of the past yet still cannot fully imagine a future: it is an “unsettling situation 
in which the living reality is not really free from the immediate past and has not 
reintegrated the past into the time present as a past history – that is, it has a kind of 
spectral existence.”144 In this chapter, I not only explore the “spectral existence” of 
Cold War “decompositions,” but also how these decomposing processes intersect with 
other traumatic decomposing temporalities in South Korea, such as the Gwangju 
Massacre of 1980. 
 Yet, it is important to also point out that the Cold War legacies in spaces like 
the DMZ and the CCZ (Civilian Control Zone) are not just “spectral,” but also quite 
material and exists as part of everyday life for the civilians, workers, and military 
personnel who encounter these spaces. 145  As Eleana Kim writes, the military 
hardware left behind in the aftermath of the Korean War in the DMZ and within the 
CCZ continues to affect those who come into contact with them: “Comprehensive 
government statistics on landmine casualties do not exist, but estimates by the PSA 
count 1,000 civilian casualties, and 2,000 to 3,000 military casualties.” 146 
Furthermore, 
 
Few South Koreans are aware of the existence of mines in so-called rear areas, 
south of the DMZ, where, by South Korean government estimates, there are 
1,100 “planned” mine fields (meaning laid by the South Korean military, and 
therefore documented) and 208 “unconfirmed ones.” According to the expert 
deminer Kim Kiho, when U.S. forces were drawn down in the 1970s, they left 
behind as many as 200,000 mines, the locations, types, and numbers of which 
were never shared with the South Korean military.147 
 
If one were to count the casualties due to the residual leftovers of the Korean War 
conflict as part of the official war casualties, it would be difficult to argue that the 
“end” of the Cold War (and Korean War) is solely “spectral,” as the realities of living 
and working in or within close proximity to the DMZ and CCZ comes along with 
material risks and consequences. A way to work through the material legacies of the 
Korean War with the temporal legacies of the Cold War is Ann Laura Stoler’s concept 
of ruins: 
 
This is not a turn to ruins as memorialized monumental “leftovers” or relics – 
although these come into our purview as well – but rather to what people are left 
with: to what remains blocking livelihoods and health, to the aftershocks of 																																																								144	Ibid,	33.	145	For	more	on	interactions	between	military	hardware	and	civilians	in	the	DMZ,	see	Eleana	Kim’s	article	on	the	agency	of	mines.	Eleana	J.	Kim,	“Toward	an	Anthropology	of	Landmines:	Rogue	Infrastructure	and	Military	Waste	in	the	Korean	DMZ,”	Cultural	
Anthropology	31.2	(2016):	162-187.	146	Ibid,	169.	147	Ibid,	168-169.	
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imperial assault, to the social afterlife of structures, sensibilities, and things. 
Such effects reside in the corroded hollows of landscapes, in the gutted 
infrastructures of segregated cityscapes and in the microecologies of matter and 
mind….The question is pointed: how do imperial formations persist in their 
material debris, in ruined landscapes and through the social ruination of 
people’s lives?148 
 
Despite the focus of the collected volume on the legacies of colonialism and 
imperialism, the questions raised speak to Cold War legacies as well, and points to 
this chapter’s reading of not only the material remains of these Cold War formations, 
but also the subjectivity of lived experience in the “post”-Cold War period as well. 
 Furthermore, Kuan-Hsing Chen writes of the “affective intensities” that occur 
in people-to-people relationships during the Cold War, such as the reunion of divided 
families in both Taiwan (with China) and South Korea (with North Korea). In his 
chapter “De-Cold War: The Im/possibility of ‘Great Reconciliation,’” he emphasizes 
that in the context of North Korea and South Korea, and China and Taiwan, national 
histories and familial histories inextricably intersect: “For subjects encountering these 
experiences, the emotional plane of affective desire seems to be the most prominent, 
overshadowing all other aspects of the reunions. Nor does it matter if the bodily 
experience (tiyan) of the event is real or imaginary. These moments of intensity are an 
ineradicable part of subject formation.”149 In other words, Chen brings the question of 
subjectivity into the forefront of the study of the Cold War and its effects in the 
present. 
 He emphasizes that these “affective intensities” challenge the notion of the 
Cold War as “over”; furthermore, these “affective intensities” are essential to what 
Kwon describes as the “locally specific” Cold War: 
 
The effects of the cold war have been embedded in local history, and simply 
pronouncing the war to be over will not cause them to dissolve. The complex 
effects of the war, mediated through our bodies, have been inscribed into our 
national, family, and personal histories. In short, the cold war is still alive within 
us.150 
 
This statement has particular resonance for diasporic subjects and for cultural 
productions that are intended to address subjectivity and the traumas of the Cold War 
and Korean War. Chen’s other critical intervention within this “new” Cold War 
studies is his concept of “de-cold war.” To begin the process of “de-cold war,” Chen 
argues for the necessity to “mark out a space in which unspoken stories and histories 
may be told, and to recognize and map this historically constituted cultural and 
political effects of the cold war.”151  This text helps to further disentangle the 
epistemological structures of the Cold War and the productive power of “affective 
																																																								148	Ann	Laura	Stoler,	ed.,	Imperial	Debris:	On	Ruins	and	Ruination	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2013):	9-10.	149	Kuan-Hsing	Chen,	Asia	as	Method:	Toward	Deimperialization	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2010):	118.	150	Ibid.	151	Ibid,	120.	
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intensities” and the working through of these intensities through cultural 
productions in order to “de-cold war,” or to “de-Korean War” by extension. 
 Jodi Kim further examines Cold War “ends,” which she identifies in multiple 
ways; however, I focus on her conceptualization of Cold War “ends” as “fragments 
and remnants, whether the physical remains and ruins of Cold War violence….the 
human ruin or death produced by such violence, or the necessarily fragmentary 
attempts to grasp, remember, and narrate Cold War history.”152 This type of “end” 
seems to be similar to Kwon’s theory of Cold War “decompositions” and Stoler’s 
concept of “ruins” and “ruination,” as well as speaks to the inability to completely 
craft a coherent narrative of the Cold War through contemporary cultural productions, 
operation through the logics of memory and memorialization. Critical Asian 
American memorial studies as methodology, in looking at the subjectivity of Cold 
War material and temporal remains, can also provide a framework for analyzing the 
art projects of the REAL DMZ PROJECT and Minouk Lim’s Navigation ID. 
Furthermore, both of these art projects utilize different genres – from performance to 
the tour to film to encounters between people, “affective intensities” not from divided 
families as mentioned in Chen’s text but divided temporalities that are brought 
together through the public square or through the security tourism circuit. 
 
The REAL DMZ PROJECT 
 
 The REAL DMZ PROJECT (hereafter: RDP) began its annual exhibitions in 
2012, based off of academic research conducted on the DMZ, engaging scholarship, 
art, and the sites of the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ) bordering the Civilian Control 
Line (CCL) in Cheorwon County, Gangwon-do, South Korea. In the 2014 iteration of 
the project, the exhibition and tour of the work began at the Art Sonje Center in Seoul, 
featuring various books and art installations, and then followed a tour course. The 
stops on the tour include the tour bus, Yangji-ri Village (a propaganda village and site 
of the RDP’s artists’ residency program), the Cheorwon Peace Observatory, 
Woljeong-ri Station (an abandoned train station that is the northernmost stop in South 
Korea and used to connect directly to North Korea), the DMZ Peace & Cultural 
Square, the DMZ Peace & Cultural Hall, and Soi Mountain. 
 The mission of the project is to “investigate the paradoxical conditions of 
conflict while imagining a new, alternative reality for the Demilitarized Zone.”153 
Furthermore, the project “strives to give voice to the historical, political, and social 
strife that has resulted from the political division” and “sheds light on the ruptured 
and distorted narratives, the forgotten or erased stories.”154 The format of the RDP, 
which follows along similar sites of the security tourism circuit,155 instead takes 
tourists to these same locations but focuses on the various art exhibitions that provide 
critical interpretations of the Korean War and its legacies. These works allow for 																																																								152	Jodi	Kim,	Ends	of	Empire:	Asian	American	Critique	and	the	Cold	War	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2010):	4.	153	Exhibition	Program	for	the	REAL	DMZ	PROJECT	2014.	154	Ibid.	155	Cheorwon,	as	well	as	other	cities	located	along	the	DMZ,	is	renowned	for	its	security	tourism,	which	draws	not	only	foreign	tourists	but	also	South	Koreans	as	well.	For	historical	contextualization	and	analysis	of	the	security	tourism	see	Jeffrey	A.	Tripp,	
Contentious	divide:	The	cultural	politics	of	the	Korean	demilitarized	zone,	1953-2008	(PhD	diss.:	University	of	Hawai’i,	Manoa,	2010).	
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more open and oppositional readings of the memory of the war and division 
beyond official memorialization discourse, as found in the various memorials located 
at the sites of the tour. 
 For example, one of the last stops of the RDP tour is the DMZ Peace and 
Cultural Square, which consists of an exhibition hall that featured several of the art 
projects from the REAL DMZ PROJECT. One of the exhibits within the museum hall 
is titled “We Want to Be Back on Track,” referencing the disconnected railway line at 
Woljeong-ri that used to connect North Korea and South Korea. There was an ardent 
wish for peace and a desire for reunification, and dioramas featuring reproductions of 
the DMZ and the CCL, as if in anticipation for a future in which those borders would 
no longer exist. 
 Outside of the Peace and Cultural Center and sitting across the plaza is a large 
white cenotaph with the phrase “Memorial Stone to the Dead Generals and Soldiers of 
the Korean War Iron Triangle Battle.” The memorial itself is not that striking, but the 
rhetoric in the plaques surrounding the cenotaph was in stark contrast to not only the 
aims of the RDP, but also to the DMZ Peace and Cultural Square. One plaque reads in 
large letters: “The Korean War is the victory war fighting by the people all over the 
Republic of Korea. [sic]” An adjacent plaque reads: “The Korean War (1950-1953) is 
the war blocking the invasion of the communist and taking victory of the liberal 
democracy. If we forget the Korean War, that kind of war would be break out again in 
the near future. Let us protect our country together with all our strength. [sic]” The 
Korean in the Peace Plaza is referred to as a “victory war,” a “war block the invasion 
of the communism,” and “taking victory of the liberal democracy.” The memorial’s 
one-dimensional representation of the war and its official state-sanctioned reading of 
the memory of the Korean War seems to be in direct contrast with the aims of the 
RDP, which aims to provide more complicated understandings of the Korean War. 
 However, it is these very moments of slippage that demonstrate precisely how 
Korean War temporality, and Cold War temporality, is more complicated than 
“decomposition” or “recursive” temporalities. These overlapping narratives and 
memory works – peace museum, war memorial, critical remembering156 that is 
practiced by the RDP, and the visitors’ own subjectivities – combine to form 
palimpsestic temporalities that exceed any one notion of time. At the public space of 
the DMZ and by its very contested nature of memory, erasures, and forgettings, time 
is neither linear nor circular, not decomposing nor occurring in circular motions. 
 Despite the existence of all of these types of temporalities simultaneously 
working with and against one another, the RDP does not explicitly illuminate these 
contradictions. Rather, by adding to the memorial landscape, the RDP becomes 
another type of competing memorial project. However, the RDP functions as a 
framework by which visitors can begin to deconstruct the existing memorial legacies 
of the DMZ on their own terms and the public square, as well as individual artists’ 
utilizing of public space becomes the means by which these contestations unfold. To 
this extent, I examine four of the RDP artists and their usage of public space within 
their artworks. 
 
 																																																								156	See	Crystal	Mun-hye	Baik,	“Unfaithful	Returns:	Reiterations	of	Dissent,	U.S.-Korean	Militarized	Debt,	and	the	Architecture	of	Violent	Freedom,”	Journal	of	Asian	American	
Studies	18.1	(February	2015):	41-72.	
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The Politics of Sound and Space: 
 Florian Hecker (born in 1975, Germany) – Reformulation, 2014, three-
channel electroacoustic sound, loudspeaker system, 23min 7sec157 
 
 Florian Hecker’s “room-specific” sound piece is exhibited in the community 
air-raid shelter at Yangji-ri, built for the purposes of keeping the villagers safe in the 
case of an attack by North Korea. As a community located on the border of the DMZ, 
these community spaces were necessary. Yet, before the RDP’s usage of the space as 
an exhibition space, according to the tour guide, it had been used as a community 
gym. All of the equipment had been moved out, however, at the artist’s request. 
 The sounds that come from the speakers hanging around the walls of the room 
were disjointed, jarring, and unpleasant.158 The room, due to its emptiness, amplified 
the sounds and many participants on the tour, including myself, were visibly 
uncomfortable by being in the room, especially when the heavy door was closed, 
creating a claustrophobic environment. The sound was everywhere, unavoidable. 
 The walls, however, retained the original intentions of the community space as 
air-raid shelter as numerous posters demonstrated in elaborate detail the procedures to 
take in the case of a nuclear attack. The room’s intended purpose as shelter speaks not 
only to the enduring legacies of the war, but also to the everyday realities of living in 
a space in close proximity to the futurity of possible war. That the artist removed the 
exercise equipment that allotted the communal transformation of this space from site 
of war to site of everyday living underscores this point further. 
 Furthermore, in the program notes, the usage of sound is given a particular 
rationale: “As the DMZ is a territory marked by invisible tension, oppression, and 
paranoia, Hecker’s approach is likewise non-visual.”159 That much of the presence of 
militarization on the Korean peninsula relies on invisibility or the masking of 
militarized technologies speaks to a necessarily non-visual means of representing the 
inherent contradictions in the space. However, while the usage of sound and the 
experience of moving through the air-raid shelter with other people allow for alternate 
possibilities for imagining the militarized spaces of impeding future war, there also 
still appear to b unresolved contestations between artistic usage of the space and 
community ownership – why is it that the villagers needed to give up their communal 
space for the sake of the RDP? Nevertheless, opening up the possibilities for the non-
visual, represented through sound, space, and bodies as they interact with and among 
the sound waves, draws attention to other invisible forms and circuits of 
militarization. 
 
To Move Across 360 Degrees: 
 Tomas Saraceno (born in 1973, Argentina) – DOF (Degrees of Freedom), 
2014, custom-made binocular 
 
 Tomas Saraceno’s work is exhibited in the Cheorwon Peace Observatory, a 
museum and exhibition space that is a popular destination for Cheorwon’s security 																																																								157	Program	Notes.	158	I	was	unable	to	obtain	recording	of	the	sound,	but	these	are	examples	that	correspond	closely	to	the	sounds	playing	at	the	REAL	DMZ	PROJECT:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VNgVAXG91VM.		159	Program	Notes.	
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tourism. Most notably, the Peace Observatory features binoculars for curious 
tourists to look at and into North Korea. Despite the focus on visuality that form much 
of the draw for this space, we were told repeatedly by the staff to not take 
photographs, particularly in the direction of North Korea. This rule was strictly 
enforced. 
 Saraceno’s piece draws attention to the contradictions inherent at the site and 
the power relations at play in the control over visuality. What exactly are the objects 
that are to be “observed” at this observatory, if not the desire to look at the forbidden 
spaces of the DMZ and North Korea? Visuality is tied to power and to knowledge, of 
making legible the unknown. As Nicholas Mirzoeff argues, “visuality sutures 
authority to power and renders this association ‘natural.’”160 After all, despite the 
naming of the space as the “peace observatory,” what is most appealing to the tourist 
gaze is the attempt to either observe overt displays of militarization or the glimpse of 
what a “real” North Korean person might look like. This focus on visuality and 
visibility reaches an apex in the largest space within the observatory, which is a room 
facing towards North Korea. The side of the room facing North Korea consists 
entirely of windows with various binoculars (which work with coins, emphasizing the 
economy of visuality) while the opposite side of the room consists of chairs 
resembling that of a theater. Here, North Korea becomes stage either for comfortable 
observation in the chairs or in close-up through the binoculars. 
 Saraceno’s art piece specifically is to subvert the one-dimensional authority of 
vision, represented through the limited mobility of the binoculars, which are confined 
to perhaps 90 degrees of movement. The piece manipulates the standard binocular by 
freeing its movements; Saraceno’s binocular can rotate an entire 360 degrees as well 
as can pivot in any direction. Furthermore, unlike the other binoculars that function on 
coins, Saraceno’s binocular is free to use. Despite the “degrees of freedom” allowed 
by the binoculars, most people on the RDP tour still used the binoculars to look out 
into North Korea. However, taking advantage of the full mobility of the binoculars 
leads to a rather disappointing view: the seats of the auditorium and the people sitting 
in them remain out of focus due to their close proximity to the lens. Yet, the freedom 
of movement speaks also to the cinematic techniques used in the South Korean film 
Joint Security Area (Park Chan-wook, 2000); the 360-degree camera spin used in the 
film establishes a unique form of identification with the characters. Saraceno’s 
binoculars, which opens up “perspective to the air space above and to the widely 
varied species of birds and insects in the area, naturally, unrestricted by borders, 
fences, and land mines”161 also gives spectators a different way of engaging with the 
DMZ, opening up alternate possibilities and utilizing and imagining the space of the 
DMZ in an otherwise restricted area. 
 
Overlapping Temporalities in Space: 
 Jae Eun Choi (born in 1953, Korea) – No Borders Exist in Nature, 2014, neon 
wall text and sound installation, dimensions variable 
 
 Jae Eun Choi’s installation also follows along the security tourism course, 
located in a small hut inside the Woljeong-ri Station complex. The train tracks at this 																																																								160	Nicolas	Mirzoeff,	The	Right	to	Look:	A	Counterhistory	of	Visuality	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2011):	6.	161	Program	Notes.	
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station used to connect the Korean peninsula; however, after the division of the 
peninsula and the Korean War, the train station fell into disuse after being destroyed 
by bombs. It is the last stop before heading to North Korea and is also the last stop on 
the special “DMZ Train” that leaves from Seoul Station. The station was constructed 
in 1914 by the Japanese, and remains a symbol for the continual division of the 
Korean peninsula and the desire for unification. 
 The installation features a neon sign that reads “No Borders Exist in Nature,” 
as well as a sound piece based off of the artist’s documentary on the DMZ, which 
features “an UN peacekeeper explaining the DMZ and the state of division at 
Panmunjom.”162 Choi draws attention to the multiple temporalities reflected in the 
state of the train station through the usage of the past – the sound of the disembodied 
voice – and the present – the neon hum of the sign. 
 The sign draws attention to the artificiality of the DMZ as arbitrary division of 
the Korean peninsula, reflected in the use of the neon sign, as neon is often associated 
with artifice. Yet, these borders have real repercussions. However, despite the stalled 
temporality of the train station, Choi also draws attention to the fact that time is not 
static for nature. The exhibition booklet includes a poem with the same title: 
 
No Borders Exist in Nature 
 
The Panmunjeom borderline is made of thick concrete. 
Now cracked and ruined, it no longer resembles a border. 
Yellow dandelions stick their heads out through the cracks. 
Ants are busy, crossing the border, back and forth. 
 
The dandelions mock the border 
And the sorrowful division and the social mechanism created by human society. 
 
The ants know. 
Just how many beings of this universe are looking at the same stars. 
 
The cranes flying over Woljeong-ri Station are gazing. 
At the last abandoned trains lying there like beasts. 
And the 1,120,00 [sic] mines left in the barbed fences.163 
 
The poem calls attention to the eroding power of nature in breaking down barriers set 
up by “the ‘closedness’ [sic] of human society.”164 While the poem does romanticize 
nature, there is value in studying the ways in which border crossings take on different 
meanings if agency is granted to non-material objects or animals.165 These multiple 
ways of engaging with the space of the stalled train station, taking into account site, 																																																								162	Ibid.	163	Ibid.	164	Ibid.	165	Anthropologist	Elena	Kim’s	forthcoming	book	project	explores	DMZ	border	crossings	and	everyday	interactions	between	humans,	animals,	and	non-material	objects	like	landmines.	For	a	book	focused	on	human	border-crossing,	see	Suk-Young	Kim’s	DMZ	
Crossing:	Performing	Emotional	Citizenship	Along	the	Korean	Border	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2014).	
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sight, sound, and poetry point to alternate readings of the DMZ besides as a space 
solely of stalled temporality and stalled movement. 
 
Imagining the Future: 
 Koo Jeong A (born in 1967, Korea) – Dearest Young Hoi, stainless steel table, 
matte definition top with black enamel painted legs, 200 x 74 x 74cm, wall drawing 
sticker from Steady Zero, 84.1 x 118.0cm 
 
 The last segment of the RDP tour takes place on Soi Mountain, a site of past 
Korean War battles along the 38th Parallel, as well as a point for strategic military 
bunkers used by the U.S. The piece, Dearest Young Hoi, takes over one of the 
abandoned military bunkers and explicitly imagines its future usage. Young Hoi is a 
fictional creation by Koo, an imagined persona who will inhabit this space. Young 
Hoi “was born before WWII, experienced the Korean War and lived through the 
digital age”166 and is a writer undertaking a residency in this space, analogous to the 
actual artist residencies offered by the RDP. The artist imagines the military bunker as 
a space of creation, intended for “all future writers-in-residence of a ‘post-bunker’ 
united Korea.”167 As the last stop of the tour, the space offers up a real usage for an 
imagined future time – a time not of impending war and destruction as in the air-raid 
shelter mentioned above, but of a time in which the bunker (and militarized objects) 
itself becomes obsolete, used for the creation of cultural productions. 
 The colliding temporalities and themes within the security tourism space of 
Cheorwon and neighboring villages speak to the contested nature of interpreting the 
division and the legacies of the Korean War. Cultural and artistic productions provide 
multiple ways of challenging, subverting, and imagining future intended usage of 
sites. Stepping out of the bunker and looking out into the beautiful landscape, all the 
way to North Korea (this time, with no staff members to prevent photography), it is 
not difficult to imagine the productive possibilities of continual creativity that pushes 
at the bounds of Cold War decompositions. 
 The next section of the chapter turns to artistic productions by Minouk Lim for 
the 2014 Gwangju Biennale to look more closely at relations between trauma, art, and 
performance. Unlike the hopeful, optimistic, and open-ended conclusion of the REAL 
DMZ PROJECT tour, Minouk Lim’s Navigation ID points to the realities of living 
with state-sanctioned massacres or “politicide”168 and the institutionalized forgetting 
of these massacres. This project speaks to a different imagining of the Korean War 
and its lingering afterlives – it images the meeting between different victim groups, 
calling for a horizontal reading of the Korean War and a more nuanced understanding 
of the ways in which the war brushes up against differential forms of mass violence 
and authoritarian government rule in South Korea. 
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Minouk Lim’s Navigation ID 
 
 Minouk Lim’s Navigation ID (hereafter NID) was the opening piece for the 
10th Gwangju Biennale (the theme: “Burning Down the House”), located in the South 
Jeolla Province of South Korea. The Gwangju Biennale is one of the largest and most 
prestigious art exhibitions in the world and is billed as “Asia’s oldest biennial of 
contemporary art.”169 Reflecting the spirit of the city’s history of activism, the 
Gwangju Biennale was “founded in 1995 in memory of spirits of civil uprising of the 
1980 repression of the Gwangju Democratization Movement.”170 
 Minouk Lim’s NID is a powerful video, performance, and art piece that tracks 
two shipping containers filled with the remains of Bodo League massacre victims on 
their journey from individual family graves to the Gwangju Biennale space. The 
surviving family members of the massacres were then greeted by mothers of victims 
of the Gwangju Massacre in a public ceremony at the opening of the Biennale.171 The 
shipping containers were then left at the site of the Biennale for the remainder of the 
exhibition. 
 NID also consists of several other exhibition pieces in the Gwangju Biennale 
space. In addition to NID, on display were also NID – From X to A and NID – Hole-
in-Chest Nation in conjunction with Mr. Eui Jin Chai’s Mr. Eui Jin Chai and 1,000 
canes. NID – From X to A is a 2-channel video installation that shows the process of 
retrieval and transport of the remains as well as the meeting between the Korean War 
massacre victims and the mothers of the Gwangju Massacre victims.172 NID – Hole-
in-Chest Nation consists of various sculptures resembling bone, metal, and wood 
(inspired by Mr. Eui Jin Chai’s canes), and a black t’aegukki, South Korea’s national 
flag. The canes, on the other hand, are creations from Mr. Eui Jin Chai, who is a 
survivor of a civilian massacre. According to the exhibition plaque, he “miraculously 
survived a massacre that took place on December 24, 1949, when he was left for dead 
under the corpses of his older brother and younger cousin” and “for the past three 
decades, he has been making sculpture in response to ‘a bitter struggle against a life 
tainted with sorrow, anger, solitude, and curse,’ using the branches and roots of trees 
that he has collected.”173 
																																																								169	From	the	website:	http://www.biennailfoundation.org/biennials/gwangju-biennale/.		170	Ibid.	The	Gwangju	Democratization	Movement,	also	known	as	the	“Gwangju	Uprising”	or	the	“Gwangju	Massacre,”	was	a	state-sanctioned	(and	some	argue	that	it	was	U.S.-approved)	suppression	and	massacre	of	civilian	and	student	protestors	who	demonstrated	against	the	military	dictatorship	and	martial	law	of	Chun	Doo-hwan	(the	fifth	President	of	South	Korea	from	1980	–	1988)	from	May	18	–	27,	1980.	Student	protestors	from	Jeonnam	University	(eventually	joined	by	civilians	and	other	uprisings	in	other	cities)	called	for	the	end	of	martial	law,	a	transition	to	democracy,	and	the	end	of	military	authoritarian	rule	after	the	assassination	of	President	Park	Chung-hee	in	1979.	See	Kim	Jŏnghan,	1980	taejung	pokkiŭi	minjujuŭi	(Seoul:	Kita,	2013).	171	The	trailer	for	Navigation	ID	can	be	found	on	Minouk	Lim’s	website:	http://www.minouklim.com/index.php?/navigation-id---331-trailer/.		172	The	trailer	for	Navigation	ID	–	From	X	to	A	can	be	found	on	Minouk	Lim’s	website:	http://www.minouklim.com/index.php?/from-x-to-a-327-trailer-/.		173	See	images	from	the	exhibition	on	Minouk	Lim’s	website:	http://www.minouklim.com/index.php?/the-hole-in-chest-nation/.		
	 72	
 Like the art exhibitions from the RDP, Lim’s main NID exhibit takes place 
in the public square, confronting visitors with its presence. The bones are not 
noticeable until the viewer looks through the windows of the shipping container, yet 
the bones and presence of the dead still take a notable hold on the area. Here lies the 
intersections of multiple temporalities as well: the invisible presence of the 
unresolved Korean War, the visible evidence and existence of victims of mass 
violence who were not only branded as enemies due to their association with the Cold 
War category of “communists” or “Reds,” but also their memory of this event – as 
well as commemorations and memorialization – was actively suppressed by the South 
Korean state until the 1990s, alongside the experience of more contemporary mass 
state violence inflicted on the students and citizens of Gwangju. These bones are 
literally decomposing bodies, but their memory/memorialization is not decomposition 
in terms of Heonik Kwon’s argument about Cold War temporality. The family 
members, brought together by an affective genealogy of suffering and state violence, 
by their very presence and by the bones that are now unearthed and left in the open 
for witnessing, stand testament to what Chen Kuan-Hsing writes as the cold war that 
“still lives within us” and that has never left. 
 NID, taken as a whole, is a powerful and moving experience and in addition to 
being a work of art, particularly stands out for its usage of concrete evidence of 
trauma, unearthing knowledge that has been buried by the state or remained 
privatized. In contrast to the more conventional artistic materials found within the rest 
of the biennale, NID is unique for its incorporation of actual human remains and in 
bringing together surviving family members of victims from different generations of 
state violence. These familial interactions – the Gwangju mothers and the descendants 
of the Korean War massacres – form a new genealogy brought together by state 
violence and “politicide.” By looking into the shipping containers, viewers become 
direct witness to these mass atrocities rather than mere spectators moving through 
museum space, viewing photographs and archival documents of death, or watching 
the imagined aliveness of those bodies before they are killed (again) in films. 
 
 This chapter works through two disparate yet similar projects that attempt to 
grapple with the legacy and trauma of the Korean War through art: the 2014 
reiteration of the REAL DMZ PROJECT and Minouk Lim’s Navigation ID at the 
2014 Gwangju Bienale. Both projects blur the lines between traditional museum/art 
exhibitions and performance art, congregating in various forms of public space, 
especially the public square. Furthermore, two squares resonate with me as a visitor to 
these exhibits – one left open with possibility yet with a memorial that forecloses 
anything but dominant meanings (DMZ Peace and Cultural Square) and one that hides 
in plain sight evidence of state violence (Gwangju Biennale Square). These layers 
point to the complicated nature of Korean War memory and memorialization and the 
need for a referential understanding of trauma to supplement historical boundaries of 
temporality. 
 These projects allow for the communication of trauma by visual and 
performance artists affected by Korean division as well as by families of victims 
whose voices are often not accounted for in traditional museum spaces and historical 
narratives. Furthermore, these projects read across time and space by bringing 
together multiple temporalities in site-specific locales. The RDP calls attention to the 
continued effects of militarization (often hidden away from day-to-day life yet 
enormously present in the lives of those living in the border areas) and Cold War 
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realities in the spaces in close proximity to the DMZ while bringing tourists along 
who may otherwise be unaware of the histories and legacies of the Korean War. 
Mirroring popular security tourism trails, which remain a main draw for people of all 
nationalities to tour the areas around the DMZ, the RDP attempts to showcase 
alternative usages and understandings of the DMZ and the CCL beyond that of 
securitization, militarism, and North Korean threat. 
 Minouk Lim’s Navigation ID reads the historical events of the Bodo League 
Massacre that occurred in the summer of 1950 around the official beginning of the 
Korean War (June 25, 1950) with that of the Gwangju Massacre thirty years later 
(May 1980). In the contemporary space of the Gwangju Biennale, multiple victim 
groups and bereaved citizens encounter one another as well as tourists who come 
specifically for the draw of the Biennale without necessarily directly encountering 
Gwangju’s memorial landscape. While the dissertation as a whole examines alternate 
narratives and epistemologies of the Korean War, this chapter studies forms of 
knowledge production that itself are alternate to dominant forms of memorial, 
museum, and film discourse. These cultural productions complicate theories of Cold 
War temporalities and demonstrate how these temporalities look different from the 
perspective of the lived experience of survivors and descendants of mass state 
violence in South Korea. The last chapter and conclusion of the dissertation extends 
this line of inquiry to examine future temporalities of the Korean War and 
imaginations of reconciliation and reunification through memorial form. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Memorializing the Future: Rethinking Temporality of the Korean War through 
Reunification Memorials in South Korea 
 
 At Imjingak Pyeonghwa Nuri, a memorial park, there is a memorial statue 
dedicated to the song “30 Years Lost,” the theme song for the KBS television 
program “Finding Dispersed Families,” which brought the issue of separated families 
to public light and allowed for those without resources to air their stories publicly and 
seek to reunite with lost family members, mostly from the Korean War era. The 
television archives are now part of UNESCO’s Memory of the World Register, 
inducted in 2015. The program itself ran from June 30, 1983 – November 14, 1983, 
and had a last impact on popular culture memory of Korean War and Cold War 
division of families, and resulted in 100,952 applicants for reunion of which “53,536 
cases were broadcast, resulting in 10,189 reunions.”174 The memorial features the 
lyrics on a plaque inserted into a stone cenotaph, with figures of a man and woman 
holding hands carved into the stone portion above it, and stands just a short distance 
away from “Freedom Bridge,” where the exchange of POWs took place during the 
signing of the Korean War Armistice Agreement in 1953. The memorial park, which 
functions also as a popular tourist destination, stands as a memorial to the Korean 
War, but also to the wish for reunification, an event that has yet to come as the 
Korean peninsula remains divided into two countries since the initial division of the 
country in 1948. Anticipating future reunification, Imjingak Pyeonghwa Nuri Park 
also “deliver[s] a message of peace to the international community and raise[s] public 
awareness of the importance of peace.”175 The memorial park, with a bridge that is 
closed, trains that are not currently running, and a song lamenting time lost through 
familial separation (a visitor can continuously play the song on a loop by pressing a 
button) stands as a unique form of memorial that exists both to memorialize past 
events, but also anticipates future events that have yet to come. 
 Previous chapters in the dissertation have explored cinematic and built 
memorialization of the Korean War, with attention to the temporalities of the Korean 
War. This chapter explores how themes of temporality and memorialization of the 
Korean War appears in memorial spaces dedicated to the theme of reunification. 
While memorials are generally dedicated to past events and figures, as a signifier of 
remembering the past, the memorials that I focus on in this chapter are dedicated to an 
event that has yet to come – Korean reunification. What does it mean to memorialize 
an event that has yet to pass? Focusing on reunification memorials at two South 
Korean memorial complexes, the War Memorial of Korea in Yongsan, Seoul, and the 
Independence Hall of Korea in Cheonan, this chapter explores the various 
iconography of memorials used to signify division and reunification, and reflects on 
the temporality of the Korean War and Cold War under continual division. 
 																																																								174	Cultural	Heritage	Administration,	Republic	of	Korea,	“Nomination	Form	International	Memory	of	the	World	Register:	The	Archives	of	the	KBS	Special	Live	Broadcast	‘Finding	Dispersed	Families’”	(2014):	1.	Accessed	here:	http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/pdf/mow/nomination_forms/korea_dispersed_persons_eng.pdf.		175	Exhibit	plaque.	
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Imaginary Future Memorials: War Memorial of Korea and Independence 
Hall of Korea in 2009: Lost Memories (Lee Si-myung, 2002) 
 
 2009: Lost Memories (Lee Si-myung, 2002), discussed in an earlier chapter, is 
a science-fiction blockbuster film co-produced by both South Korean and Japanese 
companies, coinciding with the 2002 FIFA World Cup, and features in its leading 
roles two popular actors from South Korea and Japan, Jang Dong-gun and Toru 
Nakamura. The film is set in the near future (at the time of release) of 2009, and takes 
place in an alternate history Seoul in which Japanese colonization had never ended. 
The series of events that led to this alternate history began with the failed 
assassination of Ito Hirobumi by An Jung-geun in 1909 (An was successful in reality). 
The film later reveals that a Japanese special agent traveled back in time to stop the 
assassination, resulting in a newly created storyline and history. In this storyline, the 
March 1st movement of 1919 is suppressed, the US and Japan ally with each other 
during WWII, and the atomic bomb is ultimately dropped on Berlin in 1945 instead of 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (preventing the U.S. from dropping the atomic bomb on 
Japan is the primary motivation for the time travelers to change history). As discussed 
in a previous chapter, although it is not explicitly spelled out in this film, in the 
alternate timeline the Korean War never occurs because the peninsula was never 
divided by the Soviet Union and the U.S. because Korea had never achieved 
independence. 
 The absence of the Korean War is the entry point through which I examine the 
representation of museums within this film. Specifically, I focus on the two museums 
that show up in 2009: Lost Memories – the War Memorial of Korea and the 
Independence Hall of Korea – in order to draw out larger parallels between the role of 
museums in public space and how they reflect alternate histories and temporalities. 
Additionally, I also return to the “problem of the Korean War” in representation that I 
addressed in previous chapters, focusing specifically on how this “problem” manifests 
within representations of museums in this film. 
 Even before the representations of museums, the film establishes the setting of 
2009 colonized Seoul (or Keijo as the city is addressed in the film) through the 
showcasing of famous landmarks and memorials associated with the city and how 
these public spaces have changed in the different timeline. Most notably, the familiar 
glow of neon or bright Korean signs and city screens are now replaced with Japanese 
characters. After establishing shots of the Seoul city streets, the film then depicts 
Gwanghwamun Square, with notable changes from the familiar public square in the 
present. 
 Within alternate timeline Seoul, the public space of the city itself has now 
changed (or remained the same, as in the case of the Japanese Colonial Government-
General Building). Instead of the statues of Admiral Yi Sun-shin and King Sejong, 
Gwanghwamun Square now features Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who led the first attacks 
against the Korean peninsula in the late 16th century (leading to a defeat by Yi Sun-
sin)176. Behind this statue, the specter of the still-standing Government General-																																																								176	Yi	Sun-sin	is	perhaps	arguably	South	Korea’s	most	recognizable	national	hero.	John	Lie	includes	a	short	interlude	in	his	book	on	Korean	pop	music	on	Korean	national	heroes.	See	John	Lie,	K-Pop:	Popular	Music,	Culture	Amnesia,	and	Economic	Innovation	in	
South	Korea	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	2014).	Dramatization	of	the	Battle	of	Myeongyang	can	be	seen	in	the	recent	blockbuster	film	The	Admiral:	Roaring	Currents	
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Building looms (the camera first focuses on the statue of Hideyoshi and then fades 
out to focus on the background structure). Historically, the building was demolished 
in 1995, the 50th anniversary of the end of Japanese colonialism in Korea. Despite 
these public memorials not being a central focus of this chapter, I introduce them 
because of the film’s utilization of the changes in Seoul public space in establishing 
shots to demonstrate how museums, memorials, and public space are utilized for 
ideological purposes and expressions of power. Public space and nationalism are 
inherently interconnected and memorials and museums, as well as their claims over 
memory, are always political.177 The difference between the current Gwanghwamun 
Square and the cinematic Gwanghwamun Square in 2009: Lost Memories 
demonstrates starkly how public space reflects the differing ideologies of the states in 
power. 
 With the attention to public space and power from the beginning of the film 
with its establishing shots, I turn to the film’s representations of exhibition space, 
specifically the War Memorial of Korea in Yongsan, Seoul and the Independence Hall 
of Korea in Cheonan. The first of these museum spaces, the War Memorial of Korea, 
shows up in the film within the alternate timeline. However, it is no longer called the 
War Memorial of Korea; rather, this museum complex is now the Japanese Cultural 
Center and is the site of an exhibition hosted by the fictional Inoue Foundation, which 
includes displays of artifacts collected from throughout Asia.178 It is later revealed 
that the Inoue who established the foundation was the person who originally traveled 
back in time to assassinate An Jung-geun, thus setting into motion the alternate 
timeline of the film. 
 The site of the War Memorial, or the Japanese Cultural Center, is significant 
because on display is an artifact called the “Lunar Soul,” which is an ancient Korean 
agricultural tool that also turns out to be the key to reopening the gate of time, which 
would allow for the Korean independence movement (or terrorist group as classified 
by the Japanese authorities) – the Hureisenjin – to go back into the past and to restore 
the original historical timeline. My main question, however, is: how does a structure 
like the War Memorial of Korea exist in this new timeline? There is no attempt to 
mask the War Memorial of Korea as a different institution; its exterior and interior 
look exactly the same, albeit decorated a little differently and with different exhibition 
materials, and the central plaza is most notably missing Admiral Yi Sun-sin’s turtle 
ships. Yet, most viewers who are familiar with the museum would recognize it 
immediately. But what allows for the War Memorial of Korea to exist in this alternate 
timeline, particularly since the museum was constructed specifically to convey the 
history of the Korean War (as well as Korean military history and patriotism), a war 
that never happened in the alternate history portrayed within this film? 																																																																																																																																																														(Kim	Han-min,	2014),	which	is	the	current	top-grossing	and	most-watched	film	in	South	Korean	film	history.	177	For	an	analysis	of	public	space	and	power	in	Korea	during	the	Japanese	colonial	era,	see	Todd	A.	Henry,	Assimilating	Seoul:	Japanese	Rule	and	the	Politics	of	Public	Space	in	
Colonial	Korea,	1910-1945	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	2014).	See	also	Hong	Kal,	Aesthetic	Constructions	of	Korean	Nationalism:	Spectacle,	Politics	and	History	(London:	Routledge,	2011).	178	For	more	on	politics	of	collection	and	exhibition	display	in	Japan	see	Noriko	Aso,	
Public	Properties:	Museums	in	Imperial	Japan	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2014),	especially	Chapter	3	“Colonial	Properties.”	
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 The uncanny overlapping of differing temporalities rewrites the War 
Memorial space, intended to convey Korean patriotism, into an exhibition space that 
consolidates the Japanese imperial gaze in colonized space through exhibitionary 
practice. As Youngmin Choe points out, the War Memorial of Korea/Japanese 
Cultural Center’s staging for the first major action scene in the film can be read as a 
forcible reassertion of Korean sovereignty over a space that was originally intended to 
function as such, at least in a “correct” timeline: 
 
Against this ahistorical vision that invokes the Korean War while denying that it 
ever happened, the Korean liberation group suddenly intrudes into the 
exhibition hall through the skylight that opens and focuses like a camera 
aperture. The Korean liberation group shatters the museal space and the museal 
gaze authorized by the Japanese, and brings back the specter of the Korean War 
by forcing Sakamoto [played by Jang Dong-gun] to confront his own feelings of 
ethnic fidelity. Entering through the cinematic eye, the intruders violently 
recode the very same museum space into a violent site of remembering and 
recollecting a different past denied outside the museum – namely, a different 
past of a liberated Korea by asserting their presence and resistance.179 
 
The overlapping yet co-existing temporalities of continual Japanese colonialism and 
continual Korean War in separate timelines (that of the film and that of history), serve 
to draw further attention to the absence of the Korean War. Yet, the presence of a 
unified Korean group breaking into the museum space also speaks to the inability of 
the War Memorial of Korea to fully convey this history of unified Korean identity as 
the museum is marked by Cold War division culture and a patriotism that is 
specifically South Korean, or which makes claims on South Korean legitimacy over 
unified Korean culture. As Sheila Miyoshi Jager points out, the War Memorial itself 
makes claims to Korean independence movements and armies in an unbroken 
patriotic lineage that manifests itself as a natural genealogy to the current South 
Korean state and military power: 
 
The heritage of the ROK Army is traced to the Righteous Army and the 
Independence Army, while Japan’s formative role in the establishment of the 
South Korean military is strikingly elided. Clearly, if such a lineage had to be 
drawn, it was the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the official 
name of North Korea) Army, and not the ROK Army, that accumulated the vast 
majority of anti-Japanese Independence fighters within its ranks. The 
obfuscation of this fact further indicates the present-minded vantage point of the 
memorial: the possibility of laying claim to Korea’s (anti-Japanese) patriotic 
past could be made only by illuminating the victorious state’s ultimate triumph 
over its enemies – Japanese imperialism and North Korean communism – 
through the memorial’s grandiose display of power and prosperity. It was 
precisely this assertion of ultimate victory that allowed the South Korean state 
																																																								179	Youngmin	Choe,	“Postmemory	DMZ	in	South	Korea	Cinema,	1999-2003,”	Journal	of	
Korean	Studies	18.2	(Fall	2013):	329-330.	
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to lay claim to Korea’s patriotic tradition because North Korea (and the 
DPRK military) had ultimately failed.180 
 
The War Memorial of Korea is a space also for a revision of Korean history that 
marks the Republic of Korea as the legitimate inheritor of the “martial masculinity” of 
the past, especially in contradistinction to the DPRK/North Korea. In the context of 
the film 2009: Lost Memories, the Hureisenjin can be seen as taking back the War 
Memorial of Korea’s exhibitionary space, asserting the strength of not just Korean 
sovereignty and unity regardless of national borders, but also as a reminder of South 
Korea’s claim to this legacy through the film’s utilization of the familiar space of the 
War Memorial of Korea. 
 As discussed in a previous chapter, despite the Korean War not being 
mentioned within the narrative, the film is still significance because an erasure of 
Korean War is still a method by which narratives can resolve or grapple with the 
“problem” of the Korean War. This comes into play more prominently as even after 
the resolution of the conflict in the film and a reversal of the tampering of historical 
timelines, the film in its corrected timeline still presents a different alternate future. 
This is indicated by one of the members of the Hureisenjin who explains the “proper” 
timeline to the protagonist: “[in] 2008, after 60 years of separation North and South 
Korea united to become a new nation with a strong economy and military. Korea 
became a new icon in Asia.” The “true” timeline of history in the film does not reflect 
actual reality at the time of release of the film (2002), although at the height of the 
Sunshine Policy reunification was seen as within the realm of possibility for 
happening within the near future, or even now (2019) as the Korean peninsula still 
remains divided, despite the North Korea-South Korea joint talks under the current 
Moon Jae-in presidential administration. What this film presents, however, is a 
different future in which successful reunification is not just a promise, but also a 
reality. 
 Yet, what does this mean for the context of actually existing memorials, and 
what to make of reunification memorials that memorialize a future promise rather 
than an actual event? It is possible that the imagined future outcome is a promise that 
is meant to be kept, as articulated by the film that presents a united Korea “with a 
strong economy and military” and the “new icon in Asia.” Yet, perhaps the 
reunification memorials can also be seen as memorialization of a failure of resolution 
of the Korean War, and anticipating a future in which the Korean War does not need 
to have existed as in the case of 2009: Lost Memories. Part of the issue of the Korean 
War is that it exists as a “problem,” an epistemological rupture predicated on division 
and Cold War ideologies that leave no room for non-alignment or neutrality, 
particularly on the Korean peninsula and the very real material legacies and effects of 
Cold War sentiments that continue to exist in the present. Furthermore, the war 
destabilizes narratives of Korean identity, collaboration, and independence 
movements within the discourse of colonial resistance, which emphasizes unified 
Korean spirit against Japanese oppression. The “problem of the Korean War” 
becomes a literal problem at museum sites in South Korea that focus on the Japanese 
colonial era, in which the Korean War makes virtually no appearance, including at the 
Independence Hall of Korea, or at the War Memorial of Korea where genealogies and 																																																								180	Sheila	Miyoshi	Jager,	“Monumental	Histories:	Manliness,	the	Military,	and	the	War	Memorial,”	Public	Culture	14.2	(2002):	399.	
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legacies of earlier resistance movements are subsumed into South Korean national 
narratives of martial manhood. It is not surprising that 2009: Lost Memories imagines 
reunification within its narrative rather than the Korean War in order to avoid 
addressing the difficult problem of South Korean capitulation to external forces such 
as the U.S. in the aftermath of the Korean War. Korean sovereignty is retained at the 
expense of Korean War representation. 
 Is it possible to portray Korean reunification in a continual state of division 
culture outside of the realm of imagination? After all, there are reunification 
memorials at the War Memorial of Korea. However, the last scenes of the film 2009: 
Lost Memories seem to point to the issue of South Korean sovereignty through 
switching perspectives to a different museum space, perhaps indicating that the War 
Memorial of Korea is insufficient in being the representative war memorial complex 
for a reunified Korea. By the end of the film, the Japanese attempt to distort history 
(literally) fails as the Hureisenjin, led by Sakamoto, is able to return to the past and 
redirect history back on its proper path. The final scene of the film takes place in 2009 
– this time in the “correct” timeline. However, the film does not return to the War 
Memorial of Korea, the exhibition space represented at the beginning. Instead, the 
film ends with another museum – the Independence Hall of Korea in Cheonan, which 
focuses on Korea’s independence movements before and during the Japanese colonial 
era. 
 A tour guide leads a group of students through the exhibits and stops at one 
panel with archival photographs of independence movement participants: “These 
people are the ones who gave their lives to reclaim our country. Without them you 
wouldn’t be here.” This familiar rhetoric of debt and sacrifice, as discussed in a 
previous chapter, is also found at the War Memorial of Korea, in which the similar 
phrase used in U.S. war memorial culture is repeated throughout the exhibition: 
“Freedom is not free.” However, the sacrifice made on behalf of future generations in 
the context of the Independence Hall of Korea was done by unified/pre-division 
Koreans rather than soldiers from the U.S. or the UN, presenting a slightly different 
genealogy of gratitude than at the War Memorial of Korea. In this way, the 
Independence Hall of Korea, mediated by the docent, can represent a greater claim to 
a reunified Korean lineage than the War Memorial of Korea that presents a more 
explicit South Korean claim to patriotic genealogy. 
 While recognizing that this film focuses on the independence movements and 
on a continuation of Japanese colonialism, it is still significant that the film is 
bookended with two iconic museums – the War Memorial of Korea at the beginning 
of the film as a representative of Japanese colonial power and its exhibitionary gaze, 
and the Independence Hall of Korea at the ending of the film as a representative of the 
distinctly Korean gaze that celebrates its fight for sovereignty. However, why did the 
film not begin and end with the Independence Hall of Korea? Conversely, why did the 
film not begin and end with the War Memorial of Korea? 
 Perhaps these questions speak more to the issue of temporality and 
representation of Korean War in museum and memorial context. What would happen 
to museums that focus on the Korean War, and that are attendant to Cold War 
discourses of anticommunism, outside of the frameworks of Korean War and Cold 
War? While museum texts and spaces are subject to revision as any other cultural 
text, will there still be a need for an institution like the War Memorial of Korea, a 
museum complex that focuses on the history and legacies of war as told from a South 
Korean perspective, in the context of a unified Korea? 
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 Public space and discourse serve certain ideological needs that would 
change along with new interpretations of history. In this sense, it is telling that the 
film does not end with the War Memorial of Korea in the “corrected” timeline in 
which unified Korea in 2009 is a reality rather than a possibility, perhaps suggesting 
that the War Memorial of Korea is obsolete or outdated in this temporality, as it is a 
space predominately focused on Cold War ideology motivated by South Korea’s 
relations with the U.S., which is no longer necessary in a country reunified and that is 
the “new icon in Asia.” The Independence Hall of Korea, with its focus on 
independence movements and an entire exhibition hall devoted to pre-history and 
Korean sovereignty is a museum complex that could potentially exist in a unified 
Korea, perhaps even appealing to North Korean historiography as well and bringing 
together the Koreas in a truly unified cause. The wish fulfillment of a unified Korea 
leading Asia in the film speaks to the fantasy of reunification and reconciliation that 
seemed to be on the cusp of reality in 2002 and could potentially have happened by 
2009, but the reality is that a decade later, the reunification question and the end of the 
Korean War is still up in the air and division culture still remains. 
 
Imaginary Future Memorials: Reunification Memorials at the War Memorial of 
Korea and the Independence Hall of Korea 
 
 While both the War Memorial of Korea and the Independence Hall of Korea 
are represented in the film 2009: Lost Memories as parallel exhibitionary spaces 
serving different purposes in parallel timelines, they exist together in the present, and 
both museums include reunification memorials in their exterior exhibition spaces. 
How do these memorials compare with one another and what iconography do they use 
to memorialize the promise of a future event yet to come? Furthermore, what does it 
mean to memorialize an anticipated future event, which also seems to be deferred or 
broached depending on changing political tides and presidential administrations? 
 At the War Memorial of Korea, there are several different reunification 
memorials scattered throughout the outdoor exhibition space. The most recognizable 
of these is the Statue of Brothers, which I discussed in the introduction. The memorial 
portrays two brothers – the older brother representing South Korea and the younger 
brother representing North Korea – in an embrace on top of a grave-shaped burial 
mound with a crack running down the middle. The crack also doubles as an entrance 
and visitors can enter inside the doom to see murals of various Korean War scenes 
and plaques on the floor for each of the UN member nations who participated in the 
war. Equating national division onto familial division, particularly the divide between 
brothers, is commonly used in cultural texts such as film and literature, and also 
makes an appearance in memorial iconography as well, particularly in figurative 
sculptural works. As critiqued in previous chapters the brothers’ embrace can be read 
as a paternalistic enfolding of North Korea into South Korea rather than of a 
reunification on equal terms. The figurative embrace of the brothers also speaks to the 
symbolic embrace of the War Memorial’s architectural structure itself with the wings 
of the structure functioning to embrace visitors into the museum space, bridging the 
gap between the public plaza representing everyday life and the reverential space of 
the memorial and museum complex.181 																																																								181	Kim	Ch’angsu,	“T’echŏnjaengginyŏmgwan	hyŏnsangsŏlgye	mit	tangsŏnane	taehan	pip’yŏng,”	Kŏnch’uk(Taehan’gŏnch’uk’ak’oeji)	34.2	(1990-03):	45-46.	
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 However, there are several other reunification memorials throughout the 
memorial complex with different iconography that focus on abstract themes like 
temporality and peace. These include the “Korea Peace Bell” and the “Clock Tower 
of Peace” and the “Clock of Hope for Peaceful Reunification.” The “Korea Peace 
Bell” was dedicated on July 27, 2014, and had the backing of the National Cultural 
Festival Committee for Peaceful Unification of Korea. The statue consists of a bronze 
bell hanging from the top of two intersecting bronze “U”- and “N”-shaped abstract 
structures, resembling the middle part of a chain-link. The plaque that the bell sits on 
is embossed with flags of UN member nations that were involved in the Korean War 
with the UN flag in the center of the plaque. The structure is by British designer 
Arnold Schwartzman, and another version of the memorial was dedicated in 2015 at 
the JSA in Paju. The sponsoring organization, the Korea Informational Association 
has plans to build more bell structures along the DMZ as well as in the capitals of the 
UN participating nations.182 As is common for memorial complexes, oftentimes 
memorial sculptures, museum exhibition texts, and displays contradict one another or 
present competing interpretations. Reunification is no exception and here, the “Korea 
Peace Bell” stands out in its design as not just a non-Korean bell, but also for its 
bright garish color alongside the more subdued colors of the other memorial 
sculptures in the park. The UN-shaped sculpture and Western bell presents almost the 
opposite iconography of the Statue of Brothers, with the Statue of Brothers focusing 
on inter-Korean reconciliation (even if overtly paternalistic in regards to North Korea) 
and the brothers’ position on top of a Silla-style burial mound. Rather, this memorial 
is a UN memorial and collapses the discourse of reunification together with UN and 
U.S. intervention during the Korean War. In this memorial, reunification is not a 
Korean affair, but also a global undertaking as well (especially with the plan to 
replicate more memorial statues around the world), and a reminder of the sacrifice of 
other countries involved in the Korean War rather than of reunification on Korean 
terms. What does it mean for a reunification memorial, made from materials collected 
in the DMZ area, to literally spell out the word “UN”? In earlier chapters, I 
demonstrated how the memorial complex allows for competing memories and 
temporalities to exist in the same spatial location, yet the same can be said of the 
future anticipated even of reunification as well, where competing memorials already 
have been established despite the speculative nature of what reunification might 
actually look like and on whose terms it would be carried out. 
 The remaining reunification memorials at the War Memorial of Korea are the 
Clock Tower of Peace, and an accompanying Clock of Hope for Peaceful 
Reunification located a little further away from the tower. The tower memorial stands 
just beyond the Statue of Brothers on the same path, closer to the entrance to the left 
wing of the War Memorial. While the Statue of Brothers presents a fraternal and 
masculine imagery of the Korean War and division, as well as the hope for future 
reunification, the Clock Tower of Peace presents a more feminine image of war and 
peace through the portrayal of two young girls on top of a pile of military machinery 
including tanks, ships, and aircraft. One girl is kneeling and holds onto a clock 
stopped at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25th, 1950 at what 
appears to be 4am. The other girl is standing with her arm supporting the kneeling girl 																																																								182	http://www.korinf.com/contents/board/webzine/webzineView.asp?page_str_menu=23&action_flag=&search_word=&page_no=0&bbs_seq=1054&passwd=.		
	 82	
and carries another clock on her shoulders marking the current time and date. The 
sculpture was designed by Korean artist Ahn Pil-Yun, Professor at Kyung-Gi 
University and was dedicated on January 1st, 2002, and symbolizes the hope for 
Korean reunification in the future. An epigraph at the sculpture reads: 
 
Erecting the Clock Tower 
 
Symbolizing War and Peace 
a Twin Clock Tower 
Points to a new time of New Millennium 
on a pile of rusty arms 
 
Stopped clock wrecked by the Korean War 
Here a Clock Tower is erected 
for the day of reunification 
again beating like the hearts of two girls 
 
The usage of clocks to represent both war and peace together has been commonly 
used in memorial iconography, particularly at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial in 
Japan. Furthermore, the imagery of young girls and military hardware is also common 
particularly to emphasize the juxtaposition between innocence/peace and war. 
Destroyed arms and the triumph of innocence, youth, and femininity are also common 
iconographies used in peace memorials throughout the world. The stopping of the 
clock at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War points to the idea of Korean War 
temporality as a stalled temporality, and the gap between the present date/time since 
the beginning of the Korean War points to the unresolved nature of the war. 
Furthermore, the addition of a separate clock apart from the two already represented 
at the Clock Tower of Peace in a different part of the park, but part of the same path, 
points to the anticipation of future temporalities as well. According to the memorial 
plaque, the separated clock will eventually be placed on the tower as well: “Someday 
when Unification is realized, this Clock will be put on the Clock Tower and will 
indicate the Time of Unification.” These memorials are themselves separated and will 
be reunited once the countries are unified as well. The three reunification memorials 
at the War Memorial of Korea – the Statue of Brothers, the Clock Tower of Peace, 
and the Korea Peace Bell all point to different memorial strategies in memorializing 
war and peace, and anticipated future reunification, making up a small part of the 
massive war memorial complex. 
 How do these reunification memorials differ from those at the Independence 
Hall of Korea, which was presented as perhaps the more appropriate memorial space 
for unified Korea in the film 2009: Lost Memories? The Independence Hall of Korea 
opened on August 15th, 1987, seven years before the War Memorial of Korea, and 
features an incredibly large memorial park space with seven exhibition halls and 
numerous outdoor exhibitions. While most of the exhibition space is dedicated to the 
independence movements during the Japanese colonial era (1910-1945), the museum 
as a whole also conveys a sense of Korean ethno-nationalist pride as well, which can 
be found in its incorporation of elements from a national history museum, particularly 
in the first exhibition hall. 
 However, what is the connection between this museum and the Korean War? 
Much like 2009: Lost Memories, this memorial hall also marginalizes the Korean War 
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in its historical narratives, instead focusing on Korean resistance narratives and its 
righteous armies and the future hope of reunification. To this extent, the museum and 
memorial complex is a commentary on Korean identity and nationalism. Furthermore, 
the first exhibition hall resembles a natural history museum in that it tells the story of 
the origins of the Korean people, utilizing the phrase “5,000 years of Korean history.” 
A plaque that is titled “The Origin of the Korean People” reads: “Over a period of 
5,000 years, Korea has cultivated its remarkable cultures as one of the major nations 
of Northeast Asia. Since the prehistoric era, Koreans have established their unique 
culture on the Korean Peninsula, and have overcome many external invasions and 
national crises through a combination of unity and wisdom.” This narrative mirrors 
the War Memorial of Korea’s narrative of wars as a history of foreign invasions, 
although in that museum North Korea, with the backing of the PRC and USSR, is also 
presented as an invader. Nevertheless, at the Independence Hall of Korea, Korean 
ethnic identity is identified as existing for a long time and is self-evident, and a plaque 
that is titled “The Beginning of the Korean People” justifies the idea of an unbroken 
lineage of Korean ethnic heritage, until Japanese colonialism, beginning with the 
Prehistoric Period that “begun around 700,000 years ago.” The main six museum 
exhibition halls (the 7th is reserved for special exhibitions) focus on the cruelties of 
Japanese colonization, including torture of independence activists (along with graphic 
dioramas and sound effects similar to Seodaemun Prison History Hall in Seoul) and 
the “comfort women” system, alongside celebrations of Korean martyrs who 
sacrificed themselves for these independence movements. The museum draws to the 
distant past to justify the self-evident ethnic nationalism183 of Koreanness and the 
sovereignty that was lost during the Japanese colonial era, as well as the fight to 
regain sovereignty; however, is it possible for this lineage to be represented in the 
context of the Cold War and Korean War, and the still-divided peninsula today? 
 The Korean War does make an appearance in this museum, although at the 
end of the last exhibition hall and in only one panel. Yet, the Korean War itself 
destabilizes the narrative of an unbroken lineage of Korean ethno-national identity 
against foreign ruling powers because it is not just a Cold War conflict, but also a 
civil war premised on the politics of legitimacy over the direction of what Korean 
independence and sovereignty and the decolonizing process should look like. South 
Korea’s development into a subimperial power in its own right,184 as well as reliance 
on U.S. and the presence of military bases draws question as to whether the goals of 
the independence movement were truly met: South Korea may be “free,” but is it 
“independent” or “sovereign”? This tension can be felt in the museum as well, as the 
Korean War section is very small and the panel description of the war is intentionally 
vague: “The Korean War was provoked by North Korea in its ambition to occupy and 
communize South Korea with the full support of the Soviet Union and communist 
China under the pretext of ideological war between democracy and communism on 
the heels of World War II.” The focus on the Korean War as “ideological war” is 
strategic because it erases the civil war aspect of the Korean War and by pointing out 
North Korea’s connections to the Soviet Union and China, there is also an implicit 
																																																								183	For	more	on	Korean	ethnic	nationalism	see	Gi-Wook	Shin,	Ethnic	Nationalism	in	
Korea:	Genealogy,	Politics,	and	Legacy	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	2006).	184	Jin-kyung	Lee,	Service	Economies:	Militarism,	Sex	Work,	and	Migrant	Labor	in	South	
Korea	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2010).	
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questioning of North Korea’s own claim as legitimate inheritors of the spirits of the 
independence movement activists. 
 Division, in the context of this museum, is particularly difficult to represent, 
yet there still is a reunification memorial on the grounds of the Independence Hall of 
Korea complex. Located in a corner of the grounds, there is a space with a memorial 
dedicated not specifically to unification, but to its wish; this area is referred to as the 
“Garden of Yearning for Unification” (t’ongiryŏmwŏnŭi tongsan). The memorial 
structure is particularly striking as it incorporates an amphitheater-shaped structure 
with a bell at the underground base, as well as a towering structure that rises up into 
the air in a shape that almost resembles claws. The structure is made almost entirely 
of off-white granite, and the “claws,” while appearing quite thick from the side, are 
quite thin when looked at directly from the ground. The memorial incorporates quite a 
bit of symbolism with its abstract construction and multi-level structure, and 
represents a convergence of heaven, earth, and humanity (ch’ŏn, chi, in) culminating 
in a wish for reunification by Korean people. The description of the memorial reads: 
 
The Garden of Yearning for Unification was dedicated on Liberation Day 
(August 15) in 1995 as a monument to the wish of all Koreans for the 
unification of their Motherland. At the center of the Garden is an extraordinary 
bell which is run to express the Korean people’s longing for unification. The 
bell is designed to simultaneously emanate sound underground, representing the 
land, and sound above the ground, or the heaven. The bell is styled after the 
typical Buddhist temple bell, 3 m in height and 8.6 ton in weight, but has an 
unusual feature in that it has two strikers so that it can be rung from the north 
and south at the same time. 
  The Tower of Wishes for Unification stands on six 17.1-meter-high 
pillars on both sides, symbolic of the heaven, earth, and humankind, thrusting 
into the sky in the image of a rainbow and meeting at the center. The structure 
above ground forms three semi-circles, signifying respectively the spaces of 
Peace, Freedom and Equality, which are the directions of the Korean people’s 
aspirations. The 160-meter long stairway leading to the Tower symbolizes the 
path the Korean nation is destined to walk as divided it is as of yet. The clay 
wall in the square is open to anyone who wishes to engrave his or her words of 
wishes for national unification. 
 
What is significant about this memorial structure is that it avoids mention of “North 
Korea” and “South Korea” and retains an abstract quality that leaves room for 
interpretation unlike the more figurative reunification memorials at the War Memorial 
of Korea. In fact, the unification that is referred to in the text at the plaque is not just 
“t’ongil” (unification) but “minjokt’ongil” (ethnic unification), translated as 
“unification of their Motherland.” 
 Throughout the dissertation, I have discussed wish fulfillment, particularly in 
South Korean cinema, in which unification can be presented in an imaginary or 
fantasy environment, outside of reality. Here, this memorial is also an abstract 
representation of the wishes of unification, which have yet to be fulfilled. Looking up 
at the memorial from the lower level, next to the bell, the symbolic intent of this 
memorial is particularly striking. The points of the pillars that rise up into the sky “in 
the image of a rainbow” actually do not meet at the center as the plaque indicates. 
Rather, they almost meet, symbolizing not reunification itself but the wish for 
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reconciliation, as well as a failed promise of reunification of a sovereign Korean 
nation after liberation from Japanese colonization in 1945. Whether the non-
converging points can be read with the optimism of a “not yet” or the pessimism of 
the failure of reunification to happen is up to the spectator. With the historic summit 
meeting on April 27th, 2018 between South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North 
Korean Leader Kim Jong-un and the recent announcement of concrete steps to 
officially end the Korean War, reunification and reconciliation as endless deferral can 
be part of the past. Yet, the ambiguity of the memorial’s noncovering points speaks to 
the fragility of the process of reconciliation, and especially, reunification. After all, 
there is a third reading beyond wishing for reunification or recognizing the 
impossibility of reconciliation. Perhaps the points in the memorial were never meant 
to match up after all; perhaps they were meant to bypass one another. 
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